The path to climate sustainability, which goes through the Paris agreement, net-zero emissions by 2050, is quite well designed. But it makes sense to ask, in the spirit of stress tests, what are the critical links that need to be watched carefully. Everyone will have their own. I will point out two.
The first refers to the objective of Paris. The danger is fatigue. As we still do not have enough renewable energy we are asking the population and industry to limit their use to the levels of demand associated with high prices and, except in situations of vulnerability, to pay this price. The impact on the standard of living is significant. So far the population accepts the principle and a growing minority enthusiastically. But will this continue?
We know that we have a cheap source of energy at our fingertips: oil and that the use of this energy has harmful and irreversible effects on the future of humanity. That will suffer, however, with intensity the non-immediate future generations. Our children, and, with greater difficulty, our grandchildren will be able to live there. Will the current population endure out of conviction and in the necessary magnitude for the benefit of great-grandchildren? Or will fatigue prevail?
For me, the only prudent way out of this dilemma is forward: we must accelerate the process of abundant availability of clean energy at historic prices. The evidence of what we are doing with wind and photovoltaics, today fully competitive with carbon, allows us to be optimistic. We can repeat it with hydrogen and other clean energy sources and vectors. What is needed: massive investments, private and public, in R&D and incentive policies for the fledgling industries to reach the maturity that guarantees low prices.
The second critical point, more hypothetical and post 2050, is demography. Current projections indicate that the world population will stabilize before the end of the century at around 10 billion. It is an imposing number, but it is assumed in the sustainability calculations. A major deviation to the upside is unlikely, but possible. Above all, in my opinion, because the explanation of the projection is based on three hypotheses that are correct now, but which might not be correct in the future:
– That the desire of families for a good number of children is not very strong and that it is perhaps a survival from when many children died as children. But this does not explain why there are groups, typically religious, with large families. Today it is these groups. Find out tomorrow.
– That the education of children who will not die requires effort and that families prefer quality over quantity. Therefore: few children. But can we be sure that technology and the social organization that accompanies it will not change the situation?
– That pro-natality policies will not be generalized for geopolitical or other reasons. Or that they will not be effective. Maybe so, but…
It is not obvious to me that humanity has forever abandoned a softened variety of Malthus’ judgment: that if the level of development and technology allow for an increase in population it will occur. Not, as Malthus anticipated, to the point of reducing the population to a subsistence level, but to limit their level of well-being below the best possible.
