a sector of Junts, which in conventional terms could be described as the most conservative from an economic point of view or more pragmatic and pactist from a political point of view, identified with the extinct Pujolian Convergence, explains in recent weeks, always discreetly, that it is possible that the President Carles Puigdemont, the leader of the formation, lost a golden opportunity to achieve something similar to the fiscal pact during the past negotiations for the investiture of Pedro Sánchez. According to this informal stream of pro-independence formation, parliamentary commissions of inquiry or generic references to the meaning of the process or the claim of a referendum that seems impossible to them will barely produce practical results, while a new model of relationship financial with the State would have changed things radically.
If he had opted for this path, things would have returned to how they were at the end of the summer of 2012 – the first stages of the process – when Artur Mas, then president of the Generalitat, met in Moncloa with president Mariano Rajoy and proposed the fiscal pact, with a success known to all. What makes its postulants think that it would now have been possible to start a concession of this magnitude where they achieved nothing?
Obviously, parliamentary arithmetic, Sánchez’s inescapable need for his votes to return to the presidency of the government. In the first episode, Rajoy enjoyed an absolute majority, he did not need the Catalan nationalists for anything and European power was focused on preventing almost any magnanimity of the Spanish government. Now, say the critics of Junts’ orbit, Sánchez would have finally conceded before resigning to repeat the mandate. But it should be remembered that they and their former Convergence never achieved, in similar circumstances, neither the fiscal pact nor anything similar.
But, returning to Sánchez’s investiture, could he have added to the controversial amnesty an economic concession of this magnitude? Defenders of the deal reached argue that, simply not.
Little by little it is becoming clear that, as the complex processing and application of the amnesty is clarified, undoubtedly the main issue, the axis around which the new legislature will orbit will turn towards the negotiation of financing as an alternative to the discussions on self-determination and referendum. In the political conjuncture, the guideline will be applied that, the more abstract proclamations are lavished on these last two points, the closer we will be to materializing agreements on the first. Like now, but around the discussion of specific proposals on regional funding. ERC depends on this to present itself in the elections as a political force with management capacity, and Junts, for the viability of the bet to be the new formation of the measured classes and the Catalan bourgeoisie, which, said past, they have already abandoned the past vigilities altogether or not at all.
From this point of view, how do you read the reorganization of the Sánchez Government to accommodate the departure of Nadia Calviño from the Ministry of Economy? It is a markedly presidentialist Executive. Sánchez controls everything and imposes the necessary changes without almost any discussion, there is talk of pacts with other parliamentary forces – including the minimum margin to give freedom to Yolanda Díaz and Sumar, since he is the essential partner to aspire to present himself at the investiture – or long-range political decisions, such as amnesty or foreign policy. This presidentialism defines Friday’s ministerial changes.
The governments of Sánchez, for the purposes of their management in the economic field, have functioned in the economic field as a pact between María Jesús Montero, the Minister of Finance now promoted to first vice president, and the already absent Calviño, but with the nuance that the political criterion of the first, which was that of Sánchez, predetermined the technocratic position of the second. Díaz chose to start some battles, knowing in advance that he had the two ministers in front of him.
In the new Council of Ministers, this feature is accentuated, given the new authority of Montero and the inevitable technocratic inexperience, even if temporary, of Carlos Cuerpo, the new Minister of Economy. The presidency of the delegated commission of economic affairs, which brings together all the ministries of the branch, will be hierarchically below Montero; just the opposite of what happened before with Calviño, for whom Europe was at the top of his political priorities, but always in the minority.
And Montero is in charge, precisely, of regional funding, the central portfolio. Its ease of negotiation allows you to intuit agreements at the end of a complex and tense negotiation. But there is no doubt that the State will have to substantially increase contributions to the autonomous communities, in other words, more spending, for the signature to be possible. The situation has filled the coffers of the Central Administration for this situation – increase in revenue, maintenance of economic growth -, and this gives it a certain margin. Also, the drastic moderation of inflation heralds an upcoming drop in interest rates, which will reduce interest payments and may make it a little easier to control the deficit.
The new composition of the Government indicates that the financial pact with the autonomies is the main goal, largely because without the latter, it has no chance of survival. In principle, trying not to come into conflict with the new fiscal rules of the European Union, this is the role of Cuerpo, but making it clear that it will not be the master beam of its policy. The asymmetry of Sánchez’s preferences has been accentuated with the new cabinet.