With just over two weeks to go before the polls, the replacement at the helm of the central government seems more than likely. The Ipsos survey for La Vanguardia, carried out between July 3 and 6 on a sample of 2,000 interviews, yields an estimate that places the PP above 35% of the vote, with an advantage of seven points over the PSOE (which would reap 28% of the ballots). The scenario of July 23 would be completed with almost 13% of the votes for Sumar and 12.6% for Vox.
This correlation would draw a range of seats that would oscillate between a clear absolute majority of the conservative block (with more than 180 deputies) and a wide relative majority, around 170 parliamentarians, of PP and Vox. In the best of cases for the left, the total count of the progressive bloc would not go much beyond 150 seats. However, if the poll’s vote estimate were confirmed on July 23, the most probable outcome would take the PP to 145 deputies which, together with Vox’s 36, would represent a solid absolute majority in the lower house.
In fact, the vote correlation in the survey does not exclude Feijóo from obtaining more seats (145) than PSOE and Sumar, which could remain at 140. This scenario would be consistent with a vote for the conservative bloc as a whole that would be close to 48 % of the vote, very close to the record registered by the center and the right twelve years ago, when PP and UPyD added more than 49% of the vote and gathered 191 deputies. Now, the most favorable projection would give popular and ultras a maximum of 186 deputies.
Of course, the elections are an eternity of two weeks away, so a late reactivation of the left-wing electorate could lead to a scenario conducive to the blockade, so that PP and Vox would not reach the 176 majority seats. In this sense, the hemicycle that the poll draws leaves few possible partners for the right-wing bloc, since, for example, Empty Spain and the Canarian insularists would not add more than three seats. However, some direct data suggests that the PP’s lead is solid, while the base of the left remains very demobilized.
A good example of this situation are the percentages of vote fidelity that the survey collects. While more than 76% of those who voted for the PP in 2019 assure that they will now support Feijóo, less than 60% of those who supported Sánchez in the previous general elections will now repeat their vote for the PSOE. Of course, around 24% of the voters of United We Can in 2019, will bet on July 23 for the Socialist Party. But at the same time, more than 13% of those who voted for the PSOE four years ago are now inclined to choose the Popular Party ballot.
In addition, the PP will benefit from the contribution of more than 60% of former Ciudadanos voters and one in five Vox voters. Conversely, one in ten PP voters in 2019 would now support Abascal. Even so, there is more data that supports the hypothesis of a victory for the popular. For example, something as decisive as the preferences for the future president of the Government also plays in favor of Núñez Feijóo. While 28% of those consulted favor Sánchez, one in three does so for the PP candidate. At the same time, 64% take a victory for the PP for granted, compared to less than 20% who bet on a victory for the Socialist Party.
In reality, almost 60% of socialist voters also believe that the PP will win the elections and less than 30% trust in a PSOE victory. Of course, as a counterpoint, more than 32% of those consulted prefer that the Socialist Party win, compared to 31% who favor the PP. But, globally, 60% are in favor of a change of government in Spain and only 35% support the continuity of the current coalition. The paradox is that more than a third of those who will vote for the left are also in favor of a replacement at the head of the Executive (although a good part of them are in favor of Yolanda Díaz occupying the presidency).
In fact, Sumar’s candidate is the one that obtains the highest percentage of approval for her political work: up to 46% of those consulted approve Yolanda Díaz’s management, compared to 47% who disapprove. Next, Pedro Sánchez achieves a similar approval (45%), but his disapproval soars above 53% due to the rejection he arouses among the conservative electorate. In turn, Núñez Feijóo reaps an approval of 42%, but with a disapproval of 49%. And, finally, Santiago Abascal arouses disapproval that exceeds 70%.
In general, the motivation to vote for one or the other party is “negative.” Thus, the main reason to support the PSOE is “that the right does not win” (30%), in the same way that the main reason to support the PP is “that the left does not win” (27%), in both cases for above management, or the ideas and proposals defended by each candidate.
From this data set, the margin for surprises is small, but not non-existent. For example, voting by mail – which in the United States tilted the elections in favor of the Democrats – would currently reach one in ten respondents. However, the vast majority of those who have applied to vote by mail have not yet decided who. As if they rushed the deadline before making an irreversible decision. And in this sense, the poll itself reflects the existence of 13% undecided who, however, show a firm decision to go to the polls on July 23. It is, in absolute figures, three and a half million voters. Sufficient, therefore, to alter in one way or another the correlation between right and left.
Finally, the electoral projection of the poll detects a significant change in the Catalan scenario and more specifically in the pro-independence universe. There, not only are high margins of indecision and a greater tendency to abstentionism appreciated for now, but also an inversion of positions between Esquerra –winner in Catalonia of the 2019 elections– and Junts, which would now take the lead, although with an advantage just two tenths.
In short, the tremendous polarization of these elections is affecting peripheral nationalism, although in magnitudes and for surely different reasons. In Catalonia, one in ten Junts voters is now inclined to support the PSOE, the same as 11% of the PNV voters in the Basque Country. However, the flight in favor of the ‘useful vote’ reaches one in five ERC voters, who also suffers from the indecision of one in four of their voters. On the other hand, only 6% of the voters of Bildu will choose the socialist ballot and that is why in Euskadi it is the nationalist left that could displace the PNV as the first political force in number of votes.
