There are tragedies that acquire the category of historical reference. Which underline without nuances a before and an after in the memory of the events. That will be remembered for years and that will be used as a comparative exercise for future claims. The tragedy in Valencia, the fire of two towers in a luxury district, will always be part of the collective memory, for decades. It is not only the terrible dimension of the human drama, with nine deaths. It is also about becoming aware of the fragility of an architectural landmark, erected during the real estate boom, which was engulfed in flames in just 30 minutes. Driven by an implacable west, the fire devoured him at an unusual speed; the property of 450 people was completely stripped of trees, and their 143 dwellings, their houses, their homes, burned, a fact that questions in form and substance the criteria of a project on which a thousand suspicions now weigh and which is subjected to judicial instruction.
The story is already known. On Thursday, around 5 p.m., a fire started in a house in the highest tower. The wind was blowing from the west, with virulence. The first firefighters who arrived on the scene were surprised by the speed at which the flames spread. Hours later, the two towers were two torches; they have been completely burned. The quick warning action prevented what could have been a human catastrophe of great dimension. Some yesterday called it a “miracle” that there were not dozens of dead. One shudders to imagine the consequences if it had happened at night. Soon, the technicians understood that something had not worked well in a construction that was promoted in 2000 as luxury and “highest quality” housing. Through the facade, the flames spread at an unusual, excessively fast speed, and a black cloud emerged from the fire that flooded the entire city of Valencia. How could the disaster progress so quickly? The question circulated yesterday in the colleges of architects and engineers in Valencia. There was a first hypothesis: that the covering of the facade, called “skin” by the architects, which had to include, according to the projected visa, a sandwich formed by two aluminum plates with a covering of rock wool, which is completely fireproof, instead it included an insulating but combustible material. This was confirmed to this newspaper by the president of the Official College of Technical Architecture of Valencia (COAT Valencia), Vicente Terol, entity that has the project documentation and photos. He pointed out that, if the skin had been built as planned, the rapid spread of the flames and the black smoke they generated, more typical of polyurethane, would not have been logical. He recognized that the way in which the disaster developed “seems to indicate a priori that the characteristics of the facade together with the prevailing wind influenced it”. The Rigid Polyurethane Industry Association (IPUR) also stated that “there is no evidence that the polyurethane was part of the ventilated facade of the building”.
What material did the developer use to insulate the facade? There is another added issue. If rock wool was used, why did the fire spread so quickly? Was the sandwich made correctly, respecting the configuration of the air chambers? Did the municipal authorities inspect the work once it had started? This newspaper consulted yesterday two prestigious architects and an engineer who requested anonymity but who agreed that, in the first years of the millennium, the production of work was so intense that, sometimes, the builders resorted to materials not projected to meet deadlines. And that the inspectors did not have the scope to control the projects. But it’s just a hypothesis. The truth is that, if rock wool or even fireproof polyurethane had been used correctly, as has been done in many works, the flames should not have advanced at such a speed.
The building, according to data from the school, was started in February 2006, prior to the Technical Building Code (CT), which is the current regulation that governs our buildings and came into force in 2006. of the fire in London, a modification was made in the CT, in 2019, which increased the requirements regarding materials and ventilated facades like this, requirements that increase according to the height of the building. Currently, in buildings of this height, the ventilated chambers must be interrupted in continuity, for example, so that they are segmented and not continuous.
Are there more buildings with similar facade cladding in Spain? There may be hundreds or thousands of them, but that doesn’t mean they aren’t well made. This type of coating, called alucobond, is, according to all the people consulted, an optimal solution for thermal protection but expensive, so it is usually applied to luxury buildings or large companies. It would be necessary to analyze project by project to know how many buildings built during the “brick fever” correctly adopted the rules to incorporate fireproof material in this solution.
Suspicions and doubts also spread among the emergency teams, who undertook an immense task in which their lives were on the line to rescue people and transfer them with guarantees to the hotels where they were resettled and to the municipal building of tobacconist A firefighter told La Vanguardia that, when he entered the charred building, he understood that the flames had acted with unusual aggression due to their speed. The west wind also helped them reach the two towers.
Yesterday, the tragedy generated an immense wave of solidarity, and all the institutions overturned to provide the families with physical, psychological and economic means to face the situation. The main authorities were present at ground zero, from the Prime Minister, Pedro Sánchez, to the Valencian President, Carlos Mazón, and the Mayor of Valencia, María José Catalá. Up to two municipal housing buildings have been made available to families, as well as resources to access financial aid. The scale of the tragedy is not yet defined. And we need to know the truth about a disaster that, perhaps, could have been avoided.
