China is already a great power in space. With independent launch capabilities, missions to the Moon and Mars, an independent navigation system, and advanced space military capabilities, the country is now articulating missions to explore the asteroid belt and deep space that are intended to activate new concepts, such as space mining.
The 2021 white paper on space activities, released by the State Council of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), identified space as a critical infrastructure that contributes to the national resilience and rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. When President Xi Jinping became the general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the president of the PRC in 2013, he unveiled a new conceptual thinking called “the China dream.” China’s dream is, according to President Xi, to guarantee the country its rightful place in the world as a great power in the international system. In 2017, China’s dream was embodied in the PRC Constitution. And spatial development is part of it today; President Xi equates the spirit of aerospace with the spirit of Mao Zedong’s long march in the 1930s from the countryside to the cities, culminating in the creation of the PRC in 1949. For China, space is an integral constituent of Comprehensive National Power (PNI), theorized and instituted as part of the CCP’s strategic narrative by Deng Xiaoping in 1986, itself as part of a study commissioned and later taken up by the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CCA) and the Chinese Academy of Sciences. of Military Sciences (ACM). In that study, the ACC and ACM concluded that economic power is key, as it unlocks everything else, including military power, influence power, scientific and technological power, and power projection.
In its 2019 defense white paper, China said space is now an integral part of international strategic competition and contributes to building the country’s economic strength.
China has articulated an ambitious, clear and concise strategy to establish space superiority by developing civil, military and commercial space capabilities. The plan is to develop a sustainable presence in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO) and cislunar space (Earth-Moon system), as well as capabilities in deep space (Mars and asteroids). The development of the Tiangong 1 and 2 space laboratories, and now the Tiangong space station in LEO, the construction of solar power satellites in LEO by 2028, the commercial gigawatt-level power generation planned for 2050, and the expansion of supporting military space capabilities are so many advances that occur on an ongoing basis.
We can divide China’s space objectives into civil, military, and commercial, with a clear strategic focus on integrating those capabilities for the purposes of the NIP. In this, the advice of the thinker Sunzi is followed, according to which a country needs an ambitious comprehensive strategy to succeed as a kingdom (read nation-state today).
China is focused on developing its space presence capability in LEO. This includes the construction in 2030 of a national constellation of satellites called Guowang made up of some 12,992 satellites that support the Internet and considered as a “new infrastructure”; the launch and operation of some 250 military satellites that will enhance China’s intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities; and the independent BeiDou system of 35 satellites in support of navigation, missile tracking, launches and communications, as well as navigation.
The civilian focus of China’s space program includes, in addition to satellite internet, the development of the lunar exploration program, its mission to Mars, the mission to asteroids and the construction of solar-powered satellites. As for its lunar program, China has become the first country to land a ship on the far side of the Moon; it did it in January 2019 with a robotic mission called Chang’e 4. No other country has done it. In 2020, China returned samples from the near side of the Moon with its Chang’e 5 mission. In 2024, China will launch Chang’e 6, which will return samples from the lunar South Pole, and in 2028, it will start prospecting and the construction of a research base to be completed in 2036 in collaboration with Russia. The idea is to establish a permanent presence on the Moon and use its resources, such as water ice, helium 3 and rare minerals, to develop capabilities for space travel, including building rockets and nuclear propulsion technology.
In 2021, China became the first Asian country to orbit Mars, land on the planet, and communicate from the surface (India was the first Asian country to orbit Mars in 2014). China now aims to return with samples from the surface of Mars in 2030, build an Earth-Mars space system in 2045 and a base in 2049.
Another critical mission for China in relation to civilian space capability is the Tianwen 2 mission for asteroid exploration. That mission, which will launch in 2025, targets Kamo’oalewa, a small near-Earth asteroid from which samples will be collected. The mission is important because it will test four robotic arms for landing and have drills attached to them to extract samples. The Russian Academy of Space Sciences is now participating in the initiative. The mission is also known as the Zheng He Mission, after the famous Chinese explorer and admiral of the 15th century during the Ming Dynasty. In 2022, China made the decision, backed by its space white paper, to convert the Long March 9 rocket, capable of delivering 140 metric tons to LEO, into a reusable three-stage rocket by 2030.
China has an advanced space military capability that regards space as an integral part of national security and a force multiplier. Under Xi’s leadership, China created the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (SPFA) in December 2015. The strategic idea behind the FAEELP is the integration of space, cybernetic and psychological operations under an optimized unit to fight the battles of the future, in space and in the computer and digital environment. In 2007, China tested its anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) and has continued to improve that capability through simulation and training with the LAFAEELP. Those ASATs include the HQ-19 surface-to-air missile variant (used in ASAT tests in 2007 and 2010), the DN-2 (2013), and the DN-3 (2015, 2016, and 2017). In addition to kinetic ASAT weapons, the PLAFA has developed several non-kinetic ASATs, such as jamming, glare and spoofing, rendezvous and proximity operations, as well as the ability to capture an orbiting satellite with a robotic arm. That capability was demonstrated with his Shijian 17, or SJ-17. The SJ-17 can, hypothetically, take over US satellites and disable communication systems, which would deal a major blow to US military space capabilities that rely on Global Positioning System (GPS) for aircraft carriers, fifth generation fighters, tanks, missiles, command, control and nuclear communications. China has prioritized network-centric warfare and has committed to developing its ASAT capabilities in LEO and GEO; Thus, it has become the first country to demonstrate its ability to trap a satellite in GEO and send it into a graveyard orbit. The SC-19, based on the DF-21C ballistic missiles, is China’s main ASAT weapon, with a range of between 2,150 km and 2,500 km. In addition, the country possesses by 2023 the DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile, both a land-based and anti-ship missile, the DF-21A and DF-21E (nuclear-powered), and has 350 medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. . Some 75 of those missiles will be equipped with hypersonic weapons, especially the DF-17. China has increased its nuclear warheads, from 290 (2019) to 410 (2023).
In August 2021, China tested a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile that crossed LEO and then glide to its target. This is a critical advance as it flies at five times the speed of sound, does not follow the parabolic trajectory of a ballistic missile, can maneuver and is therefore difficult to track with current radar systems.
China has been investing since 2014 in commercial space capabilities. Under the guidance of the State Council, it published a specific guideline for its commercial space sector. That document entitled Orientative Opinions of the Council of State on the promotion of social investment in investment and financing mechanisms in key areas of innovation. Document 60 encourages the commercial space industry to develop space systems, from launch to small satellites. China’s funding for commercial space has increased to $3 billion by 2022. Space companies like Onespace have reached orbit. Landspace attempted launches in 2018 and 2022, but failed to reach orbit. Linkspace, a company that develops reusable rockets, launched a prototype that climbed about 1,000 feet and came back to land intact. In December 2021, Galactic Energy, a private space company built and launched its four-stage Ceres 1 rocket that put five satellites into orbit. The first Ceres 1 rocket, also known as Gushenxing 1, was successfully tested in November 2020, making the Chinese space company the second after iSpace to deliver a rocket to LEO. Jiangsu Deep Blue Aerospace Technology is building a reusable rocket called Nebula 1, and is also developing additive manufacturing by 3D printing.
China has clearly stated that almost all commercial space development falls under its 2021 National Defense law, which obliges companies to work for national defense when called upon; if they refuse, they can be tried in a criminal court. The established strategy is modeled after President Xi Jinping’s civil-military integration strategy.
Xi Jinping has instituted a civil-military integration strategy at the highest level of the State Council. According to it, the military forces and civilian institutions owe allegiance and fidelity to the CCP. “Putting the military-civilian integration strategy into practice is a prerequisite for building integrated national strategies and strategic capabilities and realizing the Party’s goal of building a strong army in the new era,” Xi said. The Chinese civil, military and commercial space program falls within this civil-military integration strategy. Space is perceived as an important complement to the legitimacy of the CCP and the stability of the regime. China’s scientific and technological capabilities are part of the PNI, whose assessment sees space as playing a vital role in China’s leadership in space and international relations by 2049, eclipsing the US as the pre-eminent power. In an article published in Qiushi, the CCP’s flagship magazine, Xi called for total loyalty to the CCP from the military. In 2017, a civil-military integration unit called the Central Commission for Integrated Civilian and Military Development was created at the CPC Politburo level to ensure that the strategy is led and conceptualized at the highest level. Such integration is vital for defense, infrastructure construction, personnel training, new energy, the aerospace industry, and the Internet.
Within such a strategy, and with the objective of turning the country into a space power, there are certain institutions that work to achieve those objectives. China’s space program is run by the State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (AECTIDN), which operates under the direction of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. Under the AECTIDN is the National Space Administration of China (ANEC), which applies the space policy conceived and directed by the State Council. China has recently reorganized its science and technology institutions, including the space field, with a new Central Science and Technology Commission focused on enforcing policies and ensuring goals are achieved. Nearly 200 space institutions financed by the State depend on ANEC; among them, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the China Academy of Space Technology, the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation.
For China, science and technology allow it to continue consolidating its image as an adaptable, intelligent and future-oriented country. Since 1986, China has focused on the concept of the NIP and on becoming a modern great power that will eclipse the US by the end of the century. Since 2000, it has upped its ante and, in the last 20 years, has achieved several important space goals; These include missions to the Moon and Mars, a permanent presence in LEO, its own independent launch and navigation systems, as well as constellations of satellites in LEO and GEO. According to his ambitious strategic thinking, space is an area in its own right and requires priority attention, capacity building, policy and funding. China aspires to become a great space power that increases the resilience of society, the power and influence of the State, its international position and its ability to project power. Such a development is not only supported by solid economic power, but also by diplomatic positions such as the “spatial information corridor” of the Belt and Road Initiative, promoted by some 151 member countries in 2023 (among them, Italy ). China has also made a political decision to collaborate with Russia in creating a major anti-international order strategic alignment spearheaded by the US. Since space is perceived as a critical domain and infrastructure in its own right, China has prioritized to certain strategic technologies, among which space figures alongside artificial intelligence, robotics and quantum computing. Such development of strategic technologies is part of the national innovation policy and the “Made in China” policy. The development of space power and technology has led to China enabling Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by offering implicit support by signing a joint declaration in February 2022, when Putin visited Beijing, just before the start of the invasion. . In that statement, China and Russia agreed that NATO expansion would result in Russia claiming a legitimate claim to its “sphere of influence.”
The conquest of space, space development from the perspective of economic benefits and usage prospects, is what makes China’s space program unique. Through it, establishing a permanent presence in LEO, manufacturing solar-powered satellites for long-term strategic advantages, developing its Earth-Moon zone and deep space capabilities to go to Mars and the asteroids contribute to the creation of a space ecosystem. It incorporates the development of China’s lunar presence capabilities, which is the only country with a relay satellite called Queqiao (Magpie Bridge) that orbits around the L2 Lagrange point of cislunar space and enables communication with missions in the far side of the Moon. In addition, China plans a second link satellite in 2024.
Given the ambitious strategy established, the long-term space objectives and the development of capabilities, the next ten years (2023-2033) will be crucial for the development of space capabilities in the world and will decide which system creates the space ecosystem and who will be there. in command: a democratic system or a one-party system. All of this will have an impact on how space rules, governance and national space laws will be developed and applied. We may also need new space treaties that address 21st century space activities and complement the space treaties developed in the cold war. The time has come to adapt, develop additional space regulation and encourage responsible behavior in space for the benefit of countries.
Namrata Goswami is an independent researcher specializing in space politics, great power politics and ethnic conflict.
