Although there is no clear evidence that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is preparing to invade Taiwan, the invasion of Ukraine has cast a new and renewed light on the island. The war has raised the parallel of a possible invasion of that island by China, a parallel that ends up being easy, comfortable in many ways, but not necessarily true. The differences are substantial. However, there is no doubt that the war has influenced the way in which the EU and the international community view the tensions in the Taiwan Strait. In this framework, the EU stresses the importance of the international community’s support for the island’s right to self-defence, as well as the importance of respect for international law. Brussels believes that the most effective way to deter an attack is to publicly underline the democratic link between the EU and the island and support for the rule of law. However, there remains a gap between ambitions and actual policies. The convergence comes mainly from the Union’s legislative powers, rather than from its executive actors, and avoids the critical issues of diplomatic and symbolic recognition.
The European Economic Community (EEC) and the PRC established official diplomatic relations in 1975. During the negotiations, Sir Christopher Soames, then Vice President of the EEC, had to grapple with the thorny question of Taiwan. Although Soames clarified that “matters such as state recognition were not the responsibility of the Community,” he told PRC officials that “according to positions taken at various times by member states, the Community does not maintain official relations or have agreements with Taiwan. Soames thus expressed the community policy of “one China”, which has remained unchanged since then and which continues to represent a pillar of relations between the EU and the PRC. Over the past 48 years, without recognition of Taipei’s sovereignty, EU policy can be summed up as safeguarding the status quo and stability in the Straits, establishing beneficial economic relations and advocating for a peaceful and rules-based resolution of the question.
In September 2022, in the plenary session of the European Parliament, the high representative Josep Borrell declared that the EU intends to “expand our cooperation with Taiwan, [and] modernize our dialogue. But all this within the framework of the ‘one China’ policy, which recognizes the PRC as the only Government of China. Let me be clear on this: the ‘one China’ policy does not prevent us from continuing and intensifying our cooperation with Taiwan, nor from expressing our concerns over the recent rise in tensions.”
The EU’s willingness to play a more proactive role in the Indo-Pacific was already evident in September 2021 with the publication of the Indo-Pacific Cooperation Strategy. In addition, Borrell has reaffirmed on multiple occasions that the Europeans and the Indo-Pacific states have an interest in mutual security. In this framework, Taiwan represents an important hot spot, “not only for the security and prosperity of the region, but also for ours.” Faced with the recalibration of the “one China” policy undertaken by Biden and the various pro-Taiwan laws proposed or passed by the US Congress, Borrell’s statement clearly defends the “one China” policy. Both the High Representative and the European Parliament have repeatedly reaffirmed the European will to strengthen ties with Taiwan. In fact, there is a growing awareness in Europe of the importance of Taiwan as an economic partner, but also a political one.
EU-Taiwan relations have undergone a maturing process of cooperation in recent years. The EU remains Taiwan’s largest foreign investor and fourth largest trading partner. In 2021, trade between the two rose to 63.9 billion euros, with an increase of 29% compared to 2020.
But the EU wants to expand cooperation with Taipei beyond the existing strong economic ties. Taiwan is a major supplier of advanced ICT components; in particular, semiconductors. Its critical role in today’s geopolitical environment makes it an attractive partner to ensure supply chains, technology development and data protection. But not all are economic ties. Brussels increasingly stresses that the institutions of the EU and Taipei share and promote the same democratic values, respect for international law and human rights, making political cooperation another important item on the common agenda.
In fact, the EU has already extended its relationship with Taiwan beyond economics and is focusing on expanding political cooperation underlining common democratic values, the rule of law and human rights. The European Parliament has openly expressed its political support for Taiwan’s democratic institutions in the face of Beijing’s behavior, which is seen as threatening and coercive. In the last year and a half, the European Parliament has adopted eight resolutions or recommendations expressing its support for Taiwan. Among them, a recommendation “to intensify political relations and to pursue a global and strengthened association” and the resolution on the situation in the Strait, in which the EU strongly condemns the military maneuvers carried out by the PRC in August 2022. In In the same resolution, as a further sign of the EU’s close attention to Taiwan’s critical role in the semiconductor sector, the European Parliament called on community bodies “to draw up a resilience strategy and quickly get to work on a agreement on a resilient supply chain with Taiwan in order to address respective vulnerabilities in a mutually beneficial manner and with the aim of preserving Taiwan’s security by strengthening its silicon shield.”
More importantly, in recent years we have witnessed several visits by EU and national policy makers to Taiwan, including the visit of the Vice-President of the European Parliament, Nicola Beer. In total, between 2016 and 2022, the EU has sent 18 delegations to Taiwan, and 90 member states. The most frequent delegations have been those of French political representatives, followed by officials from Germany and the United Kingdom. Likewise, in 2021, a large Taiwanese delegation visited Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Brussels. Following Nancy Pelosi’s visit last August and Chinese military exercises near Taiwanese territorial waters, more and more high-level European government officials have announced a visit to the island in the coming months. The complex nature of the EU’s foreign policy allows its members to develop very diverse approaches towards Taiwan. Unlike the US, Europe’s adherence to its one-China policy had historically meant that state officials refrained from visiting Taiwan. Reciprocal visits by parliamentarians, policy makers or government officials play an important role in setting the agenda, maintaining the focus and promoting further cooperation in important sectors such as economic, scientific, cultural, political and personal exchanges. Within this framework, the Czech Morava Library has recently signed a memorandum of understanding with the National Museum of Literature of Taiwan aimed at furthering cooperation in publications and bilateral exchanges between staff and experts.
In addition, the symbolic dimension is always a sensitive and prominent aspect when we talk about Taiwan, as Lithuania’s recent decision to improve its relationship with the island clearly illustrates. The Baltic country recently allowed Taiwan to open a representative office in Vilnius under the Taiwan name and opened its trade office in Taipei, potentially paving the way for similar actions by other European states. The move prompted Beijing to impose a trade embargo on Lithuanian products and sparked internal criticism. However, economic duress failed to get the Lithuanian government to change its policy. As the US gradually erodes its one-China policy, the EU is seeking closer ties with Taipei, and many eastern European states are taking a tougher approach to the PRC and a more sympathetic approach to Taiwan. As a consequence of the war in Ukraine, it is possible that the example of Lithuania will soon be followed by other European states, especially in Central and Eastern Europe.
The PRC has strongly warned and condemned any statement in favor of Taiwan and also official visits to the island by representatives of European states. When in October 2022 the new Italian Prime Minister, Giorgia Meloni, expressed her support for the island in the face of the PRC’s military activities in the Strait, the PRC embassy in Rome expressed its deep discontent with them; He called them “external interference” and urged Italy to recognize the “highly sensitive nature of the Taiwan question,” to follow a “practical” one-China principle, and not to encourage “separatist pro-independence forces from Taiwan.” Taiwan”. In December, the Chinese ambassador to Belgium, Cao Zhongming, lobbied the Belgian Parliament to amend a motion for a resolution on “the growing threat to Taiwan” and warned that “any action in support of ‘Taiwan independence’ will seriously harm peace.” and the stability of the Straits and that ‘playing with fire’ on the Taiwan issue will seriously damage relations between the relevant countries and China”.
In recent years, the image of the PRC in Europe has deteriorated considerably. Accusations of human rights abuses in Xinjiang, the brutal crackdown on protests in Hong Kong, the 5G scandals, and Beijing’s ambiguous stance on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have led many European states to view the PRC as a partner. which cannot be trusted. Already in 2019, the EU described the PRC as “an economic competitor and a systemic rival”. Last year, during the briefing on the 2022 EU-China summit, Borrell warned that “given China’s growing assertiveness, both at home and abroad, it is clear that we do not share the same political values” and struck out the EU-China dialogues on human rights and the war in Ukraine of “dialogue of the deaf”.
However, the PRC remains a crucial economic partner for Brussels. Despite the declarations of Merkel, Macron and Borrell about the end of European naivety regarding China, the EU has so far proven incapable of adopting a single, firm and coherent strategy. The important commercial relations of many member states with Beijing, the internal divergences on how to approach the country and the security challenges at the gates of Europe have given rise to different opinions within the community institutions. Many European members may see Beijing as a competitor, but they do not see it as a strategic rival and do not share the US view on the need for technological, economic or political containment. Bearing this in mind, European and Taiwanese players should not forget that prioritizing symbolism over substance and increasing EU-Taiwan engagement could further aggravate tensions with Beijing.
The EU is increasingly strengthening its economic, technological and political ties with Taipei. Not just out of economic self-interest, but also as part of a broader strategy of recalibrating Europe’s ambitions in East Asia. Lacking significant military power in the region, Brussels believes that public support for Taiwan’s burgeoning democracy and a rules-based international order is the only effective way to deter an escalation of tensions across the Straits.
Taiwan represents a good credibility test for the EU’s ambitions, globally and in the Indo-Pacific. The issue of diplomatic recognition remains problematic, but the current geopolitical environment calls for increasing strategic clarity about the West’s willingness to defend Taiwan. Such clarity about ends must be combined with ambiguity about means to preserve flexibility, reduce risks of escalation, and effectively communicate intentions. If Brussels wants to bring its political documents to life, it must find enough internal cohesion and enough political will to maintain and, if necessary, defend democratic values, freedoms and multilateralism against the rise of undemocratic, coercive and unilateral forces. .
Michael Malinconi is a research assistant at Carnegie China and previously at the Elcano Royal Institute.
