On March 24, 1999, NATO began its bomber campaign to stop the Slobodan Miloševi? regime’s repression against the majority of Kosovo’s population and prevent a new genocide in the Balkans. In a few hours, the Atlantic Alliance planes achieved complete control of the skies. At least, in appearance.
In the first three days of the war, neither Yugoslav aviation nor anti-aircraft defenses were able to shoot down a single NATO aircraft. Belgrade had very outdated weapons systems, while the Western air arsenal – and, in particular, the American one – was truly sophisticated, with the F-117 Nighthawk aircraft as one of the crown jewels.
These devices were very difficult to detect by enemy radars, although they were not completely “invisible” to the sensors. Its stealth nature was due to the particular design of its fuselage, which reduced its detection profile, and its materials, such as paint, which reduced the emissions that made other aircraft traceable.
Furthermore, to ensure their protection, they usually acted supported by other aircraft models specialized in electronic warfare (to interfere with enemy sensors) and in attacking anti-aircraft defenses.
Until the Kosovo War, the Nighthawk’s service record was impeccable. His debut in a real mission was in a bombing during the invasion of Panama in 1989. But his true test by fire came two years later, in the Gulf War. There, the F-117s attacked 1,600 Iraqi targets without having to regret the loss of a single aircraft.
In March 1999, operating from the Italian base at Aviano, the Nighthawks spearheaded the offensive against Yugoslavia. While stealth planes attacked the first enemy targets, NATO fighters took control of the skies. The Yugoslavs launched several of their best interceptors – the MiG-29 – but these were no match for the Alliance pilots.
The rapid dominance of the Yugoslav skies installed NATO in a feeling of absolute superiority, which was altered on the night of March 27. The commander in chief of the Allied forces, American General Wesley Clark, received news that an F-117 aircraft – nicknamed Something Wicked – had been shot down by Serbian anti-aircraft defenses. How had it been possible?
Despite being aware of their technological inferiority, the Yugoslavs showed some ingenuity in trying to achieve some success against NATO. Some of its officers had fought in Bosnia, and contributed their experience of Western air tactics.
They sought to shoot down and capture some Western and, in particular, American pilots, which propaganda would have sold as a great victory. Miloševi? knew that intervention against Yugoslavia was unpopular among the US population, and seeing one of his own captured could create a climate of pressure for Bill Clinton’s administration that would force him to seek a diplomatic solution.
Among the Yugoslav officers with the most experience in anti-aircraft weapons, Lieutenant Colonel Zoltán Dani stood out. He had painstakingly studied NATO tactics throughout the Balkan conflicts, and, since the bombing of Yugoslavia began, he had also analyzed their attack routines. So he thoroughly prepared his unit, the 3rd Battery of the 250th Missile Brigade.
This battery operated the S-125 Neva anti-aircraft missile system, a Yugoslav version of a Soviet design dating back to the 1960s, which had been used in conflicts such as the Yom Kippur War. In addition, it had a radar to direct the shots that was easily detectable by NATO, which almost guaranteed its destruction if the sensors remained on for a long time.
One of the few aces up the Yugoslav forces’ sleeve was the P-18 radar, which was more difficult to detect by Allied aircraft. Lieutenant Colonel Dani discovered that, if he operated that system at the lowest possible frequency, he could detect the F-117. The problem is that he revealed the position of the device when it was just 25 kilometers away, a very short distance.
The key was that if a P-18 “illuminated” the F-117, the Yugoslavs could quickly turn on their missiles’ target acquisition radar, fire, and turn it off again. The process could only be repeated once, and each of the two parts should not last more than 21 seconds, if they did not want to run the risk of being detected by the Nighthawk’s escorts.
An advantage for the Yugoslavs was that NATO was unaware that its enemies had these capabilities, but for the process to be effective, it was necessary to know the route of the device in advance.
In the first days of war, Dani could see that the theory was difficult to apply. Although they could detect the F-117s, they were usually accompanied by the EA-6 Prowler electronic warfare aircraft, which could jam enemy batteries and radars, leading to a lethal counterattack by other NATO aircraft.
To minimize the risks, in the weeks before the war, and with diplomatic tension skyrocketing, Dani subjected his men to demanding preparation. They trained to quickly dismantle the missile battery and change position, thus avoiding an air attack. The soldiers of the third battery managed to execute this maneuver in ninety minutes, one hour less than the average of other Yugoslav units. This drastic reduction was possible thanks to the fact that the battery launchers commanded by Dani only deployed two of the four missiles that could operate.
Luck allied itself with the Yugoslavs on March 27. Miloševi? had sent spies to the vicinity of Aviano and other Atlantic bases, from where they reported on the departure of NATO missions. That day, agents reported that the Nighthawks had taken off without support from EA-6 Prowlers or other escort aircraft.
What motivated the Americans to send one of their best planes alone? The main explanation was that adverse weather left the escorts grounded (the F-117’s most advanced systems allowed it to operate in bad weather).
But other factors also played a role for the Yugoslavs. For example, the sense of superiority had made NATO planners overconfident. In the early days of the war, they used the same routes for air raids. The Alliance also believed that, at night, enemy defenses were less effective.
With the information from their agents and the Allied apathy, the Yugoslavs were able to prepare their aerial ambush. However, practice proved to be more complicated than theory. The battery’s P-18 radar did not function at first, giving the F-117 time to attack its assigned target north of Belgrade.
Shortly before nine at night, Dani’s men repaired the P-18 and quickly received the signal from the enemy plane. Immediately, the lieutenant colonel ordered the missile firing radar to be turned on, but they did not lock the target on the first attempt. They also failed in the second, but, knowing that the F-117 Something Wicked was flying alone, the Yugoslav officer risked a third ignition that, this time, was successful.
Immediately, two missiles flew towards the plane. One failed and the other exploded close enough that the shrapnel made the device unmanageable and it crashed. There the F-117’s odyssey ended, but that of its pilot, Lieutenant Colonel Dale Zelko, began, who was able to eject at the last moment and descend by parachute about 45 kilometers from Belgrade.
Other NATO aircraft operating in the area immediately reported the downing of the Nighthawk. The loss of one of her most sophisticated aircraft made a deep impression on American commanders. On the ground, Zelko turned on his locator beacon and a rescue operation was launched. For their part, Yugoslav military, police and civilians also began searching for the American.
Zelko had to hide in a ditch while waiting for evacuation. He also limited the broadcast time of his beacon for fear of being tracked by the Serbs, so his companions only had a rough idea of ??his location. After six long hours, American rescue helicopters managed to reach the position of the downed pilot.
NATO tried to hide the news for as long as possible, but the next morning Yugoslav television broadcast images of the remains of the F-117 with soldiers and civilians around it, celebrating the downing. Some scenes that soon went around the world. Dani was promoted and his entire unit was decorated.
Speculation soon began about the fate of the remains of the sophisticated device. Many analysts considered that Belgrade could hand them over to China and Russia to decipher the secrets of this “stealth” technology. Although the Pentagon minimized the risk that its geopolitical rivals could obtain really sensitive information.
NATO took note that it could not rely on its technological advantage against a motivated enemy. On April 30, the Yugoslavs hit another F-117, although it was able to return to its base in Germany. For the rest of the war, the Alliance only had to mourn the loss of one other aircraft, this time an F-16, to enemy fire. This loss was also attributed to the battery commanded by Colonel Dani.
His tactics continued to prove effective. For example, thanks to the training that he had subjected his men to, they emerged unscathed from twenty-three anti-radar missile attacks.
Today, the remains of the downed F-117 can be seen in the Belgrade Aviation Museum, and remain a source of national pride. The two protagonists, Zelko and Dani, met in 2011. It was during a visit by the American to Belgrade, where they both starred in the documentary The Second Meeting, with which they wanted to send a message of peace and reconciliation.
