The current parliamentary correlation is an almost exclusive product of right-wing electoral suicide. Without the fragmentation that the conservative space registered as of 2015, and that was accentuated in the 2019 elections, the composition of Congress would be very different today. Provided, of course, that, in turn, the left had not practiced a parallel harakiri whose prognosis remains uncertain today.

Said in figures: if the conservative electorate had opted for a single brand in the April 2019 elections, that formation would have been the force with the most votes in all constituencies, except in Catalonia and the Basque Country. And most importantly: it would have gathered 176 seats, the absolute majority of the Chamber.

Naturally, this is speculation that assumes that a single brand could bring together voters of the PP, Ciudadanos and Vox; that is to say, to almost 44% of the voters, as was the case in the days of Aznar or Rajoy. In any case, the conservative block has already begun a regrouping of the vote that, for now, seems to leave the extreme right on the sidelines, which would have come to stay. But in the space of the center and right, the self-destruction of Cs could allow the PP to automatically reach 28% of the votes.

This transfer of votes from Ciudadanos to the PP would profoundly alter the electoral outcome of numerous provinces where the division of the right allowed the PSOE to win some decisive seats four years ago. With the current correlation, the various projections would give the PP some 120 seats (including the two from Navarra) which, together with Vox’s 42, would place the conservative bloc above 160 deputies. Too far, however, from an absolute majority, since very few peripheral formations would add their seats to a coalition with the extreme right.

The problem with this scenario is that it would make governance very difficult. In other words, even if the PSOE retained its electoral capital from 2019 – 28% of the votes – its harvest of seats would fall from the current 120 to around 110; that is to say, Pedro Sánchez would remain at more than 60 deputies from the majority necessary to govern. And it is there where the platform of Yolanda Díaz acquires a key role with its vocation to regroup all the potential vote to the left of socialism (see attached graphs).

The polls place the current support for Unidas Podemos between 9% and 12% of the votes, while Más País would reap between 1% and 3%. This dispersion would translate into a calculation of just over 30 seats for the alternative left, which together with the 111 for the PSOE, would leave the overall harvest of the current coalition around 140 deputies. In other words, almost 36 of the absolute majority, an unattainable distance with the usual partners.

However, if Sumar manages to bring together under the same brand not only Podemos and Más País, but also the main peripheral lefts, the critical mass of this electoral conglomerate could even exceed the barrier of 15% of the vote. And that vote capital would easily translate into about 40 seats.

The resulting sum for the current coalition government would place its number of deputies above 150. And in this case, reaching 176 of the absolute majority with the help of the usual members (Esquerra, PNV and Bildu) would be within the reach of the hand, even if Junts or the CUP maintained the vote against that they already issued in the last investiture.

On the contrary, if finally the alternative left that Yolanda Díaz tries to add were to run separately, with Podemos as the main split, the harvest of the conservative bloc would be very close to 170 deputies, while the parties of the current coalition government would gather little more. of 140. In other words, they would remain at least 33 seats away from the absolute majority, unattainable unless Junts also added their deputies. And, in parallel, the PP would have some chance of government if, together with the support of Vox, it achieved the support of the center-right regionalists and the two or three deputies from emptied Spain.