After last week’s turbulent elections in Pakistan, another giant of the Muslim world, Indonesia, goes to the polls this Wednesday. This is the most complex electoral logistics of all those that are resolved in a single day, in a country with 280 million inhabitants spread over more than seven thousand islands. Some, like Sumatra, have impossible terrain and are larger than all of Japan. To take the ballots to the most remote villages, in each call more than five hundred officials lose their lives, nicknamed “martyrs of democracy.”
This year, Indonesians face a paradoxical decision. The former general who in 2014 and 2019 starred in a fierce duel with Joko Widodo, in both cases refusing to accept his defeat, is running again for the position of president in a candidacy in which Jokowi’s favorite son (as he knows him) is running for vice presidency. everyone), Gibran Rakabuming Raka.
In fact, former general Prabowo Subianto was Jokowi’s Defense Minister during the last term. For some, the decisions of Jokowi – one of the very few Indonesian politicians who does not come from the oligarchy or the army – demonstrate a refined realism. For others, it shows that the Indonesia of General Suharto’s New Order – which buried Sukarno’s non-aligned Indonesia – is not dying and Indonesian democracy is not ending.
But even his detractors recognize the country’s leap forward during his two terms, ten non-extendable years. Jokowi’s recipe for trying to preserve his influence once he is out of power is not entirely unprecedented. In the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte placed his daughter as vice president, in the candidacy that has returned the presidency in Manila to the Marcos clan, in the person of Ferdinand Marcos, son of the dictator of the same name.
For some, Jokowi’s pact with the reality of Indonesia tastes like resignation. For others, someone outside the oligarchy had no other way to carry out their program and survive the loss of power. Already in the previous elections, Jokowi surprised by giving the position of vice president to the cleric who headed the largest Islamic association in Indonesia and also in the world. Renaissance of the Ulema, in any case, advocates the tolerant and syncretic Islam of the archipelago. He thus closed the way to the hardline Islamists who, fugitives in Saudi Arabia, characterized Jokowi as a crypto-Christian, giving their support to Prabowo, always tempted by the strong hand.
Human Rights organizations are scared by the probable presidency of Prabowo, still a septuagenarian. His military career, promoted by his influential family – banker grandfather, finance minister father – accelerated after marrying the daughter of dictator Suharto. He was the head of the special operations division, the armed wing of political repression in East Timor and West Papua.
But what forced his replacement were raids on students, many of whom were tortured and killed. Thirteen of them disappeared forever, but the former general only acknowledges the arrests, without further explanation. His inaction, in the most pious explanation, vetoed his entry into the United States for many years.
However, today’s students, who were not even born then, laugh at the former general, who, with good advice, has sweetened his image on the networks, transforming himself into a funny grandpa who . If Facebook was decisive in giving victory to Marcos in the Philippines – according to the Nobel Peace Prize winner, Maria Resso – Tik Tok could give it in Indonesia to Prabowo and Jokowi’s son, even more skilled in memes.
Jokowi, also known as the Asian Obama – with whom he also bears a notable physical resemblance – came to overcome the oligarchy but now sees him being accused of nepotism. Not in vain, his son was five years away from turning forty, the mandatory age in Indonesia to run for president or vice president. The obstacle was eliminated when his brother-in-law – and uncle of the candidate – whom he had promoted to president of the Constitutional Court, sponsored the doctrine that having held a public office – Gibran is mayor of Surakarta, like his father before – exempted him from such requirement. Although the brother-in-law was subsequently dismissed for not having inhibited himself from the decision, it has been upheld.
For the first time in fifteen years, this Wednesday’s elections are not a duel between two, but rather there are three candidates in the running, although they barely exceed 20% voting intention. The question is whether Prabowo will add more than 50% of the votes and finally become president the first time, or if he will need a second round in a few months.
One of the contending candidates, Ganjar Pranowo, former governor of Central Java, paradoxically, is part of the same party as Widodo, whose president is the former head of government, Megawati Sukarnoputri. Both this candidate and Sukarno’s daughter consider themselves betrayed by Jokowi, even though he does not publicly support his son, nor does he need to. On the other hand, Sukarnoputri has not given any sign that her party will cease to be a family, pseudo-dynastic fiefdom, as in so many other Asian countries.
The other candidate, who represents Islamic conservatism, Anies Baswedan, is increasing his voting intention, slowly but surely. He is a former governor of Jakarta, with a professorial profile.
In any case, the holding of elections in Indonesia, in a stable framework – with the exception of West Papua – represents hope in this part of the world. Especially because Jokowi has managed to exorcise several of the fears that were raised at the beginning of his mandate, given the strength of the oligarchy, the military and the rise of Islamism. Although Jokowi, lacking a real power base, has shied away from frontal confrontation with such powerful enemies and has even had to appease them, turning them into partners, he has not betrayed his great promises.
The Jokowi governments have seen the introduction of the minimum wage throughout the archipelago, the deployment of social security, previously practically non-existent. All this, with an annual growth of 5%. Ten years ago, Indonesia’s four biggest fortunes accumulated as much wealth as the poorest one hundred million Indonesians. It is not certain that this has been reversed, but there is a consensus that almost everyone has improved their luck, as even his former rival, Prabowo, maintains.
There have been concessions to the Islamists in matters of customs, but Indonesia remains a relatively comfortable country for its minorities, such as the Catholics of Flores or the Hindus of Bali. Papua, with tribes of the Melanesian race recently converted to Christianity, but who lived in the Stone Age until a few decades ago, has a much more difficult fit, although a specific recognition of its uniqueness has been put on the table (it was not incorporated to Indonesia until the 1960s, against the wishes of the Dutch). The construction of a highway through West Papua, as well as several ports and airports, reduces their isolation, although recalcitrant independence supporters may argue that it benefits the mining multinationals more than them.
In addition to nickel, copper, magnesium or gas, Papua is home to the largest gold mine in the world. The latter has been, for five years, 51% owned by the Indonesian state, although the American parent company, Freeport, retains 49%. Once again, Jokowi renounced forceful measures, such as nationalization, in favor of the pact. Of course, without presenting any cracks, having incorporated all living forces into his government. Three and a half billion dollars, in a period of six months, raised the state’s shareholding – previously a meager 9% – to a controlling majority.
It should be said, finally, that a foreseeable Prabowo presidency – in the first or second round – introduces some unknowns in international politics. Not in vain is he an impulsive politician, in the wake of the former police officer Duterte, but with much more solid grips on power (his brother, in addition, is a tycoon). However, in relation to the United States and China, no major changes are expected. The other candidates do not propose them either. Japan and Australia also serve as a counterweight.
During the last decade, China’s weight has grown in Indonesia, becoming the first trading partner, by far. But the country sees itself as a middle power – and not a demographic dwarf like Laos or Cambodia – so there is no fear of subordination. The New Silk Roads have overlapped quite harmoniously with Jokowi’s goals of infrastructure modernization. The most recent fruit of this is the Chinese-made high-speed train between Jakarta and Bandung, a city symbol of decolonization.
But, as noted, we must not rule out a much more prominent international profile in an Indonesia governed by Prabowo, despite his lower political intelligence. Last June, the former general allowed himself to launch a peace plan for Ukraine: Freezing of the front, withdrawal of all troops within fifteen kilometers, patrolling by the Blue Helmets and referendums in the disputed areas. Beijing applauded him, but not Kyiv, nor Brussels. Although in this case, Prabowo is one of the Asian leaders who verbalizes most frequently and clearly that Europe counts for little.
(Below, the general’s peculiar way of dancing, viral on the networks)
