Europe is witnessing its bloodiest cross-border war since 1945, but the truth is that Asia risks something even worse: a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan. Tensions are rising as US forces pivot to a new doctrine known as “distributed lethality,” designed to mitigate Chinese missile strikes. Earlier this month, dozens of Chinese planes entered Taiwan’s “air defense identification zone.” Last week, the Chinese foreign minister condemned what he called the US strategy of “total containment and suppression, a zero-sum game of life and death.”
As the United States rearms in Asia and tries to galvanize its allies, two questions are being asked. Is he willing to wage direct war with another nuclear power to defend Taiwan, something he hasn’t done with Ukraine? And, by competing militarily with China in Asia, will it not provoke the very war that it is trying to avoid?
No one knows how an invasion of Taiwan would start. China could use “grey area” tactics (which are coercive but not exactly warlike) to put the island under blockade and undermine its economy and morale. Or launch anticipated missile strikes against US bases on Guam and Japan, which would clear the way for an amphibious assault. Since Taiwan could only hold out on its own for a few days or weeks, any conflict could quickly escalate into a superpower clash.
Instead of the trenches and human wave attacks seen in Ukraine, a war over Taiwan will involve a new generation of weapons, such as hypersonic missiles and anti-satellite weapons, causing untold destruction and provoking unpredictable retaliation. The economic consequences would be devastating. Taiwan is the world’s leading supplier of advanced semiconductors. The United States, China and Japan, the three largest economies (and among the most interconnected), would impose sanctions that would paralyze world trade. The United States would pressure Europe and other friendly countries to impose an embargo on China.
War is no longer a remote possibility, because an unspoken pact has been cracked. Since the 1970s, the United States has been careful not to encourage Taiwan to formally declare its independence, nor has it explicitly promised to defend the island. Without going so far as to exclude force, China did not fail to state that it would favor a peaceful reunification. However, those positions are changing. According to the CIA, President Xi Jinping has told the People’s Liberation Army to be prepared for an invasion in 2027. President Joe Biden has declared that the United States will defend Taiwan in the event of an attack by China (his advisers claim that the policy has not changed). The military balance no longer favors the United States as clearly as it did in the 1990s. And in Taiwan public opinion has changed; above all, because of the way in which China has ended freedoms in Hong Kong. Only 7% of Taiwanese are now in favor of reunification.
Both sides are reinforcing their positions and trying to show resolve, with destabilizing consequences. Some actions make headlines, like when Nancy Pelosi, then Speaker of the House of Representatives, visited Taipei last year; others are almost invisible, like the mysterious cut in the underwater cables that carry the Internet to some remote Taiwanese islands. Diplomacy is at a standstill. Senior US and Chinese defense officials have not spoken since November. During the recent spy balloon incident, the “hotline” between the two countries did not work because China did not answer the calls. Rhetoric directed at domestic audiences has become more belligerent, both in the US election campaign and in statements by China’s top leaders. What one party sees as a defensive act to protect its red lines is seen by the other as an aggressive attempt to thwart its ambitions. For this reason, both parties feel tempted to continue hardening their respective positions.
It is unclear how far the United States would go to defend Taiwan. The island is not a domino. China has some territorial intentions beyond itself, but does not want to directly invade or rule all of Asia. And it is not clear how many Taiwanese see China as a real threat or how many would be willing to fight it.
The Taiwanese, like the Ukrainians, deserve American help. The island is admirably liberal and democratic, proof that these values ??are not alien to Chinese culture. It would be a tragedy if the Taiwanese people had to submit to a dictatorship. If the United States were to withdraw, the credibility of its security umbrella in Asia would be severely compromised. Some Asian countries would adapt more to China; maybe South Korea and Japan would try to get nuclear weapons. And the Chinese vision of the world according to which the interests of the States are above the individual liberties enshrined in the United Nations after the Second World War would receive a strong boost.
However, the aid that Taiwan receives must be aimed at deterring a Chinese attack without provoking it. The United States must take into account Xi’s calculations. A general security guarantee from the US could encourage Taiwan to declare formal independence, a red line for the Chinese leader. The promise of a much larger US military presence in Taiwan could lead China to invade as soon as possible, in anticipation of its deployment. Still, a failed invasion would cost Xi and the Communist Party dearly. The US needs to graduate his stance: reassuring Xi that his red lines remain intact, but convincing him that aggression carries unacceptable risks. The goal should not be to resolve the Taiwanese issue, but rather to postpone it.
Taiwan has avoided provocations. Its president Tsai Ing-wen has not declared independence. Yet she needs to do more to deter her neighbor, increasing defense spending to help her survive longer without American help and preparing her citizens to resist gray-area tactics, from misinformation to voter fraud. The United States, for its part, must do more to reassure and deter China. Avoid symbolic acts that provoke China without strengthening Taiwan’s ability to defend itself. Continue modernizing its armed forces and mobilizing its allies. And prepare to break a future blockade by building up fuel reserves, planning an airlift, providing backup Internet links, and building allied consensus around sanctions.
The United States and the current Chinese regime will never agree on Taiwan. However, they share a common interest in avoiding a third world war. The first fifteen years of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union were characterized by a terrifying mix of political brinkmanship and near catastrophic mistakes until the Cuban Missile Crisis led to a revival of diplomacy. This is the terrain the world stands on today. Unfortunately, the potential common ground between the United States and China around Taiwan is shrinking. Somehow or another, the two rival systems must find a way to live together less dangerously.
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Translation: Juan Gabriel López Guix
