In the mid-16th century, the Mediterranean was a lake controlled, in its eastern half, by the Ottoman Empire, while in the western half the Spanish were the hegemonic power. At that time people always lived between peace and war, and fate could be, to say the least, uncertain. The pirate who became rich one day could be defeated and imprisoned the next. In fact, a thousand and one robbers from the most diverse towns were waiting for the opportunity to rob his prey, which is why traveling was so risky.
Since the capture of Constantinople in 1453, the Turks had undergone an unstoppable expansion. Their strategy was to dominate islands and, from them, attack the continental lands. They did not seek territorial conquest, their goal was to humiliate the enemy and seize the loot, the bigger the better.
His withering attacks caused a true psychosis in Christendom. The climate of general fear translated into economic damage. If sailors and fishermen feared being captured by the enemy, they avoided going to sea and stopped generating wealth. There was, however, one poor consolation: the captives were not killed. They were a commodity from which it was expected to obtain the maximum possible return.
The various European monarchs, aware that the fight against the Turk was at the top of the political agenda, rushed to capitalize on it for their benefit. The first, Charles V. When presenting his candidacy to the Holy German Empire, the future emperor did not hesitate to proclaim his desire to lead Christianity in a crusade against the Turk.
Around the same time, Francis I of France expressed identical intentions, as did Henry VIII of England. All three knew that Emperor Maximilian was going to die one day or another. Since his throne was elective, they wanted to be well placed in the race for succession.
Rather than taking Carlos at face value, it is necessary to pay attention to what he did next. The situation, with the Turks occupying eastern Europe, was difficult. His brother Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria, was threatened. However, instead of preparing to help Vienna, the now emperor delayed the matter. He wasn’t the only one. Passivity would be the dominant trend among Christian princes who limited themselves to blaming each other.
Charles V, when the time came, knew how to be pragmatic and put geostrategic considerations before religious ones. That is why he distinguished between some Muslims and others based on a simple principle: the one that establishes that the enemy of your enemy is your friend.
The Shah of Persia was a rival of the “Great Turk”, therefore, he courted him to attack Suleiman the Magnificent from two fronts. The plan came to nothing, because he set out to neutralize the Persians and, in addition, gained the support of a Christian prince, Francis I of France. Throughout the 16th century, religious differences did not prevent Christians and Muslims from fighting one day and being allies the next.
In this confrontation for Mediterranean hegemony, Italy, due to its strategic location, was going to become a nerve point. Hence all the alarms went off when, in 1534, the privateer Barbarossa, serving Constantinople, occupied Tunisia. The conquest of the Spanish protectorate was equivalent to the creation of an enemy base that pointed directly to Sicily.
To ward off this threat against his Italian dominions, Charles V organized a powerful navy the following year. The expedition managed, in just over a month, to recover the North African plaza.
Algiers would achieve its objective after six years. But not because the monarch had listened to his vassals on the peninsula, who had been demanding him for some time. He was looking for a prestigious operation that would make him forget a previous failure, a retreat against Suleiman. Luck was not going to be with him: a storm forced him to retreat. Barbarossa took advantage of the setback and responded by devastating the Christian coasts.
The dominions of Charles V were left in a fragile position. Its defense was becoming increasingly complicated, due to the lack of sufficient artillery and suitable fortifications. Starting in 1550, the Turks were getting closer and closer, while Spain lost one territory after another.
On May 31 of that year, the privateer Dragut attacked Pollença, in Mallorca, and took more than one hundred prisoners. Luckily, the captives’ destination was Algiers, not Constantinople, which facilitated their release. A religious order, the Mercedarians, was in charge of managing it in exchange for the mandatory ransom.
Barbarossa, meanwhile, has an imitator. The Turkish admiral Pialí Pachá. He will emulate him through an easy objective, Ciutadella, practically defenseless in a very accessible point on the coast of Menorca. Pialí also knows that he will obtain considerable loot.
If the Turks dare to carry out an attack so far from their bases it is because they have an important ally, France. The alliance between King Henry II and Suleiman gives the Turkish danger an alarming dimension, but the Pope, paradoxically, refuses to condemn an ??apparently unnatural alliance. The reasoning of the head of Christendom is clear: France allies itself with the Turks because Emperor Charles has left it no other choice.
Although its neighbors are threatened, Mallorca refuses to help them. It has its own military garrison, paid for at its own expense, but for that reason it does not wish to use it to help the Menorcans. Furthermore, the capital of the Balearic kingdom, with an antiquated wall system, is barely in a position to defend itself.
If it had to face an occupation of the territory, the Spanish defensive system would be of no use. Luckily, the Ottomans settle for raids. It is true that they take prisoners, but this becomes a problem for those affected themselves, not for the State.
The attack of July 1558 will represent the worst moment in its history for Menorca. That is why it was baptized “s’any de sa desgràcia”, the year of misfortune. Ciutadella only had practically useless light artillery. Nothing to do with Naples, for example, a city with cannons capable of sinking a galley with one shot. Here, however, this type of weaponry represented an excessive expense.
For the same economic reason, the medieval walls, useless against enemy firepower, had not been modernized. There was also no fleet prepared to defend the city.
Despite their numerical inferiority, the Menorcans fought like lions, day and night, until they collapsed. Women actively participated in the defense by helping in fortification work. Everything was used to build parapets, from branches and mattresses to bags of clothing. However, there came a time when everyone understood that resistance was impossible. Ciutadella had to be evacuated, there was no other option.
Nobody liked the idea of ??Captain Negrete, who was in favor of continuing to fight until the end. Unfortunately, part of the group of men and women who left the city encountered the Turks on the way. The result was a bloody slaughter in which many died, others were arrested and the luckiest were able to return. The Ottomans did not take long to take the square, later dedicating themselves to the looting.
The attack was an unmitigated disaster. Firstly, because of the demographic catastrophe it represented. The Menorcan population, about 10,000 people, was reduced by half between 1,000 dead and 4,000 captives. The death toll was especially tragic in the town of Barenys, which completely disappeared.
We must also take into account the economic impact. The enemy had devastated Ciutadella. From one night to the next, its inhabitants found themselves with devastated fields and lost crops. The Ottomans had also sacrificed a good part of the animals.
As if that were not enough, the maximum number of captives had to be rescued. A representative of the Menorcan authorities, Marc Martí, traveled with this mission to Constantinople. However, few were released. Just between 10 and 15%. The situation as a whole became so dramatic that the authorities forgave the tithe to the inhabitants of Ciutadella for ten years.
Socially, “sa desgràcia” produced the dismantling of the main institutions of the island and the disappearance of a good part of the elites. According to historian Miguel Ángel Casanovas, the “military arm” was the most affected sector of the ruling oligarchy.
There remains one question to be resolved. If the disaster reached such a magnitude, why do we know so little about what happened? The documentation is, indeed, scarce. To find the key we have to look to the Spanish government of the time and the signing, in 1559, of the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis with France. The two countries, until then rivals, are now allies.
That explains, according to Miguel Ángel de Bunes, why the assault on Menorca became an uncomfortable episode. Power is not interested in talking about a disaster related to a power that is now a friend, which is why it tries to hide the facts. Pasha, for his part, returns triumphantly to Constantinople with a large shipment of slaves for the sultan. He thus gains prestige before the sovereign of the Sublime Door.
In the following decades Menorca slowly recovered. It didn’t take long for foreigners to arrive to repopulate the island, especially from Mallorca. The absence of subsequent serious demographic crises (famines, plagues…), together with a high birth rate, allowed it to recover in 1600 the level prior to the attack. This population increase had a positive impact on the economy, by increasing the demand for consumer goods and therefore for labor.
Philip II, in 1570, ordered the evacuation of Menorca, which he found very difficult to defend, but he had to back down. The inhabitants did not want to leave their homes. A year later, the Christian victory at Lepanto reduced the Ottoman danger. Success, more than because of its strategic repercussions, which were actually scarce, was important because of its psychological value. He finally demonstrated that the Turks were not invincible.
This text is part of an article published in number 494 of the magazine Historia y Vida. Do you have something to contribute? Write to us at redaccionhyv@historiayvida.com.
