Interviews with more than 130 people were part of the Army’s investigation into the attack on the August 26, Abbey Gate at Kabul’s airport that resulted in the deaths of 13 U.S. soldiers and 170 civilians. These interviews covered the weeks leading up to the noncombatant evacuation, as well as its final days.
One military official said that, “In addition to controlling crowds, the Marines at Abbey Gate were made to act as God by identifying who would enter the airfield.”
An investigation revealed that the attack was not as complex as originally thought. Officials investigated more than the Abbey Gate attack and the noncombatant evacuation in august.
Freedom of Information Act requests allowed for the release of investigation documents, which include interviews. The Washington Post reported the first time about these documents.
Interviews revealed frustration at the lack of coordination between the Department of State (the administration) and the Department of State [Noncombatant Evacuation] when and where to call for an evacuation. They also discussed what documents were needed to process the evacuees and how to manage the various entry points.
Marine Corps Brigadier General John Sullivan was the Commanding General of the Joint Task Force Crisis Response. He told investigators that it was “like pulling teeth” trying get the embassy to talk about plans for a NEO. This was from early August.
“Frankly, not much leadership came out of the [Department of State] staff at all, especially the senior ones,” stated another official involved in the evacuation of U.S. Embassy staff in Kabul to Hamid Karzai International Airport. (HKIA). According to the official, his unit swept through the Embassy compound, evacuating State Department employees “intoxicated” and “hiding in rooms.”
In interviews, officials revealed to investigators that the young soldiers who manned the gates had to spend significant effort finding specific evacuees for various U.S. government officials, military officers and special interest groups.
Large crowds gathered at the gate, in large part due to messages from the State Department indicating where to go. This led to large numbers at each gate and made it difficult for Marines to “prioritize accuracy over speed” when deciding who was allowed in.
One official stated that Abbey Gate was just a large parking area with people. There were also people waiting inside the checkpoint for days under cover. “There wasn’t a system of systematic checking like at North Gate or West Gate. That is my view of the failure. Although I do not want to deny that the attack was inevitable it was the right place to be.
This same official was also present at the Abbey Gate on the day of the attack. He said that the chaos was alarming and that he didn’t know what was happening. It was difficult to distinguish friend from foe.
Interviews revealed that there was a practice evacuation from HKIA. However, this was not the case when troops arrived in Kabul.
An official stated that they believed the evacuation would follow the same orderly procedure as when they were practicing it. It just didn’t work out that way.
According to the investigation, almost every hour the identification documents required by the State Department to allow evacuees through gates and onto the airport changed. One official stated that the Department of State did not send one message to Afghans during the NEO.
Two of the two recommendations from the investigation concern evacuation planning. The first is to create an interagency NEO doctrine, as Afghanistan demonstrated that there wasn’t a common terminology among the Department of Defense (and the Department of State). Another is to make sure that evacuations are done according to the projected evacuee groups.
Interviews revealed previously unknown incidents involving U.S. military personnel that were not reported outside of HKIA. A flashbang bomb grenade caused the blindness of an Afghan national. Two Taliban soldiers were shot and killed by U.S. Marines after they “pointed guns” at them. Additionally, a Marine accidentally damaged parts of his hand using a flashbang explosive.
Documents released reveal that Abbey Gate’s suicide bomber used 15-20 pounds of explosives, which were either commercial or military-grade. He used a directional charge with bearings to cause maximum shrapnel damage. According to one official, the ball bearings were the “size of marble.” This led to some interviewees believing that there were also victims who received gunshot wounds.
The scene following the explosion was described by troops involved in transporting and treating the injured.
One military official, who coordinated medical treatment for the Abbey Gate victims, said that “some of the bodies were quite mangled”.
“I can recall seeing a wounded marine. “I remember seeing a dead baby lying on the ground,” said another official who assisted in bringing the injured to safety.
