In its latest “public information” campaign, which coincides with the one-year anniversary of Russia’s attack on Ukraine, the Hungarian government presents Hungary as a pacifist force battling the Western “war machine”.
This rhetoric – along with his ongoing attacks on the “Brussels superstate” – is a classic example of the propaganda that Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has been trying to spread for years.
However, Orbán’s position, in favor of Russia, continues to be misunderstood. It is strategic in nature, and is aimed at weakening Europe’s support for Ukraine. It is also relatively new, and a reflection of his interest in developing a personal political brand, as well as his willingness to take risks to assert Hungary’s position on the international scene. Actually, Orbán is not pro-Russian; He is pro Orbán.
To understand how and why Orbán has chosen to defend a position as a “non-aligned” country before the war in Ukraine, it is worth making a short summary. In 2008, when Russia attacked Georgia, Orbán – then part of the political opposition in Hungary – was quick to condemn Russia’s aggression, stating clearly that “military aggression is military aggression”. It was only afterwards, against the backdrop of economic uncertainty, that Orbán’s so-called “anti-liberal experiment” and his shift in outlook on the Eastern autocracy took place.
After winning the 2010 election, he came to the conclusion that “Western domination” of the world was on the decline, and decided that committing to one side would work to his disadvantage. Orbán determined that Hungary must act alone and take a leading role in a new Central and Eastern European bloc, in which smaller powers could assert themselves.
The rapprochement with Moscow was a key component in his “opening towards the East” and, just two years after describing Russia as a “military aggressor”, Orbán called on the countries of central Europe to create a new dialogue with Russia, giving a twist to the vision of the Hungarian foreign policy of the last 20 years.
This turn was supported by economic considerations and the influence of Russian loans. Between 2010 and 2014, the Orbán government nationalized the country’s energy companies, stripping them of foreign ownership, only to sell them back to government-affiliated Hungarian companies; in other words, his minions. This action allowed Orbán to control energy trade negotiations: in 2014, he secretly negotiated the construction of a Russian state-funded nuclear power plant, as well as the construction of the TurkStream gas pipeline, which opened in 2021.
The country also closed a 15-year gas purchase agreement with Russia and became the headquarters of the Russian International Investment Bank. By 2019, Hungary’s reliance on Russia had reached a level not seen since 1990. This shift in the balance of power also coincided with annual meetings with Putin, the last of which was in February 2022, described as a ” peace mission.”
When Russia invaded Ukraine, Orbán faced two choices: continue to straddle Western and Eastern interests, or go along with European support for Ukraine. He chose the former, and has spent the entire year criticizing the EU’s role in the war, and calling for peace.
“We should stay out of this war” has become the Fidesz campaign slogan. Today, one cannot walk the streets of Budapest without seeing government-commissioned posters criticizing the West’s sanctions policy. Orbán has used the power that both himself and his allies have over the media to tarnish the image of his political opponents as “warmongers”.
However, the energy crisis – which is impacting a large part of Europe – could well be the end of it. Although electricity prices for households have been frozen since 2013, the increase in bills has come as a very unpleasant surprise for Hungarian voters. Inflation hovers around 25%, largely due to government economic mismanagement, which has impoverished much of society, including those in the Fidesz constituency.
Orbán’s continuous provocations towards the EU have ended up resulting in belated attempts to rein him in. At the end of 2022, the European Commission made the grant of 7.5 billion euros in post-covid recovery funds conditional on Hungary reaching a series of democratic milestones. However, despite finding himself between a rock and a hard place, Orbán managed (again) to get out of the quagmire. In December, he threatened to veto an €18 billion aid package to Ukraine, in response to the Commission’s behaviour. So far, he has successfully used Hungary’s “non-aligned” position in the war to obtain funding.
In all the crises related to the EU and Russia, Orbán has managed to evade potential mines and has managed to advance his interests. And as the war in Ukraine drags on, he continues to have opportunistic aces up his sleeve. He knows, for example, that Europe is paying a high price for supporting Ukraine and that some political parties in Europe are calling for a quick resolution to the conflict. He is also betting on a weakening of support for the war, and that Donald Trump win the elections in 2024, so that the rules of the game change again.
Orbán’s record in power reveals one thing for certain: he likes to take risks and is willing to gamble with Hungary’s position on the international scene to stay in power. He remains hopeful that even as he takes morally indefensible positions, his “pragmatic” support for peace will bring results. He’s gotten great results with this in the past and if he doesn’t get off his feet, he could get it again.
