An unexpected effect of the war in Ukraine has been the relevance achieved by a series of southern countries, both due to their positions on the conflict and their demands for reforms in the international system. Brazil, India, South Africa and Nigeria are among the most prominent that, although they condemned Russia at the United Nations, have not imposed sanctions on it. Some of them have also tried to mediate by presenting ideas for a peace plan, and have rejected the request of Germany and the United States to send weapons to Ukraine. Likewise, six African nations (Zambia, Senegal, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Egypt and South Africa) have given Kyiv and Moscow alternative ideas to war.
In the last year, the concept of the global south, which only circulated among NGO networks, the UN and some academic spaces (the so-called postcolonial studies), became a central topic at the G-7 meeting last May. The final communiqué included several economic, commercial, financial commitments and with the SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals) Agenda 2030, among others, with the countries of the South.1
From the US and Europe, limited readings are usually made of the positions of India, Brazil and other countries, considering that it is an alignment with Russia. But the rise of the global south is due to various causes, has different objectives, and it would be a mistake for Washington and Europe not to pay attention to it.
Many southern countries see that the war in Ukraine and sanctions against Russia have caused deep damage to their economies and generated greater food insecurity. Due to the pandemic and the Russian invasion, two Chatham House analysts write, “the proportion of low-income countries that are in debt distress or at high risk of it increased from 49% in 2019 to 60% in 2023, but “Debt renegotiations with creditors are very slow.” In February 2023, financial, humanitarian and military support to Ukraine from Western countries amounted to 151 billion euros. “The developing world fears that this spending will limit the West’s willingness to help them deal with the consequences of war as well as longer-term development needs.”2
The demands of the south are not a reissue of the Non-Aligned Movement created in 1961. That was a response from countries that had recently gained their independence. Nationalism was the dominant ideology in the face of the bipolar capitalism versus communism of the Cold War (which largely ended non-alignment). The situation now is different. The southern countries are nationalist, but non-alignment is framed in the construction and uncertainties of post-Western international relations, with the US losing hegemony, in a world of multiple global and regional powers, pragmatic alliances instead of ideological alignments, and fluid and flexible commercial and financial relationships.
Global South is a broad concept that includes countries that are part of what during the cold war was called the third world or underdeveloped countries, which experience the impact of having been colonies and being subordinated in the architectures of world power, in economy, commerce, finance and security. Ann Garland Mahler (University of Virginia) says that the global south goes beyond states, and refers to “spaces and people that are negatively impacted by contemporary capitalist globalization.”3
For civil society actors and postcolonial studies scholars, looking at the world from the global south implies a historical, cultural, political and economic critique of past (colonialism) and present (capitalism) forms of domination. It is the space for south-south relations between subaltern groups around the world around issues of race (slavery, subjugation of indigenous populations), ethnicity, gender, language and nation, and their intersections.
After the end of the Cold War, the use of south spread to designate a series of countries that had been colonies. Starting in the 1990s, the subcategory of fragile states was also generated in academic and political circles in the north, which, based on the reality of dysfunctional states, generally categorized them in a lower and subordinate echelon that legitimized making external decisions about them.
To Robert J.C. Young, professor of Critical Theory at the University of Oxford, the discipline of “postcolonialism vindicates the right of all people on the planet to access the same material and cultural well-being.” However, imperial expansion between the 16th and 19th centuries led to European empires (and later the US) dominating much of the planet. This was accompanied by theories about the supposed superiority of whites, and the resulting legitimacy to rule over non-whites.
Domination continues today with other forms of power in much of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Postcolonialism, says Young, “designates a politics and philosophy of activism that challenges that disparity, and continues in different ways the anticolonial struggles of the past.” These struggles would also be aimed “at transforming Western societies.”4
From the academic perspective, some authors propose decolonizing the history and forms of knowledge that shape national and international policies. For example, Robbie Shilliam (Johns Hopkins University), seeks to “recontextualize political thinkers within the imperial and colonial frameworks that form the basis of their reflections.” For him, many “key arguments in political science have been developed with colonial logics and meanings,” and his goal is to “decolonize the academic study of politics.”5
Arlene Tickner and Karen Smith question Eurocentrism (extended to the US) and the way in which international relations and security studies generally exclude analyzes of imperial structures, the role of slavery in the formation of the modern capitalism, and do not usually include the analyzes and perspectives developed by academics from the south.6
Journalism also uses the global south, without defining whether it is a series of countries united by their past and present problems, or if there are other categories or subcategories that unify them. Haug, Braveboy-Wagner and Maihold consider that “the global south has largely become a taken-for-granted category. Most use the term without further explanation and assume that others know what it means.”7 This has the danger of including many countries with different characteristics in a very broad agenda. Furthermore, some, like Colombia, do not want to be included in a category alongside collapsing states, such as Somalia or Haiti. Others, those from Central Asia, refuse to be considered southern.
The global south usually has three meanings. The first refers to poor countries, with serious development problems. The second, to the relations between these countries to cooperate and establish commercial, technical or political alliances. The Group of 77 represents this trend. The third identifies the global south with resistance to neoliberal capitalism, with initiatives such as the World Social Forum. This last conception links with postcolonial theory and the different relationships between southern and northern movements (for example, the connections of Black Lives Matter with anti-racist and social justice NGOs in Africa, Asia and Latin America).8
These critical interpretations of the global south are not the way in which the governments of India, Brazil or South Africa, former colonies and currently emerging powers, present themselves and promote the role of their countries in the international system. Between the postcolonial positions and those of these governments there are coincidences regarding changing relations with the north. But academic and activist postcolonialism is anti-capitalist and, in particular, contrary to neoliberal policies. For example, those of the Government of India towards the rural sector.
The governments and modernizing elites of emerging or intermediate powers aspire to strengthen their economic, commercial and financial (and eventually, military) capabilities to have greater regional and global influence. Some of them, such as India and Brazil, seek to represent and lead southern countries in their demands for development, renegotiation of foreign debt, fight against the environmental crisis and promotion of international peace and security.
India, for its part, competes with China for leadership among southern countries, especially in Asia. South Africa, despite serious internal problems, is an economic, democratic and security reference in Africa. The governments of Brazil and India consider their countries powers with global reach and impact, and with the capacity to negotiate and establish alliances with Europe or the United States. For some diplomats from these countries, the concept of the global south should not serve to close doors to those possibilities. And that your priorities do not have to be set from outside.
In his new presidency, Lula da Silva promotes a new foreign policy with the environmental agenda and regional unity as priorities. Last May 30, her Government brought together ten others from Latin America to launch the Brasilia Consensus, in order to promote commercial and economic cooperation, and the creation of a free trade area. The country has built “diplomatic influence” without being a military power or being part of any alliance of this type. This would help a “South American security identity” outside of military blocs.9
For his part, last February President Narendra Modi brought together representatives of 110 government leaders and ministers at the Global South Voices Summit for human-centered development that addressed health, development, education, the international financial system, and climate, among other topics. In closing, Modi indicated that “all the ideas discussed by the broad global south will provide inspiration to India to influence the agenda of the May meeting of the G-20” (of which he had the presidency).
The rise of emerging markets began two decades ago. In September 2003, China, Brazil, South Africa and India questioned the rules imposed by Washington and its allies in the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations in Doha. In the same year, the IBSA alliance (India, Brazil and South Africa) was created. In 2009 Brazil, South Africa, India and China demanded different negotiations on climate change, and in 2010 the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) were formed. In 2008, emerging powers joined the G-20, a sign of changes in power in international relations. At the same time, criticism increased in southern and northern societies against the impacts of policies that reduce the role of the State and the imposition of deregulations favorable to the private sector.
The BRICS included the five largest economies in the world outside the OECD, which accounted for 50% of all trade. Their countries eliminated dependence on foreign development aid and strengthened south-south cooperation. China became Brazil’s first trading partner ahead of the US, and Sino-Indian trade reached $60 billion, while transactions between southern countries increased to 17% of the world total.10
The power and potential of emerging countries is very relevant, but with diverse national agendas. It is a group with the capacity to negotiate and modify operations and rules in spheres that until recently were imposed by the US, Europe and Canada. In this sense, a part of the elites of those countries consider it more advantageous to adhere to leadership policies than to remain in their Northern subordinations.
After a time of great demand for primary goods during the 2000s, the Brics saw prices fall, China reduced its purchases, and internal problems were faced (corruption, crime, social protest). Some analysts considered the initiative dead. But the 2008 financial crisis accelerated the discredit of the neoliberal policies that the US and its allies had promoted. The emerging countries pressed to renegotiate the rules of trade, international aid and, increasingly, the role that the north and the south must play in the fight against climate change.
The crisis of the international liberal order or rules-based order established after the Second World War has manifested itself since 2008, both due to the lack of compliance of its main members with those rules and due to the attacks of the extreme right in various countries. The Russian aggression in Ukraine confirmed that a member of the UN Security Council can invade a country and veto its censure. All this has caused a gap (more) between the north and the south.
While in the US and Europe there is a frequently idealized defense of this international order, in the south it is remembered that it has often been at the service of the great powers. Its rules were used to legitimize military interventions (Santo Domingo, Haiti, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, among others) and overthrow governments (such as Chile in 1973). The power dynamics between the north and the south, and the forms of domination of societies and exploitation of resources were imposed by the financial system established in Bretton Woods, with the dominance of the dollar and the WTO, and with the backdrop of the right of veto in the UN Security Council.
In southern countries these demands are not new. They were discussed within the framework of a (frustrated) New International Economic Order in the seventies. The problems were identified in a series of reports promoted by politicians from the north and south. Now, emerging countries promote changes and reforms in international credit institutions, especially the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and in the multilateral system, particularly the configuration of the UN Security Council. They want to have more power in the agencies and funds of this organization. But, as Hurrell indicates, “emerging ones are more likely to be powers that maintain the status quo than to be radical revisionists.”
The Brics have created the New Development Bank (NDB) and alternative credit to the IMF and the World Bank. This organization has provided credits worth $33 billion to 96 projects in the founding countries since 2015. Russia owns 19% of the shares in the NDB, but due to the sanctions imposed on it for the invasion of Ukraine, Its funds have been frozen, a measure so that this Bank does not lose access to the US dollar. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia (another regional and global oil power that carries out and sponsors military operations and interventions in other countries, such as Syria and Yemen) has requested membership as a partner.11
All these networks, alliances and forms of heterodox and non-ideological relationships are part of the process that Amitav Acharya calls multipolarity.12 Within it there are different degrees of power and influence, both in the north and in the so-called global south. In this context, the possibility of greater or lesser alignments and non-alignments opens up, and of regional spaces to negotiate their situation and possible benefits with more powerful others.13
To be or not to be part of the global south is a question of power. India is an example of pragmatism in multipolarity. Washington’s preferential ally in Asia, that does not prevent it from trading (and buying weapons) with Russia, maintaining open channels with China despite border confrontations, and being a trading partner of Europe. In the field of security, it is a member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), a strategic forum with Australia, Japan and the US, while also being part of the China-India Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED). Former Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao says, “The West routinely makes deals with violent autocracies to advance its own interests. The US, for example, is improving ties with Venezuela to obtain more oil. Europe is signing energy contracts with repressive regimes in the Arab Gulf. Surprisingly, the West, however, maintains that its foreign policy is guided by human rights and democracy. India, at least, does not claim to be the guardian of the world’s conscience. Like any other state, it acts in accordance with its interests, and breaking its association with Russia would harm it.”14 Possibly India’s biggest contradiction is that its government claims to represent the global south while being increasingly authoritarian and oppressing its Muslim population. .
Until a few decades ago, China was an underdeveloped country (with nuclear weapons). Now it is one of the great world powers, with investments and interests throughout the planet. Although it was occupied by various colonial powers, and aspires to represent the global south in its claims, it is difficult to consider it in this category. In fact, in the Group of 77 countries of the global south classified by the UN, China appears in a special situation but not as part of them.
Russia gives rise to confusion for being part of the Brics and for showing solidarity with southern demands. But the ambitions of Vladimir Putin’s government to regain influence, even by force, in the former Soviet geopolitical space, would be expressions of an empire in decline.15 Moscow’s interventions with the parastatal organization of mercenaries Wagner to control natural resources and support or harassing governments in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, North Africa and Ukraine, would confirm this neo-imperial ambition and the impossibility of being, at the same time, an aggressive power and a global south.
And Turkey is a middle power, the former center of an empire, a member of NATO, with a European, Asian and Middle Eastern identity, and with underdevelopment problems combined with advanced industrial and military apparatuses. Ankara does not pretend to be the global south but acts as a regional power, has carried out military interventions in Syria, has serious problems with the Kurdish minority and is one of the countries that could be part of a negotiating architecture for the war in Ukraine. Sebastian Haug equates it with Mexico, hybrid states with “northern” and “southern” characteristics.16
“When the war in Ukraine ends,” says Financial Times commentator Alec Russell, “it will occur in the context of a more subtle world order than that of February 2022. It will be more complex and probably more dangerous; but for some non-aligned countries it will have more opportunities. And they are here to stay.” The scenarios ahead are unpredictable, and will depend, among other factors, on the internal evolution of each of the intermediate powers, the development of their technological, industrial and (in some cases) military capabilities, and the responses of the United States. .and Europe. Also, the alliances that are forged, especially with Washington, Beijing and Brussels. In the European Union media it is considered that Western-style confrontations and the rest that would serve Russia should be avoided.
The growing conflicts between China and the US and the war in Ukraine indicate a reinforcement of orthodox policies by the great powers, trying to align other countries (for example, the US in Asia). This would leave less room for the rise of middle powers, or will generate more tensions. As long as the emerging south is stronger and the north more flexible, reforms of the multilateral and financial system, and agreements on big issues such as climate change and global health, could be achieved. On the contrary, if the north resists, then alternative institutions will proliferate, and current discrepancies will be reproduced. At the same time, each southern country develops its own negotiation strategies with the great powers according to its national, regional and global interests, something that weakens common positions.
As Aude Darnal of the Stimson Center (Washington DC) suggests, “as countries in the global south seek to exert their power on the world stage, American policymakers must adapt to better understand their concerns. That means recognizing that those countries are valuable partners in their own right. Above all, the US must avoid pressuring them while ignoring their desires for political independence. For US foreign policy to change course, policymakers must understand the prospects of the global south, rather than developing policies based on misconceptions. Promoting new political spaces dedicated to the role of the global south in the world order should be the first step.”17 A valid recommendation for Europe.
On the other hand, although emerging countries promote south-south cooperation and technical aid, it is uncertain how they can represent their weaker neighbors. It is possible that the south will become even more divided, with the emerging countries, on the one hand, and more than fifty countries in serious institutional fragility, devastated by violent conflicts and the climate crisis, on the other. In this sense, actions such as the one that Mia Mottley, Prime Minister of Barbados, presented in 2022 at the UN Climate Change Conference COP27 are important.
The Bridgetown Initiative (capital of Barbados, a country greatly affected by climate change) is an action plan to reform the World Bank and the IMF, and have a special fund to respond to climate and development crises in poor countries. Barbados is not an emerging power, but their initiative is an example of what they can do from the south, and the north should pay special attention.
Mariano Aguirre is an associate researcher at Chatham House, advisor to the Latin American Security Network of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, and author of ‘Cold War 2.0. Keys to understanding the new international politics’ (Icaria, Barcelona, ??2023).
