The nuclear issue that is settled in these elections is identity, personal (gender, ideological, religious, urban or rural…) and national (ultra-Spanish, independentistas, autonomistas…). Pedro Sánchez’s mandate has been characterized by agreements with peripheral forces such as the PNV, ERC and Bildu. Some of those alliances now weigh down their replay options. Opposite, Alberto Núñez Feijóo can only agree with Vox, unlike in the past, when the PP relied on the PNV or CiU. That Sánchez or Feijóo win implies one or the other territorial model. Thus, it is worth asking what will happen to the Catalan conflict after 23-J.
In the best of scenarios for Sánchez, he would have to reissue his alliances to continue at Moncloa. ERC has already warned that “the price” will rise, although it also ensures that, neither actively nor passively, it will facilitate a right-wing government. It could happen that, in addition, the president requires the votes of Junts. Carles Puigdemont poses unaffordable conditions for Sánchez for now: amnesty for those who have legal cases for the process and a referendum on independence. Now, within Junts there is a deep fracture about what should be done in that situation.
Junts sources point out that they would be willing to vote for Sánchez if they obtain amnesty in exchange (including Puigdemont or not). After the latest setback of European justice, achieving something like this would be a political victory that the former president could claim against ERC. Precisely, the Republicans have begun in this campaign to “come out of the closet” and claim that, thanks to their efforts before the PSOE, pardons and the elimination of the crime of sedition were possible, something that until now they had not done to avoid its spread. accused them of negotiating to get Oriol Junqueras out of jail.
The ERC leadership met last weekend in Switzerland with Marta Rovira to analyze post-electoral scenarios. From a negotiation with Sánchez to give him support, going through a PP-Vox government that would recover sedition and that would affect leaders pending trial, or even a lone executive from Feijóo with whom to attempt a dialogue.
Sánchez’s policy on Catalonia is broadly known, but Feijóo’s is unknown. His program foresees recovering sedition and toughening the granting of pardons. Until now he has been conciliatory on issues such as language, although he defends the application of 25% of Spanish in the classroom. Feióo mentions his Galician origins to show understanding of the Catalan singularity. He believes that the PP can occupy the moderate space left by the CiU in its transition to Junts with economic measures such as lower taxes or investments.
However, twice he has had to amend his statements about Catalonia. On his first visit to Barcelona as leader of the PP, he defended “Catalan nationality” against “centrist mentalities”. It was an adaptation of the “integrative Galicianism” of the Castelao Foundation that he defended in his land and that helped him to confront the Galician independence movement. But the wink caused hives in his game and the nuances arrived. This week Feijóo, in an interview with El Periódico, admitted that the dialogue table between the central and Catalan governments could be maintained if he governs. Hours later, the PP denied it.
The outlook for both sides is not hopeful for understanding.
