It is often said that Latin America is the continent of inequality. It’s true. But, furthermore, even earlier (in logical terms, because only democracy creates conditions for a less unfair redistribution of income), Latin America is the continent of dictatorships. Authoritarianism, however, is not the only salient feature of regional politics. The region also suffers from endemic political instability. In this context, the Uruguayan case offers a different and significantly more stimulating performance. In international measurements, Uruguay consistently appears as one of the top three democracies in Latin America and the Caribbean (generally alongside Costa Rica and Chile). Of course, Uruguayan democracy has seen better and worse times. During the 20th century it suffered two interruptions, the first between 1933 and 1942, the second, with dramatic edges, between 1973 and 1984. In addition, during the 1960s, it faced the strong challenge of the spiral of violence between left and right, in the context of the impact of the Cuban revolution in the region (which inspired guerrilla movements such as the MLN-Tupamaros) and the combination of economic stagnation with inflation. Anyway, in general terms, in the continent of dictatorships, Uruguay is a full democracy. In the continent of political instability, it is a stable regime. Uruguay is an outlier. Let’s see why.
At the beginning of the 20th century, Uruguay had moderately favorable structural conditions for the establishment and consolidation of democracy. Political economy scholars, from Seymour M. Lipset on, admit that there is a remarkable correlation between development and democracy. Uruguay, around 1900, was not a poor country. Despite being somewhat lower than Argentina’s, Uruguay’s GDP per capita was similar to that of Belgium or Denmark. Those who study the subject, I am now thinking of Carles Boix, also accept that inequality conspires against democratization. Uruguay, at the beginning of the century, was already less unequal than Chile. Third, although thanks to Arend Lijphart we know that it is possible to build stable democracies in countries with great ethnic and religious divisions, experts admit that the homogeneity of the population favors democratization. Uruguay also met this condition. Despite these favorable initial data, the establishment of democracy was a difficult process, preceded by civil wars, and can only be explained by its ability to learn.
Uruguay managed to build a comparatively high-quality and stable democracy because, since the 19th century, the political system has made a systematic effort to learn. Uruguayans as a society may not have much to say about how to solve the mysteries of economic development. In this sense, several countries in the region, such as Argentina, Brazil or Chile, accumulated a great advantage over Uruguay for decades. On the other hand, Uruguayan society has never stopped asking itself throughout its history how to improve its political practices and institutions. There is not a single generation, since the establishment of the republic in 1830, that has not sought to discover defects or pathologies. The Uruguayan political system has a high propensity for self-criticism. In this sense, the role of intellectuals, academics and experts has always been crucial.
Uruguayan democracy learned early to solve delicate political problems. The first great lesson, the one that made the establishment of democracy possible, was that of the distribution of power between the majority and the minority. There can be no political stability, as Aristotle explained more than 2,500 years ago, when one of the “parts into which the city is divided”, to put it in the words of the Stagirite, has no way to defend itself against potential offenses from the others. Uruguayan democracy began to be born when the Colorado Party and the National Party, between the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, agreed to peaceful ways of distributing power, leaving behind decades of civil wars.
The second great lesson, directly derived from the previous one, was how to balance governability and efficiency. The balance between the government and the opposition was key to the establishment of democracy. But it was also, and still is, to make its reproduction possible. Throughout its political history, Uruguay has been experiencing, in successive constitutional reforms, different ways of organizing the executive branch. In some moments it favored the dispersion of power (as in 1919 and 1952). In these two constitutional reforms, Uruguayan society experimented with different collegiate forms of organization of the executive branch, partially inspired by the Swiss political experience. At other times, to avoid ungovernability, he strengthened the power of the president (as in 1934, 1942, 1967 and 1997). No democracy survives unless it is capable of avoiding the two opposite risks: that of anarchy and that of tyranny, to use a very common distinction in Latin America during the institutional debates after the wars of independence. After decades of experimentation, Uruguay has managed to find formulas that work.
The third great lesson was the construction of stable political parties. There is no way to build stable democracies without institutionalized or, to use a much more suggestive expression, vibrant political parties. Uruguayan parties have deep roots in civil society because they were not born from the elite but around popular leaders. The Colorado Party and the National Party date from 1836. The Broad Front, a new party compared to the previous ones, was founded in 1971, more than half a century ago. The fierce competition between them has forced them not to lose connection with their voters. The parties managed to survive, moreover, because the elite generated an ingenious electoral legislation that allowed them to combine the existence of leaderships in conflict within each one of them with the essential electoral coordination between the different fractions. Lastly, intra and inter-party competition has been a powerful incentive to adapt to changes in the environment. No party survives without protecting its identity and cultivating its traditions. But the parties do not persist if they are not capable of identifying and channeling the new social demands.
The fourth lesson was how to combine political leadership with technical advice. It is often said, with reason, that populism represents a great risk for contemporary democracies. It is, by the way. But the opposite danger is too often forgotten: that of technocratic governments. The best democracies are those that manage to balance sensitivity and responsibility, the short and the long term, the urgent with the important, the outcry of citizens with the warnings of specialists. It wasn’t easy. Patronage was the predominant recruitment pattern for public officials for many decades. The social sciences were slow to prosper and gain influence. Uruguayan politics achieved a good balance between politics and technique only once democracy was restored, in 1985. The political leadership, as always, is the one that holds the helm. But it has learned to build bridges with other actors and to incorporate other knowledge.
The fifth lesson that helps to understand the success of Uruguayan democracy is the combination between representative democracy and direct democracy. The rendering works. As was said, the validity of political parties is, in this sense, crucial. But citizens have the possibility of resorting to direct democracy, either to initiate legislative processes or constitutional reforms, or to submit laws or articles of laws approved by Parliament to a referendum. Direct democracy is far from being a decorative or merely theoretical institutional device. It is a resource frequently used by civil society organizations and party leaders. The use of direct democracy mechanisms helps to channel the discontent that can, and usually exists, with respect to government decisions, public policies or specific situations. Direct democracy complements representative democracy. Ultimately, and without prejudice to the conflicts that it may cause in the short term (for example, when the majority of citizens choose to totally or partially repeal legislation approved by Parliament), it contributes to reinforcing the legitimacy of democracy. Citizens feel that they really decide.
Of course, Uruguayan democracy is far from perfect. It is not difficult to make a long list of pending challenges. Among other issues, Uruguay is needing to generate more demanding regulations to regulate the financing of electoral campaigns, redesign the second and third levels of government to increase transparency and participation, find concrete ways to make it possible to increase the presence of women in political positions, facilitate the vote of citizens living abroad and modernize the parliamentary advisory system. A democracy can only be stable to the extent that it dares to change. Stability and change are not opposites but complementary principles. Uruguayan democracy will continue to stand out for its stability if it manages to continue looking critically in the mirror, if it dares to continue evolving, if it insists on reviewing the background knowledge that informs its political practices and institutions. Ultimately, there is no democratic success without a deep and systematic reflective effort that makes new learning possible.
Adolfo Garcé is a professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences and a researcher at the Department of Political Science at the University of the Republic, Uruguay.
