At the end of the summer of 1936, the Francoist insurgents dominated much of western Andalusia. Leaving from Seville at the beginning of August, his columns invaded Extremadura with the aim of linking up with the rebel forces in the north, which had already reached Cáceres. Immediately afterwards, they headed towards Madrid. The rapid advance of Franco’s army, between the months of August and November, left behind an occupied zone, but, certainly, little protected, in the Extremadura provinces.
During the fall, winter, and early spring of the following, there was fierce fighting around Madrid. First there was the frontal attack on the capital, followed by the military operations on the A Coruña highway, the Jarama river and, finally, Guadalajara. The limited success of these actions led Franco to transfer the weight of his operations to the north, where, between March and October 1937, the rebels conquered Bizkaia, Santander and Asturias, after which they had abundant forces available to advance on other fronts.
For the Republican strategists – the most distinguished of whom was possibly the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel Vicente Rojo – the question was where to carry out an assault using the new Popular Army, much changed for almost a year, when it reduced to little more than undisciplined militias and disorganized military units.
It was then that theaters of operations that were previously considered secondary became relevant. One of them was the Extremadura front, where there were solid road junctions and railway junctions that constituted significant points in the rear of the rebels. The Portuguese border also represented an area of ??easy movement, offering, for example, security areas for Francoist planes forced to land.
In short, the Francoists controlled a continuous territory that crossed the whole of western Spain, from north to south, while the highway and the railway line between Seville and Mérida became arteries of the utmost importance, since they facilitated movement between the rear guards of the northern and southern parts of the country and between the ports where reinforcements from their allies, Germany and Italy, and Morocco arrived.
It is normal for the military strategy to seek to attack the enemy in the area of ??the front that it considers weakest. That was the beginning of the German Schwerpunkt concept, where the attacker penetrates an area deemed poorly defended and, using mechanized forces and aviation, exploits tactical success. Such a strategy was surely known by Vicente Rojo, who had published English works on the subject.
However, months before Rojo presented his famous Plan P, the professional heads of the Information Section of the Republican General Staff, led by Colonel Manuel Estrada, had already prepared a project entitled Plan for information, destruction and mass uprising of the region of Extremadura, susceptible of being extended later to other regions. In reality, it was not a military campaign per se, but rather a series of guerrilla sabotage actions, together with a possible mass uprising to distract the enemy from their activities around Madrid.
This plan, however, did not come to fruition, being postponed until April 1937 due to the battles around Madrid and the loss of Malaga in February of the same year. At that time the primitive project was rescued and the Extremadura Plan was also elaborated.
On April 22, the first Plan P was submitted to the Minister of War and head of government, Francisco Largo Caballero. It stressed the urgent need to move the enemy forces away from the Bizkaia front. The offensive in Extremadura would also have the purpose of isolating Andalusia from the rest of the rebel zone and cutting the line along the Tagus valley through which supplies and reinforcements were brought up to the Madrid front.
In this way, Franco would be forced to transfer some of his large units from that front and, it was also hoped, from Bizkaia. The plan, very ambitious and daring, set Mérida as his first objective, as it was an important communications hub. Then the region of Oropesa (Toledo) would be occupied, and then operations would be carried out in the direction of Madrid’s Valdemorillo-Brunete-Villaviciosa de Odón (that part was delayed until July).
The estimated forces necessary for the operations on Mérida included eight mixed brigades, fourteen artillery batteries, two companies of tanks, armored cars, and sapper units. To attack in the Oropesa region, the detached units would be five brigades, a tank company, and several sapper units.
As advancing towards Mérida and Oropesa with only thirteen mixed brigades was judged notoriously insufficient, additional brigades were withdrawn from the Centro front, as well as two traditional divisions, the 35th and the 11th, mainly communist in character.
However, the possibility of weakening the front of the Center in such a way aroused the resistance of its boss, General José Miaja. In turn, the tensions between Largo Caballero and the Communist Party, together with the Soviet advisers, for whom the defense of Madrid and the prestige of Miaja were untouchable, indicated that the plan would not be carried out.
Rojo, who had thought of launching the offensive as of May 7, had to suspend it when Miaja refused to give the order to detach the designated forces. Then, on the 14th, the Air Force Headquarters, probably dominated by the Russian command, reported “that there were not enough fighters available to support the operation.”
Here the historiography insists that it was political reasons that prompted the Russian advisers to deny air collaboration and the PCE to support Miaja, thus preventing the operation. Given the conflict between Largo Caballero and the communists, which would soon topple the veteran socialist, these motivations were probably of great relevance. However, the success of the Extremadura project was by no means certain. Among other things, because the detached forces were insufficient and because the inclusion of several tank companies did not inspire much confidence, taking into account the unskillful use of such a weapon by the People’s Army.
In order to prevent a probable direct attack by the rebels against Madrid and recover the initiative after the loss of the Northern front in October, Rojo drew up a second Plan P. The general planned to mobilize up to three army corps (nine divisions or twenty-seven mixed brigades), in In total, an army of one hundred thousand troops, in a surprise offensive that would be launched in Extremadura, would penetrate Andalusia and take Seville.
His thesis was rejected by Indalecio Prieto, Minister of National Defense, because, if it were carried out, they would have had to weaken other fronts, mainly the Center. Furthermore, it was stressed that the Republican forces did not have enough weapons, planes or supplies to risk carrying out such an operation.
Despite the rejection, Rojo continued to insist and re-proposed his plan, emphasizing that in the Extremadura area there was a real possibility of victory. The enemy had few and poorly organized units there, so Rojo believed it was feasible to cut the railway line that linked Andalusia with the north. The chief of the General Staff maintained that an action with strategic effects could only be developed in that area, tipping the balance in favor of the Republic.
The general did clarify, however, that the plan needed forces capable of maneuvering in free terrain and with commanders “sufficiently competent and energetic to impose discipline and rigorous military conduct, in terms of compliance with the orders issued for the development of las operaciones”, a description at odds with the occasional unfavorable comment from Rojo about the Republican forces. His report concluded with this assessment: “Despite the effective risks that can be run, it is preferable to run them.”
Rojo’s plan was divided into three phases: occupation of the area, separating the enemy in two, seizure of the Peñarroya mining basin and, finally, pressure on Seville, taking advantage of the initial success. That time, Plan P provided for the use of five army corps, but considering that the battle of the Ebro, the largest of the war, was going to be launched with only three corps, it seems unlikely that the Council of Ministers would approve the proposal. Should it fail, it could have spelled the end of the Republic military.
In effect, once again the government rejected Plan P, supporting an attack on Teruel instead. That battle, which began on December 22, 1937, claimed a large number of troops and prevented any further offensive.
This text is part of an article published in number 653 of the Historia y Vida magazine. Do you have something to contribute? Write to us at redaccionhyv@historiayvida.com.
