In December 2022, back-to-back visits by two veteran Japanese legislators, Koichi Hagiuda, Chairman of the Political Research Council of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Hiroshige Seko, LDP Secretary General in the Upper House, consolidated the story about the Japan’s accelerated strategic and diplomatic shift in relation to its stance on Taiwan. Hagiuda’s trip was the first by a key LDP figure in 19 years. Earlier, in July 2022, another high-ranking delegation led by former Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba had held talks with Taiwanese officials on regional security issues to anticipate and prevent the escalation of any potential conflict in the Taiwan Straits and beyond. there.
Those recent high-level visits are therefore historic in that they have ended the years of deference not to cross China’s red line on Taiwan; a Taiwan that was repeatedly reiterated as constituting a “fundamental interest” and an “inalienable” part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China (according to the principle of “one China”). Unsurprisingly, Beijing has criticized the visits as a violation of “Japan’s commitment on the Taiwan question” and an “irrational move to undermine stability in the Taiwan Strait.”
This abandonment of Japan’s traditional non-confrontational diplomatic stance with China becomes all the more relevant considering that the LDP leaders were close associates of the recently assassinated former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, a staunch supporter of Taiwan (considered a hawk on China). ) and to strengthen ties with Japan. Abe’s oft-quoted remarks linking Taiwan’s fate to Japan’s security interests have never seemed so prescient for Japanese security policy, which has decidedly changed course.
Despite Japan’s current shift toward an intensification (if not full adoption) of rhetoric, the contentious Taiwan issue has been in the air for some time. The April 2021 US-Japan joint statement and the July 2021 defense white paper put into effect Japan’s intention to include “crisis sense” in the Taiwan Strait in its official policy. That interplay of security interests was clearly articulated by Taiwanese President Tsai Ingwen (who has pledged to deepen security cooperation between Taiwan and Japan, and other “like-minded” democracies, to safeguard regional security) when she stated that “ On the question of strategic security, Taiwan is a very critical line of defense of the first island chain.” Therefore, China’s unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait are not only an encouragement for Japan to defend the neighboring country’s Japanese territory, but also to take responsibility for the stability of the entire Indian region. -peaceful.
After the (controversial) visit to Taiwan made in August 2022 by Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the US House of Representatives, the increase in tensions on both sides of the Strait and also between China and Japan has increased the Japanese determination to strengthen deterrence , which includes the strengthening of ties with Taiwan.
In retaliation for Pelosi’s visit, the PRC not only conducted live-fire military exercises around Taiwan, exerted economic coercion, and launched cyber-attacks against Taiwanese infrastructure, it also fired multiple ballistic missiles that landed inside the exclusive economic zone. (EEZ) of Japan.
Although the People’s Liberation Army regularly conducts military exercises in locations near Taiwan that overlap with or are very close to Japanese territory, the “drill drills” against Taiwan after Pelosi’s visit – in which some planes crossed the line middle of the Taiwan Strait and entered the island’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) – have heightened fears of some Taiwan-related contingency and the consequent repercussion on Japan’s security. In addition, Beijing has increased its naval and air presence near Japanese territories in recent months.
The great fragility of world geopolitics resulting from the breakdown of international solidarity as a result of Russia’s war in Ukraine – in particular, China’s continued support for Russia and the re-crowning of Xi Jinping in the image and likeness of Mao Zedong after the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CCP) – has only made things worse.
Faced with such a situation, Japan is naturally intensifying its defensive posture, in addition to dedicating itself to strengthening and expanding the scope of its security alliance with the United States.
However, Japan’s strategic alignment in relation to Taiwan is a direct result of its national security concerns and not a corollary of the evolution of the US strategic position on Taiwan. There is no doubt that the latter reinforces Japanese fears. Thus, while there is still debate as to whether the United States should maintain “strategic ambiguity” or resort to clarity, Japan (despite its reliance on the United States for security) appears to be seeking the development of strategic self-sufficiency and deterrence capabilities, not just take advantage of US support.
Despite the recent increase in diplomatic activity, it is important to note that Japan and Taiwan do not maintain formal diplomatic ties: 2022 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the end of diplomatic relations due to the normalization of Japan’s relations with China. However, Japan’s top envoy to Taiwan recently hailed the “best relations ever” between Tokyo and Taipei, calling the two countries “irreplaceable partners.” That partnership has become all the more crucial for both sides as they try to cope with fears that Xi Jinping’s dream of reunification is not only now very likely, given his remarks at the 20th CPC National Congress, but may have accelerated. Those fears are fueled by factors such as the war in Ukraine, the deteriorating internal situation in China after the pandemic and the trade war with the United States. In addition, Tokyo now intends to address the Taiwan issue as a key strategic priority: the US is overwhelmed and preoccupied with Ukraine, so Japan can no longer rely on Washington to deal with Taiwan on its own.
Nobuo Kishi, the former defense minister of the Japanese government, declared in 2021, in line with Abe’s sentiment, that “Japan’s peace and stability are directly related to Taiwan.” Therefore, Tokyo is inclined to defend Taiwan in order to protect important shipping lines for energy and trade in the Taiwan Strait and also to prevent the island from falling under Chinese control, which would have implications for military, economic and political policy. even a national of the country, not to mention the danger of some territorial loss. In addition to China, which has replaced North Korea in Japan’s perception as the main threat, Taipei and Tokyo share common interests in rebuilding after the pandemic and strengthening the resilience of supply chains.
In mid-December 2022, Japan released the New National Security Strategy, the Defense Strategy and the Defense Strengthening Program, all of which are aimed at safeguarding national interests “in the midst of the most serious and complex security environment since the end of World War II.” In particular, the new change in security policy heralded increased defense spending, cooperation with like-minded partners to uphold the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific, as well as a departure from the traditional defense-oriented policy and adopting an offensive posture by gaining counter missile capabilities. China has been called the “biggest strategic challenge for Japan.” Importantly, the three documents indicate how seriously Tokyo is taking the possibility of a Taiwan contingency, bolstering its military capabilities, and reiterating that Japan will proactively maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and it will not tolerate a change in the status quo by unilateral forces.
Days after the review of Japan’s new strategies, Taiwan also unveiled new plans to bolster self-defense capabilities, including extending conscription to one year and reconfiguring the military structure. Noting the improvements in Japan’s military strategy (due in large part to the threat posed by China’s military buildup and the revival of North Korea’s nuclear program), President Tsai will not only seek to deepen cooperation security (including intelligence sharing), but also counts on Japan’s expressed stance on an emergency with regard to the neighboring country not to be mere lip service, given Okinawa Prefecture’s geographical proximity to Taiwan.
Beyond security issues, the lack of formal diplomatic ties and the relationship that is officially only working and non-governmental have not impeded the development of democratic Taiwan as an “extremely crucial partner and friend” with whom Japan shares core values. For the most part, rather than through serving officials, cooperation has taken place through informal channels that China has been willing to largely ignore (retired officials or members of the National Diet, for example). example). More importantly, these methods have proven effective in building strong relationships and achieving key objectives such as sharing expertise and assisting on matters of mutual interest. For example, the Global Cooperation and Training Framework, established with the United States, connects experts from Japan, Taiwan, and the United States.
In addition, the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association (JTEA; formerly the Exchange Association) and the Taiwan-Japan Relations Association (TJRA; formerly the East Asian Relations Association), JTEA’s Taiwanese counterpart, last year commemorated the fifty years of its foundation. Both the JTEA and TJRA have actively contributed to diversifying bilateral cooperation mechanisms as well as increasing Japan-Taiwan parliamentary diplomacy.
And also in the international arena there is strong support for Taiwan from the Japanese government; for example, by providing vaccines and supporting Taiwan’s accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Partnership for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). There is also strong Japanese public support, evidenced by acts of solidarity such as the voluntary purchase of Taiwanese pineapples by Japanese consumers after receiving sanctions from the People’s Republic of China. Japan has now become one of the top export destinations for Taiwan’s pineapples, showing that even simple acts of support can be a viable tool to counter China’s economic coercion.
In Japan, recent surveys have highlighted the deterioration of China’s public image: close to 90% of the Japanese view the country unfavorably. In addition, the rise of anti-China hardliners in Japanese politics, coupled with growing pro-Taiwanese sentiment, has allowed the scope of cooperation to expand, which might include limited credible security or military ties. However, a formal military pact between the two countries is unlikely due to the lack of diplomatic ties; Without the precedent of a legal basis, the conservative Japanese bureaucracy, however nationalistic the current political environment may seem, will not push for radical measures. Therefore, it is imperative to find viable ways to arrive at legal mechanisms that can help prepare for contingencies.
There have been calls in the recent past for a Japanese version of the US Taiwan Relations Act, which allows for security guarantees for Taiwan, among other “permanent commitments,” to formalize channels for dialogue and cooperation on security matter. However, there is little indication that such a measure will be taken in the immediate future.
Japan’s reluctance to fully jeopardize ties with China remains a relevant detail: right now, amid the already volatile situation in East Asia, it’s hardly worth incurring China’s wrath. In the past, the cover that China and the United States gave to Japan and the uncertainty of the ties prevented a sustained growth of Japan-Taiwan diplomacy. However, the democratic alignment in the hardline approach towards China (especially after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine) has emboldened Japan and led it to strengthen ties with Taiwan as a decisive influence. The G-7 statement following Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan and the official US praise for the new twist in Japanese defense policy are evidence of a highly aligned US-Japan stance.
Notably, the lackluster meeting between Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and President Xi in November 2022 did not produce any final results, and regional and bilateral tensions have not abated. China is undoubtedly irritated by Japan’s new attitude: whether it is the presence of Taiwanese Vice President William Lai at Abe’s funeral, Japan’s push to incorporate Indo-Pacific partnerships with like-minded states such as India and Australia, or the review of the strategic documents of the Japanese state.
Therefore, Tokyo must be aware that any further rapprochement with Taiwan will come under close Chinese scrutiny and have drastic implications for Japan. However, Japan, as a rising world power, seems to be not only on the way to accepting the internationalization of the Taiwan question, but also to defend its national and regional security interests.
Jagannath Panda is Director of the Center for Southeast Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs at the Institute for Security and Development Policy in Stockholm, Sweden. He is also a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies in The Hague (Netherlands).
