In December 2023, Georgia was granted the status of a candidate country for the European Union. It was a day that many Georgians believed they would never see after years of knocking on the community door and finding that it did not open.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has transformed the way the European Union views its eastern neighborhood and returned enlargement to its priorities as a geopolitical imperative.

However, Georgia’s entry into the European club depends both on the political will of the European Union to fulfill its commitments and demonstrate that it can be an effective geopolitical player and on the ability of the Georgian government to carry out the reforms necessary to enter. in the club. Reforming the EU’s enlargement policy to make it fit for purpose will be crucial if it is to expand to thirty-five or more member states.

Throughout their history, Georgians have always had a strong sense of their own identity and culture, and have considered their country as an integral part of Europe. The phrase “the Roman Empire has disappeared, but Georgia still exists” is often heard in the country. It conveys pride in the idea that Georgia has since ancient times enjoyed historical continuity as a State that, although interrupted, has never been destroyed. That includes the years under Soviet rule. Unlike other nations, Georgians never assimilated. European and Euro-Atlantic integration is not only a choice of the country’s leaders, but also of the population. It is a civilization choice. In fact, in his inauguration speech, former President Mikhail Saakashvili declared: “We are not only old Europeans, we are the first Europeans, and therefore Georgia occupies a special place in European civilization.” Thus, the Georgian political elites, although they often fight like cats and dogs, are united in their desire for a future in the European Union, which they believe embodies their civilization, their culture and their history.

In fact, Georgians never tire of showing off their Europeanness. “I am Georgian and therefore I am European.” These words were spoken by Zurab Shvania, former Speaker of the Georgian Parliament and former Prime Minister, in a speech on the occasion of Georgia’s accession to the Council of Europe in 1999, when he declared that accession to the European Union was the priority of the foreign policy. Since then, Georgia has been one of the countries that has shown the most enthusiasm for integration into the European Union (and NATO). This has been an objective of both the political class and the population, among whom support remains very high: just over 81% of the population today supports the integration of Georgia into the Union. However, that path has not been easy at all.

After the restoration of independence in 1991, strengthening ties with the West was a priority. When former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze returned to his homeland and assumed the presidency of Parliament and later the presidency of the country, he prioritized establishing a strong pro-Western policy. Known as the Silver Fox for his white hair and reputed cunning, Shevardnadze was already a well-known and respected figure in the West, as he had established close relations with the United States and its allies during his time as foreign minister. However, he governed in a style influenced by his Soviet past and failed to tackle rampant corruption or introduce much-needed reforms. This inability ended up creating disillusionment among society and led to a decline in his popularity that culminated in the Rose Revolution of 2003, when thousands of people took to the streets to protest controversial electoral results and forced new elections in which Saakashvili won the presidency.

With Saakashvili in the presidency, Georgia’s foreign policy moved towards European and Euro-Atlantic integration. Young and a determined Atlanticist, he stressed in his inauguration speech that Euro-Atlantic integration was the main priority of Georgia’s foreign policy. During his first term, Saakashvili and his United National Movement (MNU) brought down an entrenched corrupt elite; This included a major reorganization of the corrupt police force, the implementation of free-market reforms that led to impressive economic growth, and the implementation of a zero-tolerance approach to crime. Accession to NATO and the European Union was the axis of Saakashvili’s foreign policy.

After two terms, Saakashvili lost power in 2012 to oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili and her Georgian Dream (SG) party amid, among other issues, growing fears that he was allowing the rise of a new kleptocracy by favoring businessmen. closely linked to their political party.

However, never in the history of Georgia had there been such a peaceful and legally compliant change of government as the one that occurred at that time. It was a direct consequence of the country’s aspirations for the European Union. Despite fears about his ties to Russia, Ivanishvili declared European and Euro-Atlantic integration a priority and also boosted efforts to strengthen ties with the European Union.

Given Georgia’s desire for membership, it is not surprising that for most of the last two decades it has been the European Union’s reform pupil. The country has a long track record of successfully implementing required reforms and has consistently led calls for stronger EU engagement in the South Caucasus region.

However, while the European Union welcomed the democratic change in the country, it did not share the same level of enthusiasm when it came to accession. Instead, alternative policies were put on the table. Georgia was included in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in 2004. That year, the big bang of enlargement that saw the accession of ten new countries drastically changed the borders of the Union. And these new borders also brought immediacy to community reflection on the states on its periphery. The main objective of the ENP was to share with neighboring countries the benefits of the 2004 enlargement, stability, security and well-being, in a different way than membership in the European Union. The objective was to commit to sharing values, namely democracy, the rule of law, good governance and respect for human rights, as well as the principles of the market economy. Although it fell far short of Georgia’s goal of becoming a full member state, it was still a step in the right direction.

The 2008 Russia-Georgia war, when Russian tanks headed towards Tbilisi, marked (in a negative way) another important milestone. The Russian invasion consolidated the Kremlin’s occupation of around 20% of Georgian territory (North Ossetia and Abkhazia), but gave rise to the birth of the Eastern Partnership (EAP) initiative, a Polish and Swedish initiative. A fundamental objective of this policy was to increase the stability, prosperity and resilience of the European Union’s neighbors. In fact, the AO allowed the two partners to further strengthen political and economic relations with a tailored approach. The European Union also became the main security actor in Georgia with the deployment of the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM).

The European Union’s ties with Georgia deepened even further in 2016 with the implementation of an Association Agreement and a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) signed in 2014. These agreements were pioneering, as which allowed Georgia (and Moldova and Ukraine) to access the European single market in certain sectors and grant European Union investors in those sectors the same regulatory environment in Georgia as in the European Union. However, despite these positive developments and the fact that Georgia had not let up its reforms for most of the last two decades, the door to accession remained closed. In part, this was due to a lack of community interest in further enlargement, but also to concern about Russia’s reaction to such a step; above all, taking into account the Kremlin’s clear objections to all community policies that strengthened ties with the countries that Russia considered included in its sphere of influence, including Georgia.

The fact is that it has been Russia that has reactivated the enlargement of the European Union. The large-scale invasion of Ukraine has put enlargement back on the EU political agenda in the form of a geopolitical imperative after years of postponements (Croatia, the most recent new member, joined a decade ago). Community leaders finally understood that leaving European neighbors in gray areas was detrimental to their security and stability and that the war in Ukraine constituted an existential threat to the security of the European Union.

Unfortunately, the European Union’s change of heart came at a time when Georgia’s reform efforts had not only slowed, but in some cases gone backwards. The result was a deterioration in ties that was exacerbated by an increasingly polarized political landscape. It culminated in a major political crisis in April 2021, with SG and the main opposition party, MNU, locked in a raw political battle. These internal power struggles were a reminder that Georgia continues to struggle to consolidate its weak democratic structures and leave the Soviet legacy behind. Commitment is not in the DNA of political parties. The political crisis was eased thanks to an agreement sponsored by the European Union, but which only lasted a few weeks.

Furthermore, over the past two years, SG has pursued what can only be described as a policy of self-sabotage. Numerous controversial and unconstructive statements criticizing the West, along with some crazy decisions such as the resumption of direct flights with Russia and the adoption of measures to approve a law on foreign agents modeled on the Russian one, have caused the Government to be perceived as pro-Russian, in a country with almost general hatred towards Russia. Georgia’s failure to join Western sanctions against Russia has given the impression that SG members (including some of its ministers) were deferring to the Kremlin. That includes Ivanishvili, who has resided in Russia since he announced his departure from politics in 2021. All of this has caused growing tensions with the European Union and many of its member states, with which Tbilisi once maintained very close relations.

Despite the opportunity to become a candidate country for the European Union, reform efforts have been slowed and, in some cases, reversed. Furthermore, some of the Government’s messages and speeches have been contrary to the expectations of the European Union. These events led to Georgia not receiving the status of candidate country in June 2022 along with Ukraine and Moldova. Instead, Georgia received a clear European perspective with the possibility of receiving candidate status on condition of meeting twelve priorities.

When the European Commission presented its enlargement package in November 2023, Georgia had only met three of the priorities: gender equality and the fight against violence suffered by women, legislative measures so that the courts take into account the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights and appointment of an ombudsman through a transparent process. Partial progress had been made on priorities related to electoral and institutional reforms, the independence of the judiciary, anti-corruption measures, the fight against organized crime, media pluralism, vulnerable groups and the participation of organizations of civil society, but there was still much to do. Deoligarchy and depolarization are essential. A systemic approach should be applied to the De-oligarchization law based on the opinion of the Venice Commission. However, on the issue of polarization, the MNU must also change its approach. To this day, he has shown no interest in reducing polarization.

In the final weeks leading up to the European Council on December 14, 2023, Georgia stepped on the accelerator and made progress in many areas, although many shortcomings remain. Community leaders agreed to grant candidate country status, but that decision has largely been a recognition of the Georgian people’s commitment to the European Union and democratic values, rather than a decision based purely on reform efforts. It has also been a geopolitical decision, which has reinforced the footprint of the European Union in the South Caucasus.

Although Georgia has received the status of a candidate country, there is still much to do. The Government’s image remains seriously tarnished, and infighting in the SG undermines the party’s credibility. It is speculated that one of the reasons for Ivanishvili’s very recent return to Georgia as honorary president of the party is to restore control and reinforce popular support ahead of the October 2024 parliamentary elections.

If the European Union wants to start accession negotiations at the end of this year, the Georgian Government must seriously step up its efforts and prioritize meeting the priorities set by the Commission. This includes ensuring that October’s elections are free and fair, implementing an effective De-oligarchisation law and continuing to align with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as requested by the Commission. Doing so is in the national interest, and the ruling party owes it to the Georgian people to show an exemplary commitment to that goal.

At the same time, the European Union must have a fair and genuine approach towards Georgia. Although the country is located further away than Ukraine and Moldova, it would be a serious mistake to believe that its geography makes it irrelevant to the security and stability of the European Union. Georgia is situated at an important geostrategic crossroads. In addition, it is a Black Sea littoral state. The granting of candidate status will contribute to strengthening its Europeanization, including its Black Sea coast, which will help undermine Russia’s efforts to strengthen its control over it, as well as reinforce the influence of the European Union throughout the region. South Caucasus at a time of geopolitical turmoil.

The Georgian government must get to work on its duties and show leadership, but the European Union must also show geopolitical and strategic acumen. This includes demonstrating the political will necessary for the European Union’s enlargement policy to adapt to a Union of thirty-five or more members. This will require reforming key policies such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the structural and cohesion funds. Moving from unanimity to qualified majority voting must also be a priority to prevent bottlenecks and bilateral disputes from blocking the process. Likewise, it is crucial that candidate countries see immediate returns from reforms, and not promise a big carrot only once accession negotiations are concluded and membership is secured. The idea of ??phased or gradual integration is gaining speed. This will allow candidates to set foot in the European Union (for example, by entering the single market or participating in various policies) before becoming full members, which will help incentivize reforms.

Georgia’s accession to the European Union will be beneficial for everyone. It will not only reinforce security and stability throughout the region, but will demonstrate that the country has learned the language of power and is capable of being a strategic geopolitical agent.

Amanda Paul is Senior Policy Analyst, Center for European Policy (Brussels).