Michel Goya, retired colonel and doctor in History, has spent more than twenty years analyzing conflicts for the French army and as the author of books, the last two on Ukraine and Gaza. Son of a Basque professional cyclist who deserted and took refuge in France, Luís Goya, who died after a fall shortly after he was born, in 1962, Colonel Goya did missions in Africa, the Balkans and the Pacific. He is a commentator on the LCI network, specializing in international politics.
As a military historian, what surprises you most about the Ukrainian war?
The war itself because it represents an anomaly. I was one of those who saw it as unlikely, since it did not correspond at all to the way of proceeding by the Russians and Soviets, who were generally quite cautious. Sometimes very brutal, but always prudent. They only got involved if they knew they were so strong that there would be no opposition. In my analysis I forgot the hypothesis that errors are made, even from rationality, if it is totally biased. There are other historical examples.
Which is it?
When Hitler declared war on the US, for example. There was nothing pushing him to do it. They had not attacked him. The same when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union. The Germans made many strategic mistakes.
The one in Ukraine is an industrial war, you yourself always talk about a war of military stocks. Can you explain it?
Indeed, it is an industrial war. The military revolution took place between 1850 and 1950. It was the emergence of large-scale industrial warfare. After World War II, things have not changed much. If they put Marshal Chuikov (Battle of Stalingrad) in charge of the Russian army in Ukraine, he would immediately understand what is happening.
There were no drones then.
True, but there were many more light aircraft. This war is very consuming and destructive [of weapons], like the Second World War. The difference is that back then a new plane could be manufactured in two years, or a tank in one year.
Does it refer to the period between conception and manufacturing?
Yes, two years could pass from the time it was designed to the time it left the factory. Now it is totally impossible. It may take 5 or 10 years. So you fight with the old.
Is technological sophistication to blame?
Yes, sophistication greatly lengthens deadlines and it is much more difficult to produce. In World War II, Americans manufactured hundreds of airplanes every day.
It depends on the old material.
Exact. There is not much technical innovation during the war. You were talking about drones, but they are relatively small objects that can be made by hand and adapted to old material. What impresses me is that this war is being fought with teams that I knew during the Cold War, in the eighties. The tanks are the same, perhaps somewhat improved. As it is a very destructive war and production is weak, we are forced to resort to stocks. If this war has lasted so long it is because the Russians and Ukrainians had stocks. If it hadn’t been finished a long time ago.
And from now?
Industrial wars can be very short, lasting several weeks, if one of the opponents is much stronger and prevails. If there is balance and they begin to entrench themselves, to settle in, the war of movement becomes a war of positions. So we no longer count in weeks but in years. It happened in Korea or in the war between Iran and Iraq. Also in the First World War. It is a type of war that lasts for years and, as is the case in Ukraine, it is difficult for the military industry to feed. Hence the importance of having stocks.
In this scenario, is the most likely hypothesis a frozen conflict, as in Korea or Cyprus, with Russia retaining the conquered territories?
It is a quite probable hypothesis. We see on the ground that it is very difficult to make the front line move. It has barely moved since mid-November 2022. Since early 2024, the Russians, who are on the offensive, have conquered the equivalent of two-thirds of the principality of Andorra. Just that in four months of effort. It’s tiny.
How do you see Biden’s strategy, so gradual? Would things really change drastically with Trump if he returns to power?
American policy is quite cautious. It is clear that they want to dose their military effort so that Ukraine resists. In military terms it is called “pinning” the adversary, but no more, for fear of escalation. You don’t want to go too far against Russia because you are afraid of the consequences, of a nuclear escalation, which no one wants, or consequences for the rest of the world. That is why they have limited the aid and do not send the F-16s. As for Trump, even without him military aid was blocked for six months. The US is a very random ally. Trump’s peculiarity is uncertainty. The problem for the US is that they must monitor other fronts. The European is not necessarily their priority. They have Korea, Taiwan and China, which worries them a lot. Their priority is Asia, the Pacific.
Will Congress’ unlocking of this latest colossal aid alter the course of the war?
It will change some things and will provide a breath of fresh air to the Ukrainian army, which urgently lacks artillery ammunition, but it will not fundamentally alter the situation. It may allow Ukraine to resist better, but it will not truly change the balance of forces.
Even if Trump wins, can you imagine the United States dropping Europe, where they have many interests?
Yes, yes, of course, but doubts have already arisen about the reliability of American aid if something important were to happen in Europe.
Maybe they think that Russia will not dare to go further, threatening the Baltic republics or Poland?
Since 2014, it is thought. The real change for us, the military, occurred in 2014, with the annexation of Crimea and the intervention in the Donbass. We realized that Russia had recovered a military power that it had lost and that was really threatening. They struck in Georgia, in Crimea. We thought they could continue doing it. In reality, they were not thinking so much about Ukraine, which seemed neutralized, but rather about the area of ??the Baltic countries, which were more vulnerable, which could be invaded very quickly. It is because of them that (NATO) battalions were deployed in those countries and in Poland. But it was a time when jihadism was the main problem, after the attacks in France. We were thinking about the Russian threat but we were focused on other things.
Who destroyed Nord Stream (the Baltic gas pipeline)?
Ha ha ha, if I only knew. Ha ha ha.
It is delicate to answer this question.
It is impossible. As in an Agatha Christie novel, there is a crime and many possible suspects, and everyone has a motive, a reason.
Why would Russia be interested in destroying the gas pipeline?
Because the relationship with Russia is still within the framework of a commercial relationship and the rule of law. If Gasprom, Russia, had interrupted all gas supplies, it would have had to pay billions of dollars in compensation. That was the reason why Nord Stream was already cut off under the pretext of a breakdown, to say that they were not the ones cutting it. Yes, Russia could have a purely economic interest in doing that, yes. But also Ukraine. If you look closely, there are indications for everyone’s guilt. There can be all versions. I don’t know if we will know one day. I think if.
Did Macron make a mistake by not excluding the sending of ground troops to Ukraine, since the response of the allies was negative? Was it something improvised?
It seems not. I think it was well calculated. This hypothesis had been evoked among several countries and several general staffs. I think that Macron wanted, indeed, to move things a little and also impose himself as the leader of support for Ukraine at a time when the United States was failing and seemed unreliable for the future. And behind the support for Ukraine, also as a leader in Europe, the defense of Europe, especially against Eastern Europe. Because it is true that Germany said no, emphatically, but the eastern countries, the Baltic countries, Poland, accepted the idea.
Do you think that in the end, one way or another, there will be NATO troops? Although in reality it is already known that there are personnel…
Ah, yes, yes, the first thing would be to recognize that there are already people, special forces, intelligence. Macron acknowledged it in a low voice. But another step would be to send specialists, technicians, advisors. Instead of training Ukrainian general staffs in Poland or France, train them directly in Ukraine. The next step would be to send combat units. That would be another thing that would go too far. But the important thing is the principle of having said that we are already in the phase of dosing our help, that that is over, that there are no limits, although we will be careful. It is above all a change of attitude, of speech. When you look at the history of military aid to a country at war against its adversary, what happens with Ukraine has been the most prudent, moderate and progressive. When the Soviet Union attacked Finland in 1939, everyone wanted to help it even though it was at war with Germany. France decided to send 200 planes to Finland and thought about sending troops. When the Soviets were helping North Vietnam against the United States, they went all out. 10,000 Soviets passed through North Vietnam. So now we are facing one of the most timid military aid in history
Maybe Macron could say it because he is in charge of the only country in the European Union with the atomic weapon?
That always adds weight to the word, always.
The four submarines launching strategic nuclear missiles
It’s like in chess. The atomic weapon is like the queen, the most powerful piece. Even if he doesn’t move, he influences the entire game. That is one element, but there is another: in the French military structure, the president, in fact, does what he wants, send troops, whatever he wants. It is a French peculiarity. In most other countries, especially Germany, it is much more complicated. It involves voting in Parliament. Macron can afford to say that. It is an advantage for France, in addition to having experienced armed forces that know how to carry out foreign operations, that know how to project themselves easily, even if they have quite limited means. Those are the three French advantages: atomic weapon, decision-making processes and an experienced army.
