Analogies, both in rhetoric and in literature, operate in that (symbolic) dimension that Roman Jakobson defined as the magical space of contact contamination. The Russian linguist denominated in this way the (intellectual) process by which a term is described by virtue of the qualities of another. It is the formula that encloses any definition – explaining a word using other words – and governs the art of metaphor and metonymy.

Conceptual associations, however, in politics must be handled very tactfully. Its wrong administration, or excessive doses, can turn an electoral candidate into a zombie. Three elements govern a metaphor: the object that is actually spoken of (tenor), the object that is invoked or named (vehicle) and the relationship between the two (foundation).

Feijóo had the first two before 23-J – the prophecy said: “In Spain the same thing that happened in Andalusia a year ago will happen” – but he has lacked the third. Overconfidence and polarization, of course interested, have led him to that phantom zone where the winners are seen by everyone, beginning with them, as losers.

The PP candidate for Moncloa, who had all the environmental factors in his favor and some surveys that presented what was only probable as inevitable, has not achieved a majority to repeal sanchismo. Consequently, the Socialists will impeach him without mercy, unless a parliamentary deadlock leads us all to another new election.

Much of the puncture of the PP is due to Andalusia, where not all the votes that were initially expected to achieve a resounding electoral victory have arrived. The advance of the PSC in Catalonia and the slowdown (relative) of the PP in the South are the two mainstays that sustain the sanchista baraka. It is always the same: the higher the expectations, the greater the disappointment. Andalusia has not tipped the balance of political power in favor of Feijóo. Because?

Unraveling this mystery requires, in addition to analyzing the electoral data, discriminating between the context of politics in the South and the state environmental circumstances, which are not always – as it is clear – identical to those stated from Madrid. Spain cannot be understood without its peripheries. What happens in their territories refutes many of the commonplaces that, although in the Puerta del Sol they are considered dogmas of faith, lead to sudden calamity.

An example is this (blind) trust in an exact translation of the (Andalusian) theory of the dike, whose formulation is the following: “The vote that flees from Vox ends up in the PP, not the PSOE.” In Andalusia, precisely this happened a year ago in the regional elections. On Sunday in Spain the opposite happened. In Genoa they bet without hesitation on the former because Feijóo’s circle of trust is made up, among others, of politicians from the South such as Elías Bendodo or Juan Bravo. Did instinct fail them or was it the polls?

It is clear that the metaphorical transfer between the Andalusian formula and the rest of Spain has not worked with the required intensity. Not so much because the environmental elements were not the same, but because the Genoese took it for granted that their electoral story lacked an antidote. The vote that flees from Vox, which has already become the factor that grants (or denies) electoral hegemony to the two big parties, needs factual support to orient itself.

In Andalusia he had it because Moreno Bonilla, who reached the Quirinale of San Telmo thanks to the ultramontanes, knew how to encapsulate them from day one in parliament. Vox influenced the regional chamber, but did not manage the budgets or appoint anyone.

Moreno Bonilla fought them with a left hand: he formally assumed their demands to guarantee their parliamentary support, but later diluted them in government action. The spirit of this great comedy worked not so much because of the ability of San Telmo as because of the insolvency of the leaders of Vox, who prefer tremendous gimmicky to political rigor.

The ultramontanes relentlessly criticized gender policies, public money subsidies for employers and unions or the existence of autonomy itself, but year after year they sanctioned accounts that financed all these policies and consolidated – without touching it at any time – the inheritance of the successive regional governments of the PSOE.

When Moreno Bonilla decides to advance the regional elections and Vox, with Macarena Olona as head of the list, demands to enter the Quirinale, many of the former socialist voters come to the (natural) conclusion that the most effective dam against the ultra-right is the PP , instead of the socialists, who had spent three years in the most absolute political irrelevance.

This is how Moreno Bonilla achieved his most absolute: thanks to a transfer of foreign votes of the order of 14%. Feijóo had to replicate –at a state level– this same model to reach Moncloa. From the start there was only one obstacle: unlike Moreno Bonilla, Feijóo did not govern, so his margin of action to avert (in public) the contamination of Vox depended on the political strategy established in Genoa and the government pacts that they be authorized in the territories where the PP could reach power.

Here was the gold bonus on the right. The government agreement in Castilla-León with Vox, signed in March 2022, a few months before the Andalusian regional elections, was a kind of dress rehearsal. And all a mirage. After the absolute majority achieved in Andalusia in June, Genoa came to the (erroneous) conclusion that the territorial agreements with Vox, necessary to conquer autonomous Spain, were not going to entail an excessive image bill. This conclusion was established based on the interests of their chancelleries in Valladolid and Seville.

The subsequent alliances with Vox in Valencia, the Balearic Islands and Extremadura, amplified to their benefit by the left, inevitably blurred the appearance of moderation built from Andalusia, situating Feijóo before that electorate fleeing from the ultramontanes, and who already settles power in Spain, as someone tolerant of the reactionary drive. The 23-J has broken the reverie, making the progressive vote return to its traditional brands.

The victory of the PP in Andalusia – ten more seats – is as indisputable as it is clearly insufficient. The Socialists have lost four deputies but have not sunk. They match the results obtained in November 2019. Less than three points distance them from the PP.

Moreno Bonilla has grown 16 points, seducing former Andalusian and liberal voters, and apart from those of Vox, but all this gain no longer gives peace of mind. It produces restlessness. Without the transfer of progressive votes, the Quirinale, like Genoa, needs to annihilate Vox so as not to lose power in the South and conquer Moncloa at some point, uncertain for now.