On March 1, 1896, the fierce and numerous, although poorly armed, Abyssinian host of Ras Makonnen Walda defeated the Italian expeditionary army of General Oreste Baratieri near the Ethiopian town of Adua, causing more than five thousand deaths. With this victory he had ensured the independence of the kingdom of his lord, Menelik II, against the claims of the Italians, who from the recently occupied Somalia and Eritrea sought to take over the unstable Ethiopian state.
The massacre shocked Italian public opinion. Abyssinia became a recurring motif for the spokesmen of revenge, who, shouting “Ricorda Adua!”, kept the disaster present in the collective memory.
The arrival of Mussolini to power in 1922 propelled Italian desires for East Africa. The idea was taking shape in the Duce’s mind that a victorious action in Ethiopia could offer him nothing but advantages. Propaganda could present him to the world as a civilizer, and his countrymen would see in him the avenger of Adua’s affront.
The military and industry would be favored by an easy campaign, and the surplus population of southern Italy, whose usual route of emigration had been closed by the New York stock market crisis, could find accommodation in Abyssinia.
The conquest would give continuity to the Italian possessions of Eritrea and Somalia, now separated on the coast by French and British dominions. This would allow the foundations of the New Roman Empire that had been promised to King Victor Emmanuel III to be laid.
Before, however, Mussolini had to achieve the neutrality of the main colonial powers in the region, France and England. Especially since the three countries had agreed at the beginning of the century to divide up the Ethiopian state in the event of disintegration.
France was the first to be tested. The year was 1934. Pierre Laval, Minister of Foreign Affairs, saw the need for pacts that would satisfy and at the same time limit the Duce’s ambitions.
The expansion of the Italian colony of Libya by 114,000 km2 to the south – basically desert – and the delivery of 21,000 km2 of territory between French Somalia and Eritrea was established, as well as the implicit acceptance of its intervention in Ethiopia, although without foreseeing occupation. some.
But achieving a similar pact with the British was far away. Meanwhile, Rome interfered as much as it could in internal Ethiopian politics, encouraging all kinds of uprisings against Emperor Haile Selassie I. He asked the League of Nations for help with little success.
It seemed that the meeting of the prime ministers of Italy, France and Great Britain in Stresa was going to offer a good opportunity to resolve the dispute, but that was not the case. The Ethiopian conflict was not even mentioned, which made Mussolini believe that Britain was giving him carte blanche.
Nothing is further from reality. In the session of the League of Nations on April 15, and at the British proposal, an arbitration commission was created to decide on the dispute, when Rome was already concentrating arms and troops in Eritrea and Somalia with a view to the invasion of Ethiopia.
The reaction of the Italian press against the London government was angry. Alarmed by the turn of events, the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, traveled to Rome with a proposal to calm Mussolini’s spirits. The Ethiopians were granted access to the sea through the port of Zeil, in British Somalia, in exchange for the transfer to Italy of the desert province of Ogaden.
The fascist leader rejected him with a phrase that would become famous: “I am not a collector of deserts.” And such a solution not only prevented the territorial continuity sought by Rome, but also opened the door to Anglo-Ethiopian collaboration.
Still, efforts to prevent war continued, and on August 16, Laval, now prime minister, and Eden presented a project granting Italy the right to act in Ethiopia on behalf of the League of Nations, but with the prohibition of occupying territory.
The rejection of this last proposal made the European chancelleries see that war was inevitable. Mussolini, with military preparations advanced as they were, could not turn back. On October 2, 1935 he announced his decision to invade Ethiopia. It became effective the next day, when Italian troops from Eritrea crossed the Mareb River.
Ethiopia was at the time one of the few independent African nations. However, Haile Selassie’s army was an example of the precarious situation of the country. It was made up more of warriors than soldiers, who stood out for their lack of uniformity and the heterogeneous and obsolete equipment they had.
Despite the difficulties, the Ethiopians would at all times show great courage and spirit of victory, and their perfect knowledge of the terrain would cause serious problems for their enemies.
However, their tendency to attack in frontal waves, underestimating the effect of modern weapons, and their inability to resist the temptation of plunder often made them easy prey for Italian riflemen.
The Italian army appeared to everyone as an effective war machine. However, this was only a half-truth. The squads of its units were always incomplete, while the reserves of equipment and weapons were minimal, and largely came from the First World War.
The Mannlicher-Carcano 1891 rifle, the basic infantry weapon, was defective, although there were others of excellent quality, such as the M-35 81 mm mortar. Also their armored vehicles (such as the CV 3/35) and air vehicles were beginning to become obsolete, although in Ethiopia they were able to operate freely.
The level of training and equipment of the Italians varied greatly. The alpini and bersaglieri units stood out for their effectiveness, as well as the Eritrean askaris, who were usually used as the spearhead in attacks and who were very expeditious with their traditional Ethiopian enemies. The regular and Black Shirt (MVSN) divisions were at a lower level.
All in all, morale was very high, and the combatants felt supported by a population that understood the war as just. Not in vain, the Duce’s own son-in-law and children would leave for Ethiopia.
More than 200,000 men gathered before its borders (of which 60,000 were colonial) who had about 800 artillery pieces, 300 airplanes and about 200 armored vehicles. This material superiority, which would later be transformed into numerical superiority, and the soon mastery of the air were going to be the decisive assets.
Under the command of the fascist general Emilio De Bono, the Italian device provided for two converging lines of attack, converted into fronts, which had to pivot towards the interior of the country to meet east of Addis Ababa.
The main one, which had a very offensive character and was led by De Bono himself, would leave Eritrea with three quarters of the expeditionary army. The rest of the troops, stationed in Somalia under the command of General Rodolfo Graziani, had been arranged with a much more defensive tone.
During the first days, the Italian forces advanced without major difficulties, since Emperor Haile Selassie had placed the bulk of his troops further inland. This allowed the emblematic city of Adua to be occupied on the third day of the march, with the corresponding joy of the Italian press and population.
But the speed of the cautious soldier was insufficient in Mussolini’s eyes. In light of the classification of an aggressor nation granted by the League of Nations to Italy, the Duce feared not only the cutoff of oil supplies, but also a direct intervention by Great Britain.
Thus, he urged De Bono to end the war as soon as possible, without taking into account that the lack of roads for motorized vehicles was forcing his troops to spend almost more time building roads than fighting.
In the end, the Duce’s pressure had an effect on De Bono, who accelerated the advance despite leaving his right flank unguarded. In any case, Mussolini relieved him, handing over command to Pietro Badoglio.
This ordered the reorganization of the device with the objective of destroying the bulk of the Ethiopian forces in one or two battles, repealing in the process De Bono’s order that prohibited all bombing of the civilian population.
The preparations had not yet been completed when a strong Ethiopian contingent under the command of Ras Immirú attacked the unguarded flank along the Tacazzé River and threatened to overwhelm the bulk of the expeditionary army.
For several weeks, both forces fought for every meter of ground. For the first time, Italian planes dropped poison gas (yperite, or mustard gas) on the attackers. In the Battle of Tembien, an Italian attack would manage, at the cost of serious losses, to divide the enemy forces and break the encirclement. After recovering, Badoglio launched his forces against Ras Mulughietá, the greatest obstacle on the road to Addis Ababa.
Preceded by a strong aerial and artillery bombardment, the Italian army advanced in three columns destined to unite in Antaló. The bravery of the Ethiopians was of little use in the face of the superiority of Badoglio’s troops. The battle ended up becoming a general retreat, which turned into carnage due to the incessant attack of the Italian aviation. The bulk of the Italian army, some 200,000 men, then advanced towards their objective.
Faced with the defeat of his leaders, the Ethiopian emperor had only two options left. The first was to confront Badoglio with the rest of his forces, including the Imperial Guard, to stop the attack and prevent the fall of the capital. The second, withdraw towards Dessié and force the Italians to pursue him – which, by lengthening their supply lines, would make them very vulnerable to a guerrilla war –, waiting for the rainy season to make a truce possible.
Political and moral reasons decided him to go for the first option, even knowing the few possibilities he had, just at the moment when the Gallic tribes were going over to the enemy. As it could not be otherwise, the Ethiopian forces were defeated at Maych’ew, leaving the road to the capital clear.
Badoglio would enter the city on May 5, 1936. Shortly after, the war could be concluded. Haile Selassie fled to England, but not before passing by the Geneva headquarters of the League of Nations to reproach the representatives for his passivity in the face of the aggression against his country. A few days earlier, on May 9, an exultant Mussolini had proclaimed the birth of the “Empire”, which made Victor Emmanuel III king-emperor.
Despite the more than three thousand Italian deaths that the war had caused, and a significant financial deficit that could not be corrected, the popularity of the fascist leader among his compatriots had never been greater. And he would never be again.
This text is part of an article published in number 457 of the magazine Historia y Vida. Do you have something to contribute? Write to us at redaccionhyv@historiayvida.com.
