the real problem of the extreme right in Spain is not political, but psychiatric”. This phrase was uttered by a leader of the ultra-right at the dawn of democracy. Four decades later, the loud statements that have been heard in recent weeks evoke the echoes of that diagnosis. Now, do the majority of Spaniards share the apocalyptic perception of the right about the territorial situation? And more importantly: which territorial model for Spain do the citizens defend?
Certainly, the concern caused by Catalan independence has multiplied fourfold since July. But it has gone from being cited as one of the three main problems in Spain by 0.4% of those consulted by the CIS, in July, to 1.6%, in October. In other words, still light years away from the 25% that mentioned it in November 2017.
The paradox of the current indicators is that while the conservative bloc describes a frightening picture of Spain’s territorial cohesion and is heading towards immobility, in Spanish society the desire for more decentralization is growing and, at the same time, it is losing steam feeling of Spanishness. Especially among young people. This sentiment – ??expressed through an exclusively Spanish identity – was felt by more than 22% of those consulted in 1996; it fell to 16% seven years ago and stands at just over 9% today.
At the same time, mixed affiliation (both Spanish and from its autonomous community) is consolidating as a majority and the group formed by those who feel more identified with the gentilici of their autonomy has grown by five points since 2016 with Spanish identity (they now account for more than 15%). And at the same time, the percentage of those who feel very or quite proud of being Spanish has stagnated (six points less than twenty years ago), while the percentage of those who feel little or not at all proud is growing (almost 11 points) .
Finally, territorial preferences – a thermometer of the Spanish autonomist sensibility – have registered, in the last decade, a drop of more than ten points among those who favor a State without autonomies. And although, as a result of polarization, a third of citizens (but six points less than ten years ago) now choose to suppress or cut the autonomy of the territories, another third (12 points more than a year ago decade) believes that the autonomies must have more powers or even the possibility of becoming independent states. Finally, almost 32% prefer to maintain the current territorial status quo.
However, the most relevant thing about the CIS survey on the identities of Spaniards is the future that the new generations draw. The contrast between the identity and territorial preferences of young people aged 18 to 24 and those who express the so-called silent generation (those over 75) is very visible. For example, while only 5% of young people feel exclusively Spanish, this percentage is above 10% (and up to 15%) among those over 55.
As for pride in being Spanish, only a third of young people feel very proud to be Spanish, which contrasts with more than half of those over 60. And at the same time, less than 9% of those over 75 (and around 15% of those over 55) declare little or no pride in being Spanish, while the figure rises to 24 % among Generation Z (under 26).
Finally, in the chapter on territorial preferences, young people draw a much more relaxed Spain: 41% (ten points more than the average) opt for the current autonomous model; 21% (almost three points above the average) would grant more self-government to the communities, and more than 18% (five points above the average) admit that the autonomous communities can become independent states. It seems, then, that a good part of the current territorial inflammation seems artificial.
