Very opportunely, in the midst of debate in recent days about the progress of the Ukrainian counter-offensive, the Russian army, after a month of bombing the Kharkiv region, has been able to launch an attack on the city of Kúpiansk, which which has forced the evacuation of 11,000 civilians from 53 localities. This is the same scenario as the spectacular Ukrainian coup in September 2022, which caught the Russian forces by surprise and unprepared.
This comes at a time when the main Ukrainian effort in the south, in Zaporizhzhya province, is almost at the same point as it was in early June, when it began a counteroffensive that many people thought would be heavy and swift. Where did this idea come from? You can look for culprits, but today the question is different: is the counter-offensive moving forward or does it have no future?
Several ideas fueled expectations that the war could end soon: the serious problems of the Russian army, Ukrainian combativeness and the mirage of a hundred Western tanks that would make the difference. It also contributed to the fact that Kyiv – hailed by some American military personnel – talked insistently about recovering Crimea, as if the most expensive piece of the board was within reach.
In the Pentagon, where they know the situation well, they allowed themselves a few days ago to point out the evidence that the war will last all autumn and part of the winter. And the Democratic congressman Mike Quigley said that the briefings he had had with allied military in Europe were “disturbing”, that “this is going slower and slower than I would like” and that it is “the most difficult moment of the war”. Indeed, summer will end, the weather will change and everything can slow down again.
Even before the attack began, the layout of the Russian defensive lines in the south were made public throughout the world (thanks to Western technological input). The Ukrainians now argue that there are too many mines, which has forced them to change tactics in order to reduce the number of casualties (which they do not report). The Institute for the Study of War, in Washington (ISW), the major reference in this war, points out that the Russians practice an “elastic defense”, based on counterattacks and counterattacks, which is exhausting. Russian preparations in the south would have been very efficient, while Wagner Group entertained Ukrainian troops in Bakhmut (these troops have turned the ball, attracting Russian reinforcements to Bakhmut, but this battle is still an episode).
According to the Ukrainians, if they had received more weapons and received them much earlier, they would have attacked in the spring and many lives would have been saved. From their point of view, the biggest problem is not having enough weapons to change the conditions. It is not about the much-discussed F-16 fighter jets – which could perhaps arrive next spring – but about missiles that can disrupt Russian supply lines, a need that indicates that Kyiv is still in the preliminary phase of the counter-offensive. More Franco-British Storm Shadow missiles like those that attacked the Chongar and Henichesk bridges linking Crimea with mainland Ukraine on August 6 would be missing. They did not manage to destroy them completely, but the expertise of the Ukrainian aviation (one of the best-kept secrets of this war) was demonstrated, which on the eve escaped in time from a Russian bombardment of the airfield from Starokonstantyniv.
Volodymyr Zelensky is now asking for German Taurus cruise missiles (range 500 kilometers), which has reopened the political discussion in Berlin for fear that their delivery will contribute to an escalation with Moscow, a fear shared in Washington. The frustration at the counter-offensive is taking the debate between politicians and analysts to Korean-style scenarios, a possible armistice that would involve the division of the country. For Kyiv, a prospect of eternal war.
This prediction of finishing in the tables may be premature. Ukraine still has the initiative and Russia, on the other hand, has had to entrench itself. It must be remembered that it has not managed to conclude the conquest of the four Ukrainian provinces it claims, and which – as the Kremlin spokesman, Dmitri Peskov recently recalled – it has included in its Constitution: Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia and Kherson.
The offensive on Kúpiansk, this week, does not respond immediately to any of these four objectives. It contains the effect of revenge, of course, and also of causing problems for the Ukrainian troops. A victory is also necessary at a time when Moscow is under attack by drones. But situations like this have already been seen, and will continue to be repeated.
The war doesn’t just happen in the trenches, and in this sense the Ukrainians are still masters of the story. Its aerial drone attacks on Moscow and other Russian territories, and naval drones against Russian ships and infrastructure in the Black Sea, are strikes that highlight Russia’s shortcomings, its limited anti-aircraft defense capability, the problems in the Ministry of Defense (the the uproar of the Wagner Group in June, the discord between some commands and, at least according to the ISW, the lack of reserve troops), and therefore rotations in the units at the front, which leads to speculation with the possibility that one day the lines break at some point. It may or may not happen, but in any case it doesn’t seem like the time.
