Contrary to public opinion’s perception, the terrorist threat at this time in Spain is greater than it was in March 2004, when the jihadist attacks against the Atocha area in Madrid took place, according to sources told La Vanguardia. of the intelligence services. In the last twenty years, the National Intelligence Center (CNI) has adapted its structures based on the metamorphosis that terrorism has undergone, marked by the atomization of large organizations. The fronts from which a terrorist attack on European territory can come have multiplied, but there is one that is of particular concern over the rest: the Sahel.
This African area of ??great instability – marked by military coups d’état, the expansion of Russian mercenaries and the withdrawal of Western troops – is the one chosen by the majority of terrorist groups to establish their bases from which to plan and coordinate possible terrorist attacks. And that is where the CNI has much of its focus, dedicating a good number of troops to obtain information from the guts of the organizations, according to the same sources. Information that is shared with many countries, both Western and Muslim, that have a common interest in combating jihadism.
This struggle, today, cannot be understood without international cooperation. Al Qaeda and the Islamic State no longer enjoy the hegemony of global terrorism; Countless subsidiaries have been appearing with a high degree of autonomy that are expanding their tentacles. It was easier to fight against the large clearly identified structures than against the multitude of small groups that are emerging. Much of NATO’s presence on Afghanistan’s borders for almost two decades would not be explained without the need to keep jihadists at bay. Now there is some uncertainty in the CNI due to the situation in Iraq, where pro-Iran militias harass international military missions against jihadist terrorism.
Zero risk does not exist, but for a structured organization to act on Spanish soil is very unlikely, according to experts in the fight against terrorism. The main threat is lone actors, who suffer self-radicalization marked by easy access to jihadist propaganda on social networks. These radicalization processes tend to be so express in many cases that they force arrests to be rushed to prevent them. This is another of the great differences that the fight against terrorism has experienced. In the time of ETA, once the terrorist was detected by the secret services, he was not arrested until “he was completely burned”, that is, all kinds of information had been obtained from him through telephone interventions that could be used to a big blow to the structure. Not now. At the slightest sign of an attack, arrest is made.
Precisely these wiretaps are what allowed the CNI on March 11, 2004 to hear how several ETA terrorists under investigation denied responsibility for the attack, which caught the Spanish intelligence service “by surprise.” In one of the first informative notes that were sent to Moncloa, around 9 a.m., jihadist authorship was ruled out, which was already on the table at that early moment. By mid-morning it was clear to them that ETA had not carried out the attack, something that cost the CNI to stay out of the monitoring and evaluation tables of the attack that were held those days. Something unthinkable two decades later in this matter, since thanks to the comprehensive model of its system it has valuable information both inside and outside the Spanish borders to collaborate with national and regional police forces.
The most recent reports in the fight against terrorism show increasing radicalization, “a more savage way of carrying out terrorism,” the same sources specify. While before the attacks were directed against economic or political symbols – such as the World Trade Center – now the branches of Al Qaeda or the Islamic State talk about killing wherever they can, the more the better. They do it through propaganda consumed by increasingly younger kids, hence the current concern in the security forces and bodies about the rise of terrorist minors. This is very violent audiovisual material, which is not only found on social networks, but also penetrates through other channels such as video games.
