Recent world events, from the Covid pandemic to the war in Ukraine, have sparked great interest in the so-called global south’s perceptions of the West. Indeed, the global reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in early 2022 caught the entire West somewhat off guard given the global south’s perceived antipathy toward what was happening on Europe’s eastern flank. There was an implicit expectation that there would be near-unanimous global condemnation of Russia for the invasion of Ukraine, given its violent and unprovoked nature. That rejection did not materialize, and the initial disbelief quickly turned into moral exasperation by the West at the countries of the global south that it had supported for decades with huge amounts of official development aid. The initial state of incomprehension in the face of the global reaction provoked a kind of moment of self-reflection and, without a doubt, of questioning where the alliances really lie.
However, that rather simplistic view overlooks a long-standing growing trend in the way the West is perceived in the rest of the world, where issues of global justice, anti-colonialism and hypocrisy merge in a mirror. of complex issues clouded by historical dynamics, perceptions of justice and equity, and a real desire for self-determination. And it reflects a world where relationships are increasingly transactional and cynical, leaving relatively limited space to collectively advance global problems.
In general, the prospective scenarios for the next decade coincide in four possible outcomes of the evolution of the world order. Each of them represents a unique challenge for the EU in charting its path, both in strategic and tactical terms.
The first scenario is a multipolar world structure in which power is dispersed among several global economic and political centers; and that, in fact, calls into question the international order dominated until now by the West.1 In this scenario, the world goes from a “world globalization” to a “geopolitics of division”, with the appearance of economic and political blocs. politicians who operate according to different ideologies and priorities.
A second scenario, the south-east axis, continues with a multilateral world but presents a future where the rise of China begins to reshape global norms and institutions and where the interests of the global south align with those of that Asian country. Such a scenario is characterized by a more economically and politically engaged China, as well as a disinterested US due to economic turmoil and internal political fragmentation.
The third scenario formulates a post-neoliberal world under the banners of “progressive capitalism” and “healthier globalization.”2 “Reformist capitalists” advocate an approach that combines the forces of capitalism with state intervention to ensure socially desirable outcomes and address the inequalities produced by neoliberalism. Others advocate a more careful globalization process that respects national priorities and institutional capacities.3
The fourth scenario predicts a bipolar world order defined by two hostile superpowers: the US and China. That structure recalls the power dynamics of the Cold War, although with economic and technological supremacy, not military capacity, as the main point of contention. However, critics warn that this view oversimplifies the complex dynamics of power interaction on a global scale.4
Each scenario presents a unique set of challenges for the EU, which is based on the principles of multilateralism and for which reaching a collective agreement is an almost constant existential question.
All four visions inevitably have a Western tinge. There is very little research available to say with certainty that those visions fit what the collective global south would also propose as future scenarios. Our interpretation must be based, therefore, on what has already been observed in other areas of study and take advantage of it to advance a fifth potential scenario, that of multilaterality.
Over the past decade, China’s growing involvement in the global south has exacerbated spheres of influence in geographies previously under the exclusive orbit of the West. However, these countries do not want to choose or decide between two binary options; In fact, the more agents involved, the better, precisely because the possibility of multiple options is offered. In such a scenario, a multipolar future is preferred to others.
The idea of ??multilateralism takes a step further in practice and offers a vision of the future centered on a much more intense form of transactional multilateralism. For the EU, this is a vision in which the Union works with partners in each region to advance issues of global importance in a much more flexible way than has been usual. This is a much more nuanced idea where, instead of having a set of treaties and policies based on carrot and stick, there is a set of guiding principles and basic rules that condition the commitment.
In such a vision, the thorniest questions are considered in terms of what is desirable and not what is obligatory; That is, it is a selection system that prioritizes commitment in a more pragmatic way that may not pass the test of broader values, but ends up being good enough. Ultimately, it may mean having to work with partners who may not always be ideal, but who have legitimacy in other areas and will serve as a good enough substitute. Now, this multilaterality must be supported by a basic rule or insurmountable red line.
For multilateralism to work, the values ??or basic norms that support it must have some basis of universality that guarantees acceptance by other global partners. It may be the only way to ensure credibility in an effort that will ultimately be much more transactional than the community would normally be comfortable with.
What values ??are universal? Much has been said about the universality of the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). However, a common criticism of the UDHR is that it does not take into account the plurality of diversity,5? ? that it ignores the cultural and historical contexts of non-Western states.6 Based on Amartya Sen’s definition , that is, that a value is universal because “people anywhere can have reasons to consider it valuable”,7 we arrive at the founding values ??of the EU; values ??that, based on the thirty articles enshrined in the UDHR, have been summarized in six basic principles: respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights.8 However, following Sen’s definition, democracy is arguably the most recognized and fundamental value, the value that bridges the cultural divides between the global north and the global south. Ultimately, fundamental adherence to democracy provides the cornerstone for the other fundamental principles that come after; and, above all, for the rule of law, which is the basic principle of any social contract between the individual, the State and the economy.
The EU must harness that basic principle in its relations with the global south, not to bully others into submission, but as the literal value proposition it represents. That must be done in such a way that collaboration takes into account the particularities of each region and addresses engagement through the most compatible partners in each geography.
Pacific Asia
Asia-Pacific geopolitical dynamics (including the US-China rivalry) have made it difficult for the region to maintain good student status by traditional value metrics. In fact, taking into account that China’s own Southern Strategy9 now emphasizes security considerations (when it initially prioritized economic development without conditions), it is no surprise that the pendulum movements that influence the political dynamics (not only of Burma, but also Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines) have affected everything from the judiciary to the rule of law.
However, with the emergence of the EU Indo-Pacific Strategy, the cooperation framework has become more concrete and (given the range of issues in which the EU wishes to get involved) also somewhat more nebulous. In such a terrain, it is rather a matter of the EU showing its leadership by taking a step back (not to be confused with disengaging) and supporting the various efforts of the countries of the region to advance the issues of the common agenda, from connectivity to climate.
In that sense, the two countries that stand out as obvious partners are Japan and South Korea. The EU has developed solid relations with both given the clear compatibility in the spectrum of values ??and interests. In fact, there is a nascent trend in which all three adopt greater pragmatism in their approaches towards Asia-Pacific countries and follow a much more nuanced approach towards the region, using values ??more as rhetorical tools than as ultimate objectives in themselves. themselves.
One concrete way forward in this area is for the EU to work with South Korea to reform the US-initiated Democracy Summit process into something more inclusive. The polarizing nature of this process has made even the same old people, such as Japan, hesitate to defend it firmly. However, if this process is completely ignored, there is a risk of throwing away the healthy fruit with the rotten one. There is still inherent value in providing a space for Asia-Pacific countries to come together on that controversial issue without having Big Brother in the room.
Latin America
The region is still slowly leaving behind the ravages caused by Covid, which affected it disproportionately.10 Furthermore, the bloc has been immersed in a rollercoaster of unrest: from the mass demonstrations in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia and Ecuador11 to the political upheavals in Peru and Brazil; Even Uruguay, once considered the regional bastion of democracy,12 has been embroiled in corruption scandals.13
However, despite the gloomy outlook, there are positive democratic aspects. Brazil, despite the now much more moderate initial enthusiasm for the return of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, should not be overlooked. With a demonstrated interest14 in promoting regional cooperation, the country is prepared to promote the defense of democracy in the region. Uruguay should not be ruled out either, despite the recent political turmoil.
In fact, the EU’s relationship with Latin America is undergoing something of a renewal. A survey conducted by Latinobarómetro highlights Europe as the “preferred region to partner with” for almost half of those interviewed.15? ? There is real space for cooperation, from strengthening democracy and human rights to the fight against climate change and the promotion of sustainable development.16 However, the relaunch of the relationship will not be without challenges. The EU needs to revitalize its relationship with the bloc amid rising Chinese influence17 and address divergent attitudes towards the implementation of sanctions against Russia.18 Perhaps the biggest challenge is convincing the region that the EU’s intention of renewing and strengthening ties is authentic and lasting.
The most obvious path in that space is the resolution of the EU-Mercosur trade pact. Mercosur and the EU have been locked in trade discussions for two decades, but there is now a renewed push to seal the deal. It would be a concrete demonstration of the European commitment to strengthening ties with the region.
Middle East and North Africa
The EU, with its history and influence in the Middle East and North Africa, finds itself at an interesting crossroads as the region pivots towards China both economically and politically.19 The recent readmission of Syria into the Arab League has marked the symbolic end of the Arab Spring20 and constitutes a real example of the complex relationship between stability, unity and democratic norms. On the one hand, this movement indicates a regional preference for stability and unity, even at the expense of democratic principles, in a distant echo of the community tolerance shown with Hungary and Poland when this has been necessary. On the other hand, it gives the EU the opportunity to promote these principles by supporting exchanges between people who seek to mediate in long-term conflicts and foster dialogue to fill the void created by the US withdrawal.21
While recognizing the diversity that exists in the Middle East and North Africa, it is essential that the EU identifies potential partners most aligned with its democratic ideals. However, it should also address why civil societies in the region view it with skepticism; namely, the widespread discrimination that exists within European countries and, in foreign policy, the support for undemocratic regimes in the name of security.22 However, the EU has strategic and diplomatic influence in the region with Turkey, a member and NATO partner Israel, as well as strong economic and energy partnerships with the Gulf Cooperation Council and many North African countries. Most importantly, the EU has an advantage that neither China nor Russia have: large diasporas and civil societies from the Middle East and North Africa spread across Europe.
Based on the concept of multilateralism, the EU can adopt a two-tier approach in the region. Firstly, a values-based approach, fostered through exchange between people drawing on their diverse diasporas, while at the same time openly aiming to support democracy and the rule of law in its southern neighborhood as a condition for economic development. Second, where there are no natural allies at the state level, a more nuanced approach will be necessary, focusing on areas of shared interest such as renewable energy and water security,23 while clarifying the EU’s red lines. Engaging these countries in a strategic partnership as neighbors could serve the dual purpose of reinforcing such values ??within the countries and providing a platform for broader regional influence.
The evolution of relations between the EU and Asia-Pacific, Latin America and the Middle East and North Africa shows that multilateralism (perhaps even multilateralism) provides fertile ground for advancing alliances and, at the very least, offers a somewhat more optimistic vision of the future for the global commons than the four scenarios cited at the beginning. And, most importantly, it offers space for collective efforts on several fronts (from values ??to interests) that put partners on a level playing field. A necessary prerequisite to advance our common challenges
Lizza Bomassi, Pavi Prakash Nair and Zakaria Al Shmaly. Carnegie Europe.
