Someone with less mettle than Xi Jinping might have found the situation uncomfortable. In his meeting with Vladimir Putin this week in Moscow, the Chinese leader spoke of “peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation” while dining with someone who is under an international arrest warrant for war crimes. However, Xi is not concerned with trivial inconsistencies. He believes in the inexorable decline of the US-led world order, with its professed concern for standards and human rights. His goal is to transform that order into a more transactional system of agreements between great powers. We must not underestimate the dangers of that vision, nor its appeal in the world.
In the Ukraine, China has moved well and relentlessly in a difficult situation. Its objectives are subtle: to ensure Russia’s subservience, but without such weakness leading to the implosion of the Putin regime; polishing her credentials as a peacemaker in the eyes of the emerging world; and, with an eye toward Taiwan, undermining the perceived legitimacy of Western sanctions and military support as foreign policy tools. Xi has cynically proposed a “peace plan” for Ukraine that would reward Russian aggression and which he knows Ukraine will not accept. He calls for “respect the sovereignty of all countries,” but fails to mention that Russia occupies more than a sixth of its neighbor.
It is just one example of China’s new approach to foreign policy, as the country emerges from zero-covid isolation and faces a more unified West. On March 10, China sponsored a détente between two bitter rivals, Iran and Saudi Arabia; It is a first intervention in the Middle East and has revealed the scant influence of the West in the area 20 years after the US-led invasion of Iraq. On March 15, Xi unveiled the “Global Civilization Initiative,” according to which countries should “refrain from imposing their own values ??or models on others and fueling ideological confrontation.”
China’s approach is not improvised, but systematic and ideological. Deng Xiaoping urged China to “hide capabilities, wait for the moment.” However, Xi wants to reshape the world order born after 1945. The new Chinese slogans seek to adopt and subvert the normative language of the 20th century so that “multilateralism” is synonymous with a world that abandons universal values ??and becomes governed by the balance of interests of the great powers. The “Global Security Initiative” tries to oppose efforts to contain the Chinese military threat; the “Global Development Initiative” promotes China’s economic growth model, which deals with autocratic states without strings attached. “Global Civilization” argues that the Western defense of universal human rights, whether in Xinjiang or elsewhere, constitutes a new type of colonialism.
Such a transactional vision of the world has more support outside the West than one might think. Later this month, Xi will meet in Beijing with Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a supporter of a multipolar world who wants China to help broker peace in Ukraine. For many, the 2003 invasion of Iraq exposed the West’s double standards on international law and human rights, an idea repeatedly stressed by the Chinese state media. Following the Trump years, President Joe Biden has re-engaged with the world, though the shift to Asia means less involvement elsewhere, including the Middle East and Afghanistan.
The West has been determined on Ukraine, but many countries harbor some ambivalence about the war, wondering how it will end. At least 100 countries, representing 40% of global GDP, do not fully apply sanctions. American perseverance is doubted. Neither Donald Trump nor Ron DeSantis, his Republican rival, perceive Ukraine as a central American interest. All of this creates space for new players, from Turkey to the United Arab Emirates and, above all, China. His message (that real democracy entails economic development, but does not depend on political freedom) exerts a powerful attraction on the elites of non-democratic countries.
It is important to assess what this mercenary multipolarity can achieve. Iran and Saudi Arabia have been fierce enemies since the 1979 Iranian revolution. China is the biggest export market for both, so it has influence and an incentive to avoid a war in the Gulf, which is also their biggest source of oil. The deal he has helped broker may ease a proxy war in Yemen that may have already claimed as many as 300,000 people. Or think about climate change. China’s mercantilist support for its battery industry is catalyzing a wave of cross-border investment that will help reduce carbon emissions.
Now, the real goal of Xi’s foreign policy is to make the world safer for the Chinese Communist Party. Over time, it will be difficult to hide your flaws. A network of bilateral relations of convenience creates contradictions. China backs Iran but chooses to ignore that country’s ongoing nuclear escalation, which threatens other Chinese clients in the region. In the Ukraine, any lasting peace requires the consent of the Ukrainians. It must also entail accountability for war crimes and guarantees against another attack. China is opposed to all three: it doesn’t believe in democracy, human rights, or great power restraint, be it Ukraine or Taiwan. Countries facing a direct security threat from China, such as India and Japan, will become even more cautious. In fact, whenever a country is faced with a powerful and aggressive neighbor, the principle that might be right means that it has a lot to fear.
Since China almost always backs the ruling elites, however inept or cruel, their approach may end up outraging ordinary citizens around the world. Meanwhile, open societies will face a struggle around competing visions. One task is to prevent Ukraine from being pushed into a bogus peace deal; and, in the case of Western countries, to deepen their defensive alliances, including NATO. The long-term goal is to refute the charge that global rules only serve Western interests and expose the poor worldview promoted by China (and Russia).
America’s great insight in 1945 was that it could enhance its security by binding itself to lasting alliances and common standards. That idealistic vision has been clouded by decades of contact with reality (which also includes what happened in Iraq). Yet the Moscow summit reveals a worse alternative: a superpower seeking influence without esteem, power without trust, and a global vision without universal human rights. Those who believe that something like this can make the world a better place are wrong.
© 2023 The Economist Newspaper Limited. All rights reserved
Translation: Juan Gabriel López Guix
