China is not Russia, it does not scare the majority of Europeans that much, according to the latest survey by the European Center for Foreign Relations (CERE), a think tank based in Brussels, and which La Vanguardia publishes exclusively with Le Monde , The Guardian , La Stampa and the Süddeutsche Zeitung , its partners in the Europa Group.
The majority of respondents believe that Europe must maintain a good commercial relationship with China, without taking a political side for the United States in the struggle that the two powers maintain over Taiwan and global supremacy in the 21st century.
In April, CERE asked eleven European countries what strategic decisions the EU should take with regard to China, Russia and the United States.
Regarding China, the majority opinion is that Europe must follow its own path, without aligning itself with the United States, and also not in defense of Taiwan in view of a hypothetical Chinese invasion. This position of neutrality is based on the conviction that the economic relationship is a priority and must be kept apart from the Xi Jinping regime’s support for Russian President Vladimir Putin.
The red line would be the supply of weapons to Russia to fight in Ukraine. If Beijing passes it, most Europeans would support the application of economic and political sanctions.
China, in any case, is seen rather as a “necessary partner” and not so much as a “systemic rival”.
The President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, thinks that Europe must reduce its dependence on China. She fears that, if she doesn’t, she will end up subject to interests that are not hers. He claims the risk is too great.
Against this firm position is the more conciliatory attitude of the French president, Emmanuel Macron, and the German chancellor, Olaf Scholz. They believe that Europe is interested in a very close trade relationship with China. They argue that it is fine to repatriate the production of certain strategic products, but that it is ultimately more beneficial for China to remain a large factory for many products that Europeans consume and for many European companies that do business there. Most Europeans think the same, except, precisely, in France and Germany. This lack of harmony between public opinion and its rulers demonstrates the difficulties that the executives of Macron and Scholz are going through.
Europeans are not concerned about economic cooperation with China. Nor does it bother them with its presence on the continent, as long as it does not gain control of infrastructure or media.
Europeans, as evidenced by their preferred neutrality in the China-US tussle, want the EU to have more weight on the international board. Three-quarters of respondents are happy with the renewed transatlantic cooperation, but, at bottom, they do not believe it is sustainable in the long term. For years, the US’s interest has been in Asia, in containing China, and not in Europe. So it was with Obama and also with Trump, and so it would be with Biden if there was no war in Ukraine.
Having a policy towards China must also be accompanied by its own security strategy. Europeans appreciate American leadership in defending Ukraine, but think Europe should be able to defend itself against the Kremlin’s threat.
The opinion that Europeans have of Russia worsens as the war in Ukraine drags on. Even when peace comes, most believe that the EU should not establish a full relationship with Russia, especially while Putin is in power. However, this majority is not uniform. It is very pronounced in Poland, for example, but very little in Bulgaria.
In countries like Italy and Germany, more than 20% of the population wants to restore full relations as soon as there is peace. The unity shown by the Twenty-seven in the defense of Ukraine breaks when the post-war scenario is considered.
Europeans like their diplomacy to be based on universal values ​​such as justice and democracy, as well as respect for human rights and the environment. They maintain the cooperative instinct that characterizes the EU, even if the world is increasingly less cooperative. This will, as reflected in the survey, should guide European strategists with the difficult decisions that await them.
