Hamas, a terrorist organization for Western governments, is a movement that has even more captivated the Arab world when the meticulousness and brilliance with which it prepared the October 7 attack has transcended.
Several documents that the guerrillas carried or left abandoned during the incursion demonstrate that it was not a stampede without rhyme or reason, but quite the opposite, a military operation planned down to the last detail that cost the lives of some 1,300 people and left others injured. 3,400.
The militants had first-hand information about the Israeli defenses and no one has yet been able to explain how they obtained it.
The guerrillas opened 80 holes in the Gaza perimeter fence with explosives and tractors. About 200 militiamen, probably from the Nujba brigade, Hamas’s elite corps, launched the attack through these openings.
Ten of them, armed with Kalashnikov rifles and riding five motorcycles, headed to the base where Israel manages surveillance of the more than 72 kilometers of the military fence of the Strip. Although no sign led to it, they knew perfectly well where it was. They also carried with them a color-coded map of the base, which indicated each unit.
The commando blew up the entrance gate to the base with explosives, killed a soldier in a T-shirt, had time to take a selfie, located the building where the unit from which the Gaza perimeter was managed was located, entered without problems because the door was open, killed two soldiers who had hidden under a bed and destroyed the computers, the brain of the most sophisticated defensive fence in the world.
One of the assailants, killed hours later, was wearing a camera on his head that had filmed everything and that Israeli military intelligence has shared with The New York Times.
While the elite commando destroyed the technological core of the Israeli defense, several drones dropped explosives on the surveillance towers surrounding the Gaza perimeter. The militiamen recorded the feat on video and posted it on social networks.
In a very short time, the guerrillas had left the army without cameras to see what was happening and without communication to be able to call for reinforcements, demonstrating the vulnerability of the most sophisticated military technology to detect the enemy and prevent it from attacking.
Behind this first wave of assailants, some 1,800 more militiamen came out, according to calculations by the Israeli army. Most were on motorcycles and vans, but also on hang gliders and boats. They were organized by groups, each with a very clear mission.
In each group there were navigators, saboteurs and drivers. They also had maps. They knew how to enter the kibbutzim, from what angles it was best to attack them. They had orders to murder as many people as they found, but also to capture hostages.
Mortar units guarded the rear to protect the retreat in case of an Israeli counteroffensive. But the army was nowhere to be found. It took hours to arrive and days to regain control of the area. Dozens of Gazans, who had nothing to do with Hamas, took the opportunity to enter the raided homes and take everything they could: televisions, computers, telephones and microwaves.
Some of the recovered documents are dated October 2022. Hamas planned the operation for at least a year and kept it secret because it did not digitize it, upload any paper to any computer or use cell phones to communicate.
Israel inadvertently let vital information slip. Hamas obtained very precise estimates of the Israeli military forces, their location, how long it would take for reinforcements to arrive and where they were most likely to arrive, and positioned groups of guerrillas there.
In a few hours, the militants took over eight military bases and 15 towns, including several kibbutzim. The best army in the Middle East had been defeated by a militia armed with assault rifles, grenade launchers and mortars.
Four days later, when Israel regained control of its territory, 1,500 guerrillas lay dead. Very few of those who participated in the attack lived to tell the tale.
