What does China really think of Ukraine?
This question has been on Ukrainian minds – and among its supporters in the West – since the start of the full-scale war.
Some may have hoped for answers during the World Peace Forum (WPF) in Beijing earlier this month. This annual event was inaugurated in 2012 at the prestigious Tsinghua University by the then Vice President Xi Jinping, to demonstrate that China can contribute to solving the problems of war and peace on a global scale. However, Western observers at this year’s conference were surprised that Ukraine had been relegated and disappointed that the only guests who spoke about Ukraine at the forum were Russians (apparently no Ukrainians had been invited).
Now, to all those who have been analyzing the evolution of the Chinese position, this should not have surprised them. Apart from attending the Beijing Peace Forum, we have spent the last 18 months doing a lot of interviews with Chinese intellectuals and analysts from major universities, think tanks and organizations affiliated with political parties, trying to get to the bottom of the issues, and understand China’s position on the war in Ukraine. What we found is that, while there is a lively debate about the war – more so than you might expect – the Chinese think very differently to the West.
The first lesson is that, for the Chinese, the war in Ukraine is not that important. They do not see it as a catastrophic war that is reshaping the world order, but as a power struggle between China and the United States. More importantly, many believe that the United States has used the war to try to corner China. They also explain how Japan and Korea were allegedly pressured to sanction Russia, and the fact that they were invited to participate in the NATO summit in Madrid. Following the same logic, according to many Chinese analysts, the Europeans were persuaded to include China in NATO’s strategic plan and adopt stricter positions regarding their country’s technology. On the other hand, the fact that Washington has failed to unite the rest of the world in its cause comforts most Chinese experts.
As one Chinese intellectual pointed out, unlike the Cold War, the West has had little success in mobilizing developing countries on its side. It states that a total of 157 countries do not support either the West or China in the Ukraine issue. Capitalizing on the weakness of the United States’ reputation and winning over these non-aligned countries has thus become a key objective of Chinese foreign policy.
This battle for the Global South goes far beyond the question of the war against Ukraine. As an alternative to US “feudalism”, Beijing has designed its own proposals in the form of a global development initiative, a global security initiative and a global civilization initiative, which were enthusiastically presented to the forum participants, many of whom came from countries that China is actively celebrating.
The second lesson is that China believes it has more to gain than to lose by standing by Russia. The presence of Russian experts at the Forum highlighted Beijing’s pro-Moscow tendency. But while Russian guests at the forum were honored with speaking turns, a clear sense has emerged since February 2022 that Moscow is, at best, a junior partner to Beijing. When asked to comment on Russia’s military performance, almost every expert we spoke to reacted with derision. Quite a few seemed to think that Russia no longer deserved great power status.
This tactical tendency to be highly critical of the way Russia is waging the war is linked to a strategic desire not to see Putin humiliated or ousted from power. Although there have been highly critical voices (one academic claimed that China has been the victim of a Russian-driven hybrid war, which included attempts to manipulate the Chinese media, and to frame the leaders into appearing to support the war more than they wanted to), the consensus is that China and Russia are united by a shared vision of a post-Western world order.
Third, many Chinese analysts seem to believe that the conflict in Ukraine has made war in Taiwan neither more nor less likely. The official line is that “Ukraine is not Taiwan”, but nevertheless, many academics are watching the conflict closely to learn the lesson. Many were surprised by the unity and activism of the West with its sanctions and military aid to Kyiv. However, they also noted that many of the arguments raised about not wanting to fight a nuclear power directly would apply to both China over Taiwan and Russia. Consequently, they think the West will adopt a counterbalance strategy and arm Taiwan, and support local powers such as Japan, rather than fighting directly.
The fourth lesson is derived from the third. It is that economic interdependence will not protect China in the event of a confrontation with the West. On the contrary, Beijing must be prepared for sanctions. As expected, there was a lot of talk at the Forum about economic security, supply chains and sanctions. At one point, Dilma Rousseff, the former Brazilian president who now heads the New Development Bank, criticized Western attempts at “disengagement” and “de-risking” and called for de-dollarization as a way to protect countries from Western sanctions and harassment.
In this sense, the vision of the world order that China presented at the WPF is largely reflected in its priorities regarding Ukraine. As in the forum, the war in Ukraine has given Beijing an opportunity to exploit Western weaknesses to make China feel more secure internationally, expanding its ties with the Global South, nurturing an image as a peacemaker and accelerating its efforts to become more economically self-sufficient. And by giving its tacit approval to the war in Ukraine while trying to present itself as neutral, China is trying to strike a balance between maintaining its pacifist facade and pursuing avowed revisionism.
A Chinese academic we spoke to in Beijing explained that something positive can come out of a negative situation. “As long as China does not need to arm Russia – he said – people will continue to expect Beijing to play a constructive role.” A reflection that Western diplomats present at the forum must take into account.
