The past few days have seen a whirlwind of Russian diplomatic activity regarding the Middle East crisis. On October 16, Vladimir Putin spoke with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the leaders of Egypt, Iran, Syria and the Palestinian Authority. Putin expressed his condolences for the murdered Israelis, but did not denounce the Hamas attacks. The Russian autocrat also called for a ceasefire and blamed the United States for the crisis.
These statements confirm two things: Russia’s distancing itself from Israel, and that the Kremlin sees the war between Israel and Hamas as an opportunity to undermine and distract the West. Such an effort will be applauded by China: in fact, Putin has traveled to Beijing to attend the Belt and Road summit, organized by Xi Jinping. For his part, Joe Biden has traveled to Israel to meet with Netanyahu and try to shape the Israeli military response, ensure a flow of aid to Gaza and deter Iran and its pawns in the area. All those rival trips illustrate a world divided over Ukraine, the Middle East and other issues.
Netanyahu used to call Vladimir Putin “dear friend.” He has visited Russia a dozen times in recent years. So he was no doubt surprised that it took nine days for the Russian president to pick up the phone after Hamas’ criminal attack in southern Israel. Russia has barely had a word of censure for the militants, despite reports that, among many others, 16 of its citizens were killed and eight more may be missing.
Netanyahu had courted Putin over Russia’s role in Syria, Israel’s most unstable immediate neighbor. Russia has supported the regime of Bashar al Assad, Syria’s murderous dictator, with indiscriminate bombings against various rebel groups. Netanyahu’s desire was to secure Israel’s freedom to pursue its own interests in Syria (including periodic airstrikes) without Russian impediments. Some argue that Netanyahu, Israel’s dominant politician for the past two decades, also has an affinity for strongmen like Putin. Netanyahu hesitated to criticize Russia for its invasion of Ukraine and, when he did, he showed great restraint. He has also not supplied weapons to Ukraine, despite Ukrainian requests.
There is a great potential affinity between Russia and Israel: 15% of Israelis speak Russian due to their origins in the former Soviet Union. Putin appears to admire Israel as a powerful regional power that is not afraid to pull its weight against neighbors and has welcomed Netanyahu’s apparent indifference to Russia’s democratic shortcomings.
Yet for all its cordiality, Russian support for Palestinian nationalism has remained unchanged since Soviet times, when Russia helped train Palestinian fighters and arm the Arab countries that attacked Israel in 1973. Russia has been for a long time closer to Syria than to Israel. Furthermore, Putin’s weakness for Israel has not prevented him from reaching out to Iran, the most vehemently anti-Israel regime in the Middle East.
There is no indication that Russia provided direct assistance to Hamas in the planning or execution of its attack on southern Israel. However, it has maintained friendly relations with the Iranian-backed organization since it came to power in Gaza, guided by the conviction that it could one day be useful to it. In 2007, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov warmly received Khaled Meshal, a member of the Hamas leadership, in Moscow. When Israeli forces entered Gaza in a seven-week operation in 2014, they encountered a large number of Russian anti-tank missiles supplied by Iran.
Russia’s increasingly warm relationship with Iran has already raised tensions with Israel and could have led to a confrontation even without the October 7 atrocity. Last year, when Russia ran out of missiles with which to pulverize Ukraine, it turned to Iran in search of hundreds of Shahed self-detonating drones with which to attack infrastructure and population centers. Now it is manufacturing its own version of that drone with Iranian help. In return, Russia is believed to supply Iran with attack helicopters and air defense systems. These weapons, for their part, would contribute to increasing Iran’s capabilities in the event of a hypothetical war with Israel.
That may not be Putin’s wish, but he likely won’t care if Israel’s war against Hamas intensifies and spreads to other parts of the Arab world. Hamas has already helped divert the West’s attention from the war in Ukraine. Joe Biden is now trying to get Congress to approve more aid for Ukraine by tying it to an emergency aid package for Israel. Now, even if successful, an expanded confrontation in the Middle East will undoubtedly reduce the flow of munitions to Ukraine, largely to Russia’s benefit.
By sending two aircraft carriers to the region, in addition to the trip by Antony Blinken, its main diplomat, the United States has shown an interest in avoiding the extension of the conflict. It hopes to deter Hezbollah, another Iranian pawn, which controls southern Lebanon and has an arsenal of up to 150,000 rockets and missiles aimed at Israel.
A broader war would likely bring two benefits to Russia and Iran. The first would be a rise in oil and gas prices that would help sagging economies and provide Putin with additional money to finance his war in Ukraine. The second would be to disrupt American plans for the Middle East. Hamas has already served Iranian and Russian interests by achieving the indefinite postponement of the peace agreement proposed between Israel and Saudi Arabia to which the United States has dedicated much time and effort.
For very similar reasons, China has also refused to offer comfort to Israel by condemning Hamas. For now, China has limited itself to expressing its concern “about the current escalation of tensions and violence between Palestine and Israel.” According to a report in The Wall Street Journal, by juxtaposing the preparations of heavily armed Israeli forces about to enter Gaza with images of American warships appearing to be heading towards the conflict zone, Chinese media convey the impression that the operation is directed by Washington.
Like Russia, China will be happy to see the United States bogged down in the region and see its authority challenged. Earlier this year, China helped mediate the rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, partly in hopes of undermining the U.S.-led world order. He may have had no suspicion of Hamas’s plans, but he is unlikely to regret the confusion caused.
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Translation: Juan Gabriel López Guix
