In the campaign for the May 14, 2023 elections, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan mobilized the masses by emphasizing Turkey’s growing position as a world power and declaring that not only the Turks, but the entire Islamic world, had an interest in his victory. Across the Middle East, prominent Islamist figures and scholars endorsed him on social media and urged the Turkish people to fulfill their religious obligation by electing him. And, even beyond the region, the elections were also closely followed on the African continent. On May 14, the Somali news portal Horn Diplomat noted that Turkey, under Erdogan, had become “a transformative force that has instilled hope in much of the world; especially in countries that have always been on the receiving end of world powers.” While concerned voices were raised in the global north about Turkey’s continued democratic decline under a new Erdogan government, in the south attention was focused on the country’s successes as a revisionist power with a Muslim identity, shaping its own destiny in the world scene. How do these diametrically opposed visions of Turkey relate to the country’s role in the global south?
Global South is a controversial term, and there is no unanimity about the countries that constitute it. Traditionally, it refers to economically disadvantaged countries, often with unstable democracies and that are in the process of industrialization. Many have a past as European colonies of countries in the global north. As successor to the Ottoman Empire, Turkey bears the burdens of that history in its relations with the Middle East and North Africa (except Morocco). Instead, it has a weak colonial footprint in sub-Saharan Africa, a region that is home to the world’s third-largest Muslim population. Turkey’s mobilization of Islamic identity and its anti-imperialist position have been a key factor in its relations with sub-Saharan Africa. Focusing on Turkey’s approach to that region in particular provides a framework for understanding Turkey’s interests in the global south more generally.
Turkey’s rapprochement with Africa predates Erdogan and can be traced back to the 1998 Africa Initiative Policy. However, Turkey’s commitments to the West during the Cold War made it difficult to adopt non-aligned stances or seek an autonomous position. in foreign policy. The push towards deepening relations with Africa began after 2005, with the declaration of the “year of Africa”, recovering the phrase from 1963, and the admission in 2008 of Turkey into the African Union as a strategic partner. Although previous Turkish leaders had also attempted to diversify Turkey’s spheres of influence, the diversification of Turkish foreign policy in relation to Africa is a unique aspect of Erdogan’s initial period in power and was forged in collaboration with his then advisor, Ahmet Davutoglu. Later, as foreign minister, Davutoglu was the architect of Turkey’s policies of “zero problems with neighbors” and “humanitarian diplomacy.” Both were relevant to framing Turkey as a soft power in Africa. Since then, Turkey’s interests have grown to encompass three key areas: the humanitarian and development agenda, military ties, and economic opportunities.
Turkish foreign policy until 2010 stands out for its dependence on the soft power tools of trade and multilateral diplomacy. In particular, Turkey’s humanitarian and development aid programs, which grew exponentially since 2002, have been significant in its relations with the global south. As prime minister, Erdogan undertook a highly publicized trip to Somalia in 2011, the first by a non-African leader, which helped launch Turkey globally as a humanitarian power. Traveling with him were humanitarian aid officials, businessmen and Muslim charities. Turkey is today among the top ten providers of development cooperation globally, and such cooperation remains an integral part of its foreign policy. Among other things, Turkish aid is presented as an alternative model to aid from traditional donors, as it combines elements of south-south cooperation with Islamic humanitarianism.
The vast majority of Turkish aid (98.9% in 2020 according to the OECD) is provided through coordinated bilateral means, especially through the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), which works closely with all Turkish agents involved in development cooperation (ministries, public institutions, NGOs, private sector).1 TIKA is present in more than 150 countries and has 22 offices in Africa. TIKA coordination facilitates the Government’s ability to use humanitarian and development aid as an extension of foreign policy.
In addition to a cultural presence through the export of religious education and the construction of mosques, the Turkish state actively engages the business community as a key partner in the formulation of humanitarian policy. Turkish investments in development aid serve to open doors to the business community and, consequently, contribute to expanding economic markets for Turkish goods and services. Examples of this are the Turkish construction companies that have participated in the construction of large civil engineering initiatives such as the Suleja-Kaduna highway in northern Nigeria and the already completed Al Halfaia bridge in Khartoum. The visibility of large construction projects positively influences popular perception of Turkey in the global south. In short, humanitarian engagement in the global south has been key to projecting the country as a rising middle power and aligns well with the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) ideological preference for a multipolar world order.
The narrative of Turkey as an essential regional power and a rising global middle power serves to reinforce the AKP’s position at the national level. Erdogan’s ability to project Turkey as an autonomous power, balancing its relations with the West while maintaining good relations with Russia, has earned him admiration in the global south and also domestically. The victory of the nationalist parties in the May 2023 parliamentary elections, with two-thirds of the seats, underlines the effectiveness of such an approach.
After the Arab uprisings of 2011, Turkey adopted an interventionist role in the Middle East (Syria and Libya), which marked the end of the soft power approach and the return to the logic of security in Turkish foreign policy. This was accompanied in domestic politics with harsh repression of all forms of opposition after the Gezi demonstrations in 2013 and the attempted coup d’état in 2016. In addition, the concentration of power in the office of the Presidency after 2018 and a domestic political landscape characterized by populist nationalism have encouraged foreign policy activism. A good illustration of this is Turkey’s numerous incursions into Syria to protect its national interests. Regional disorder and the decline of the US hegemonic role have led to the fragmentation and fluctuation of interest-based alliances in the Middle East. It has also given rise within the region to the emergence of new competitors for geopolitical power, such as Russia, Saudi Arabia and Iran. All those developments in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood favor hard power over soft power.
Therefore, a secondary interest of Turkish policies in relation to Africa focuses on establishing a military presence in other regions as well and strengthening its geopolitical position. In sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey’s previous soft power program has paved the way for expansion in the military sphere. Somalia, with Turkey’s largest embassy in the world, occupies a unique position. Since 2017, Turkey has invested militarily in the country and has built a military training facility for Somali soldiers: Camp Turksom. Somalia’s strategic value is based on the fact that the country is an entry point to the Indian Ocean. Turkey has also signed military training agreements with Ethiopia, Niger and Senegal, among others, and as of 2021 had established thirty-seven military offices in Africa.2
However, along with the increase in military presence, competition from other Middle Eastern states also appears; and the rivalry with Qatar, on the one hand, and with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Arab Emirates, on the other, in the Horn of Africa can bring with it another factor of instability in the region. An example drawn from Somalia is the competition between Türkiye and the Arab Emirates. While Turkey supports the central Somali government, the Emirates support the breakaway region of Somaliland and semi-autonomous Puntland. More recently, Turkey’s reach into the Sahel, where it competes with France, has French officials concerned about the region’s importance in the fight against jihadist militants.
Bolstering its military activism is the development of an indigenous and technologically advanced defense sector. The best example of this is the success of the unmanned aircraft program that emerged in the last decade. Turkish drones have shown their effectiveness in conflicts: the Nagorno-Karabakh war of 2020, according to analysts the first conflict in which an unmanned aerial vehicle won a war from the air. Although Turkish arms sales to Africa lag behind the largest exporters (Russia, the US, China and France), Turkey’s growing success is based on the competitive advantage of its low-priced drones and a lack of conditionalities imposed on its use. Another example: Turkish drones were instrumental in Ethiopia’s war against Tigray rebels. Although it reportedly resulted in the deaths of dozens of civilians, drone diplomacy served to improve the relationship between the Ethiopian government and Turkey. In addition to Ethiopia, drones have also been sold in North Africa to countries such as Libya, Morocco and Tunisia, as well as Niger, Togo and Burkina Faso in West Africa. Although it remains a small player compared to Russia or China, Turkey’s sales to Africa increased seven-fold in 2022 to reach $328 million.3 Reflecting the growing interest, delegations from Africa constituted the largest foreign assistance to Turkey’s largest International Defense Industry Fair in August 2021.
Turkey’s future engagement with the global south will depend on the AKP’s political ability to resolve pressing domestic and regional issues. The appointment of Hakan Fidan as the new Turkish foreign minister indicates continued interest in establishing relations with the global south with an emphasis on the geopolitical benefits. From 2010 to 2023, Fidan was head of the Turkish intelligence agency MIT and previously, from 2003 to 2007, he headed the Turkish development agency TIKA.
However, given the current economic crisis in Turkey, foreign policy will be influenced by both economic needs and geopolitical aspirations. Improving the economy and returning to more rational economic policies is a matter of first order. In the last two years, the lira has lost 60% of its value against the dollar, and the country is struggling with huge debts and an inflation rate close to 40% (June). Consequently, foreign policy strategies that provide economic advantages (such as exporting defense material and obtaining construction contracts) will be a priority.
Turkey’s current economic challenges will also determine the extent to which it can prioritize the soft power aspects of its policy towards the global south. Budgets for humanitarian initiatives have already been reduced due to more pressing internal problems (as has happened with the budgets of European countries). Consequently, Turkey’s economic overtures to key countries in the global south may be part of the solution to its domestic economic problems. Engagement with the global south has the added benefit of elevating Turkey’s standing in the world and reinforcing the perception of the country’s success as a rising revisionist power.
Pinar Tank is a senior researcher at the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO).
