Russia’s war in Ukraine has forced the European Union to address pending strategic challenges. The most immediate task is to end Europe’s dependence on Russian energy imports, a process that is already underway after the adoption of a gradual oil embargo that will reach 90% by the end of the year.
In general terms, Europe must also develop an effective security and defense policy, as well as the necessary capacities for its implementation. Although this ambition in itself is not new, there is a new drive to achieve it. The Russian war has made it clear that we need a change of course to jointly address defense investments. That was the main conclusion of this week’s European Council debate on defense.
There are no two identical political problems. Sometimes a challenge may seem so new and unprecedented that it cannot be tackled without a proper assessment of the new political context. Sometimes, the solutions to it are known, but the resources to carry them out are lacking. The debate on European security and defense falls into a third category: the diagnosis and prescriptions are clear, but there has been a lack of political will.
We have known for years – even decades – that European governments have spent too little on defense, and too piecemeal. The result is that we lack the necessary military capabilities to ensure our own security or serve as a capable partner for NATO. We have to spend more, and we have to get more out of that joint spending.
Over the years, many European politicians, institutions, defense ministries, think tanks and other actors have published reports and proposals calling for more and better defense spending. These exhortations have reflected a clear and firm consensus among experts in the field. Furthermore, in 2004, the EU created the European Defense Agency to support member states with joint research, development and acquisition projects.
But many countries cut their defense spending after the 2008 financial crisis, reducing the parts of their budgets devoted to collaborative security investments. Since then, governments have too often advocated joint spending while continuing to prioritize domestic procurement (often for political reasons, such as supporting domestic industries and employment).
The net result has been dramatic. Between 2009 and 2018, cuts by member states amounted to insufficient aggregate defense spending of some 160 billion euros ($171 billion). Worse still, many other actors in the world have advanced faster. Over the last 20 years, the EU’s combined defense spending has only increased by 20%, compared to 66% for the US, almost 300% for Russia and 600% for China. And what is more alarming, Europe reached a new low in 2021, when only 8% of spending on equipment went to collaborative investments, far from the 35% that the EU Member States themselves have set as a target. .
This underspending and lack of collaboration are costing EU countries (and therefore taxpayers) tens of billions of euros per year, due to redundant spending and inefficiencies. This need not be so. It is in our power to change course, and we already know the way. With the Strategic Compass, the EU institutions and the 27 Member States have drawn up a roadmap. We have tools and frameworks – starting with Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defense Fund – to help Member States promote research, development and investment in a more coordinated way.
But there are still other pieces to put in place. We must offer financial incentives for joint procurement and move towards more strategic programming. We also need to strengthen the EU’s defense industrial and technological base by supporting R&D and harnessing the potential of new disruptive technologies. As I told European leaders this week when they endorsed this approach, both the European Commission and the European Defense Agency can help in this task.
Yes, it is a cliché in European politics to say that we just lack the political will to use the tools we have at our disposal. But the clichés are usually partly right. We Europeans tend to make difficult decisions only when we have tried everything else and are faced with an acute crisis.
Those conditions have clearly been met. We are seeing Russia wage a brutal war of aggression against Ukraine, which has exposed Europe’s own vulnerabilities, revealing long-standing deficits and new needs (such as replenishing our depleted reserves). Furthermore, this crisis adds to many other threats, both in our own neighborhood and beyond. European interests are threatened in all strategic areas, including cyber, maritime and space.
We have to develop the means to protect ourselves in a dangerous world. This will require not just more defense spending, but better defense spending. To ensure our collective security, we must invest more together.
(Project Syndicate, 2022)
