In 2022, the company SpaceX managed to match the record set by the Soviet Union in 1981 with its 61 launches and this 2023 is on track to surpass it since as of March it has already carried out another 19 launches. releases of the year Just as remarkably, SpaceX launches surpassed Russia’s 21 and nearly matched China’s 62. Factoring in additional launches from New Zealand (9), Europe (5) and other countries (7), it turns out that space is getting more and more crowded, and much of the new activity is not coming from the historically dominant players, the US and Russian national space agencies.
In this article, we document the changing landscape of space activities, both in terms of the growing role of commercial companies and the shift towards a greater number of players in space. Only by understanding the causes and consequences of such evolution will we be able to steer the future of space towards use, safety and sustainability.
On May 30, 2020, NASA announced that “for the first time in history, NASA astronauts have lifted off from US soil in a US-built and commercially-operated spacecraft en route to the International Space Station.” Jim Bridenstine, then NASA Administrator, announced the event as follows: “Today begins a new era of human spaceflight as we have once again launched American astronauts on American rockets from American soil to the International Space Station, our national laboratory in orbit around Earth.” Since 2005, SpaceX contracts with NASA have grown to nearly $900 million in fiscal year 2020, all coinciding with a decline in total NASA contract funding.
Several factors explain the growing reliance on SpaceX and shed light on the broader movement of global commercialization of space: the first factor is cost. For years the US government had used contractors for certain aspects of space exploration, but in the 21st century a new model of commercial space companies has emerged. New space companies are characterized by a risk-accepting entrepreneurial attitude, large amounts of private equity funding, and therefore profit orientation. They embody the “fail fast, fail fast” ethos of Silicon Valley, but perhaps seemed too risky for space exploration. The approach led those companies (and, in particular, SpaceX) to try cost-saving measures that the government had resisted. The answer was reusable launch vehicles, which reduce the cost and therefore the accessibility of space innovation.
The second characteristic is the type of contract. With old space companies (such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin), the US government issued a request for proposals based on specific space requirements that it noted as important. Instead, companies in the new space operate on a firm, fixed-price contract, which creates incentives to keep costs low in order to maximize profits. In the case of reusable launchers, the US government had been skeptical and would never have asked for proposals for such a change. However, he received them favorably for two reasons. As noted, NASA budgets were dwindling and the space agency had to do more with less. An undeniable trend underlying the risk appetite with the new space is that, compared to the considerable space budgets that could be counted on during the cold war, the budget situation after it was more restricted. NASA’s budget fell sharply from its peak of $34 billion in 1965 (in fiscal year 2020 dollars) to a low of $19 billion in 2013. Americans have long viewed space exploration as good for society, but few have supported increased spending at NASA. At the same time, the cost per launch was increasing, in part due to a space contracting model that consumed more of a dwindling budget through cost overruns.
Third, and most importantly, we highlight the importance of geopolitical concerns and, in particular, dependency on Russia. The completion of the space shuttle program, which had spectacular successes and failures, left a gap in human space launch options. Lacking a domestic launch vehicle, the US relied heavily on foreign services, adding geopolitical considerations to the technical difficulties. In fact, after the US ended its shuttle program in the early 2000s, NASA turned to Russian Soyuz rockets to fly astronauts to and from the International Space Station. That dependency, however, proved costly: NASA paid an average cost of $56.3 million per space for the 71 missions planned and completed since 2006. Also, Russia’s integration gave Russia significant political leverage in negotiations on the International Space Station and on issues related to space activities. The critical reliance on Russian space assets extended beyond manned missions and the question of station access with the incorporation of Russian components into basic US space vehicles.
The clearest example is the United Launch Alliance’s Atlas V launch vehicle, which uses Russian RD-180 rocket engines. Its 97 releases through 2022 are a testament to both the fruits of the collaborative division of labor and the vulnerabilities of overdependence. However, that dependency became increasingly problematic; above all, after the invasion of Crimea in 2014 and the subsequent sanctions, and then with the tensions caused by interference in the US elections in 2016 and the invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Fourth, and relatedly, is the nascent space race with China. Increasing competition between the two great powers has put pressure on the US to get back into space, do it often and do it with talent. Since Sputnik launched the space race between the US and the USSR, the US space program has been a symbol of power and progress. The rivalry with China is the obvious cause of the current motivation for space exploration. Senator Jerry Moran (Kansas), the top Republican on the Commerce Subcommittee on Space and Science, reflected that feeling of a space race by saying, “We are in a race we could win, but it is certainly conceivable that China can advance in certain areas of space faster than we can. It is in our best interest…to move as quickly as possible and hopefully before our adversaries.” In addition, the fear of a military confrontation and the vulnerability of critical satellite assets to recent Chinese technological advances have put pressure on the US to be ready to quickly replace satellites destroyed during a crisis, should such an eventuality occur. Adding more release providers (particularly those with reusable release capability) will be critical to achieving that goal.
SpaceX has ushered in a commercial era of American space exploration, but its influence is far from limited to that program. In fact, it has served as a proof of concept for other countries and their commercial space sectors. Estimates indicate that the global space industry will be worth more than $1 trillion by 2040 (an increase of 300% from today’s value), with the number of satellites in space, launches, and exploration increasing commensurately. The burgeoning space industry builds on the experience of working with pioneering and innovative commercial players, and its success indicates that the private sector is capable of not only meeting the goal of affordable space exploration, but viably supporting national and non-governmental clients.
The US has already secured a major lead by being a pioneer in regularizing the US model process and putting these new partners in a position to support their own medium-term goals and continue to deliver services abroad before any other state can. Indeed, the so far unparalleled successes of US public-private partnerships in space have already prompted some foreign governments to try to emulate various aspects of that relationship. First and foremost, advanced launch capabilities and R&D programs are key features of states seeking international influence and prominence, making the US model of non-governmental partnerships attractive to rising powers.
The Indian company New Space India Limited (NSIL) was created in 2019 to supply commercial products to its space agency, but also to foreign clients. Again, the motives seem to be commercial and geopolitical: a former military man refers to space as an alternative to the oil economy and a way to establish global prominence and visibility. China currently has 120 to 150 commercial space companies, of which about 25 are launch companies. Their turn to the sector seems to closely follow US motivations, albeit with more emphasis on will versus opportunity. In 2011, the Wolf Amendment banned cooperation between NASA and China, and the combination of a new space race (for example, China’s alternative to the International Space Station and its interest in a Starlink competitor) and a perceived inefficiency of government innovation has created interest in a private sector capable of supporting state goals. China’s promotion of a commercial space sector (particularly launch services) demonstrates a common recognition of the strategic value of space resources, orbital activities and emerging technologies. However, the top-down format of that promotion and other attempts by the state to replicate the success of the new space props demonstrate the uniqueness of the American bottom-up model. Europe has also significantly increased its budget this year (by 25%) to accelerate the development of a greater annual launch capacity with the Ariane 6 launch vehicle; and also, along with public expansion, it has added an investment of 300 million euros to foster the growth of European private space companies.
The transnational influence facilitated by the new space has also turned the US model into an opportunity for smaller countries to exercise greater international authority. For countries without independent launch capabilities, new space companies may be key to securing a place in the space market by capturing a niche not yet saturated by mature space programs. Luxembourg has sought to deregulate its space sector on the American model and provide a “favorable business environment” for companies seeking to create markets for new nascent capabilities, such as asteroid mining.
In Singapore, a robust commercial space industry sector has matured and grown, encouraged by the development and successful launch of the nation’s first communications satellite. It has been a collaboration between Singapore Telecommunications (SingTel) and the Taiwanese company Chunghwa Telecom, but in which 60 companies from 11 different countries have also participated. With a globalized economy interconnected through space, innovation and transnational service delivery may make these countries indispensable to the international community.
For starters, as more governments apply the US model, more opportunities for cooperation, joint ventures, and science diplomacy will emerge, as will more pressures for international competition as countries try to catch up, secure their own market share (particularly internationally), and establish themselves in new space activities made possible by the current boom. At the same time, the increased number of launches will fill already crowded orbits, increasing space debris and the risk of collisions; especially if the by-products of “fail fast, fail fast” innovation fail at the worst time and place. The nightmare scenario would be the so-called Kessler syndrome, a situation in which space debris collides with other orbiting satellites and produces new debris, repeating the process, eventually contaminating entire orbits with impassable debris fields for many years.
Second, reusable launch vehicles complicate the governance of space activities. They will increase the number of actors capable of accessing space and allow them to carry out a broader range of activities that may not be fully covered by current space legislation. Opportunistic states could take advantage of affordable access to carry out activities previously out of reach due to high costs. Some of these activities may not be legally well defined in current space law and require concerted efforts to define, clarify and standardize to accommodate new and proliferating capabilities. The entry of new players (particularly private launch companies) may incentivize states to protect these external players as valuable assets amid expanding orbital activities. In turn, these companies could use their profits to act as a new interest group and shape the direction of US space policy to help them compete with foreign counterparts.
Third, the emergence of this new type of actor will raise questions of governance. Negotiating the International Space Station amid the tense relationship between Russia and the US has been quite a challenge. If we add a multitude of commercial actors with different ties or levels of responsibility to national governments, the coordination problem is considerably complicated. The challenge creates opportunities, but it can also foster the emergence of regional organizations that fragment the world into distinct, separate and imperfectly coordinated regulatory regimes.
Which way to go? Developed space programs should take advantage of the experience gained with public-private partnerships to increase international coordination and seek a common regulatory framework for the governance of private space activities. The Artemisa agreements are already going to increase compatibility and coordination between the signatories, but there is scope to deepen those objectives and expand cooperation beyond traditional collaborators. The acceleration of access and development of outer space requires the responsible use and management of an increasingly fragile orbital environment, both politically and materially. Existing national players must advocate for regulations that allow new and future players to benefit from the growing space economy, but do so according to rules that are consistent for all. Otherwise, other countries may be inclined to develop parallel and alternative space legal regimes that would favor them within isolated blocs, thereby limiting opportunities for coordination and cooperation.
A global regulatory regime may mean sacrificing some US advantages for the common good, consistency, and security. The recent move towards achieving a global ban on kinetic anti-satellite weapons is an excellent model. The US is the country with the most experience in anti-satellite technologies, and its strategic value only increases as attackable space activities spread. However, the international expansion of such capabilities threatens space activities in general, which has prompted the ongoing search for a common framework to eliminate such weapons. An internationally shared regulation of commercial space activities can also prevent more risky and unsustainable commercial practices in order to preserve space for all. Together, we can emerge from this space commercialization boom more prosperous, more confident, and more prepared to explore the opportunities we are just beginning to discover.
The participation of the new space in the public system of contracts has four key characteristics: the reduction of launch costs, the change in the type of contract from flexible to fixed, the clear distance from dependence on Russia, and the improvement in the reliability and redundancy of satellite capabilities in the face of geopolitical competition with China. The new space model is today adopted by other governments around the world. However, these benefits may herald new challenges: with increased access, the likelihood of governance problems will increase, and the costs of coordination failures (including the Kessler syndrome doomsday scenario) will also increase. Thus, a greater degree of governance and cooperation between national governments is increasingly needed, all in the shadow of increased geopolitical turmoil and conflict.
Sarah Kreps, Avishai Melamed and Adi Rao are professors at Cornell University, USA.
