The history of foreign transfer regulations in Spanish football is rich in anecdotes and unlikely decisions. In 1953, at the height of the Di Stéfano case and to put pressure on Barcelona, ??the borders that had been open since 1947 were slammed shut, although a few days later they were briefly reopened to allow the Saeta Rubia to register with Real Madrid.
In 1956 a prodigious measure was adopted: given the prestige that Madrid’s first victory in the European Cup had brought (so it was explained) and “as it is necessary to maintain sporting heights” and “avoid situations of disadvantage” two new foreigners per team, of which one had to be “Ibero-American or Filipino”. It should be noted here that at that time, before the 1956-57 season, the Spanish teams qualified for the European Cup were two: Madrid and Athletic, a club that never wanted foreigners. And that among the 22 teams participating in the tournament, only three, according to a detailed study of the time, had foreigners in their ranks. Madrid was thus able to register Kopa, who had offered himself a year and a half earlier to Barcelona but there was no deal when it was verified that there would be no exception then to sign foreigners.
Until the final opening of May 26, 1973, the year of the arrival of the Cruyff, Sotil, Netzer and company, history is a cluster of nonsense, with Barcelona as the usual suspect who rarely got away with it. In 1959 he wanted to sign up one of the great Peruvian soccer players in history, Juan Seminario, but collided with Zaragoza, who had a signed commitment through an intermediary. On this occasion, what things happened, the “Di Stéfano doctrine” was not applied (one year in each team or agree) but the Federation decided simply to prohibit the incorporation of the Peruvian. The president went so far as to declare that he “will never play in Spain because he lacks the necessary moral conditions.”
Three years later, in response to the peculiar team that Spain presented at the World Cup in Chile (with four players who had already been internationals with other countries: Puskas, Santamaría, Di Stéfano and Eulogio Martínez) FIFA said enough. The double international alignment would no longer be allowed, regardless of the footballer’s passport at that time. In Spain, a new border closure was decreed and foreign soccer players were only allowed if they proved they were children of Spaniards and that they had never been international so that, if they had a level, they could play with Spain.
Thus began the festival of the natives, the most sensational fraud in the history of Spanish football. Sons of Spaniards exceptionally gifted for football appeared everywhere, mainly of Argentine or Paraguayan origin, with ancestors exiled from remote villages where all the archives were burned during the war and with a guarantee (often also false) that they had not been international . This last question, today, is solved in a jiffy with an internet search, but in the sixties…
The intermediaries (prohibited in theory by FIFA) put on their boots and organized a network of obtaining false papers. An unknown character, Marcelino González, sold his story to the highest bidder and it was finally published in As. In short, he explained that for a thousand dollars the documentation was obtained and that the final and definitive step, the signature of the Spanish consul, could be obtained even in 48 hours. “It’s all about oil, the more oil the faster the car goes,” he explained.
But let’s not forget the adventures of Barcelona. In 1966 it was taken for granted that the borders would be opened after the World Cup in England and President Llaudet signed a Brazilian with an exquisite touch, Walter Machado da Silva. Overnight, the direction of the vote of the clubs changed and Silva never went beyond a few friendlies. In the summer of 1969, another scandal: Barça announced the signing of the Paraguayan Severiano Irala, alias El Drill (for his ease in goalscoring) and then Valencia jumped in, denouncing that he was also theirs and not only that: that his papers were false , how well they knew. Irala didn’t make the cut either.
In 1970, already with Montal in the presidency, another major strategic error. Once again the opening was taken for granted, the votes seemed to add up, and the naive Barcelona negotiated in the light of day with none other than Johan Cruyff, the king of Ajax. He was even relatively cheap: 22 million pesetas (Marcial had cost 18 a year earlier). And a new twist of the script: the clubs voted no. It is surprising that Bernabeu, who shortly before had declared that he was “in favor of men working anywhere on earth”, shortly afterwards launched: “Whoever thinks that we are going against someone is wrong. Real Madrid thinks of the national team, which is that of all Spaniards”. The closure was maintained and with a notice: I do not know it will be reviewed for another four years.
At the same time, the League was a festival of natives, many under suspicion. The Federation said that they were not dedicated to investigating. “If there is something, file a complaint.” Those were the years of the Adorno, Valdez, Anzarda, Touriño, Roberto Martínez, Vilanova, Acosta, Viberti, Ovejero… the list was endless. More than a hundred recorded in the summer of 1971. And then came the final trigger: Barcelona presented the documentation (false, like most, but with the duly stamped signatures) of two players: Heredia and Cos.
We are in September 1972, 50 years ago. And the Federation ruled: Cos yes, Heredia no. The documentation, which was quickly leaked to the press, was identical: the same stamps, the same signature. But not Heredia.
The scandal was capital in Barcelona. If, as a result of the Irala case, President Narcís de Carreras said that he did not want to continue competing in a League that did not treat everyone equally, then it was Montal who accused, in a note released on November 24, 1972. He reviewed everything: Irala , Silva, Cruyff… he even went back to Di Stéfano (“only extra-sports pressure made him end up joining Real Madrid”) and stressed: “Heredia arrives with the signature of the Spanish foreign minister in Asunción, the same one that appears on the certificates of the majority of natives who play in Spain”.
The end of the story is well known. Barcelona launched a detective investigation, in which Miquel Roca Junyent participated, among others, to demonstrate the large number of false natives who played in Spain. Years later, Athletic and Real Sociedad did the same, in their case with José María Gil Robles at the helm. And Montal, with a convincing report in hand, finally managed to get foreign soccer players accepted in the 1973-74 season, two per team, although yes: without permission to line up in the Cup, the Generalissimo tournament.
