The war in Ukraine has time and again frustrated expectations. And now she’s doing it again. The counteroffensive that began in June was based on the hope that Ukrainian soldiers, equipped with modern Western weapons and trained in Germany, would reconquer a sufficient portion of territory to allow their leaders to engage in negotiations from a position of strength.
That plan is not working. Despite heroic efforts and the breach of Russian defenses near Robotine, Ukraine has liberated less than 0.25% of the territory Russia occupied in June. The 1,000 kilometer front line has barely moved. Perhaps the Ukrainian army will achieve a breakthrough in the
coming weeks and cause the collapse of the fragile Russian forces. However, in view of what has happened in the last three months, it would be a mistake to rely on it.
The request for a ceasefire or the start of peace talks is meaningless. Vladimir Putin shows no signs of wanting to negotiate and, even if he did, he could not be trusted to maintain a hypothetical agreement. Putin hopes that the West will tire and that Donald Trump will be re-elected. He needs the war to prop up his internal dictatorship; Any ceasefire would be nothing more than a pause for rearmament and preparation for a new attack. If they stop fighting, Ukrainians risk losing their country.
Both Ukraine and its Western supporters are beginning to realize that this will be a devastating war of attrition. President Volodymyr Zelensky visited Washington for talks. “I have to be prepared for a long war,” he told The Economist. Unfortunately, Ukraine is not yet ready, nor are its Western partners. Both the country and the allies remain obsessed with the counteroffensive. They need to rethink the military strategy followed until now and the way of managing the economy. Rather than trying to “win” and then rebuild, the goal should be to ensure that Ukraine is resilient enough to sustain a long war and prosper despite it.
The first readjustment is military. Ukrainian soldiers are exhausted; many of the best have died. Despite the recruitment, it lacks the necessary troops to maintain a permanent large-scale counteroffensive. You need to manage resources and change the rules of the game. New tactics and technologies can take the fight to Russian territory. Tech-savvy Ukrainian entrepreneurs are ramping up drone production: those drones recently destroyed Russian warships; Its missiles appear to have damaged a large air defense system in Crimea. Many more attacks are likely to degrade Russia’s military infrastructure and deny its navy security in the Black Sea. A definitive blow cannot be expected. Russia has also increased its production of drones. Regardless, Ukraine is capable of counterattacking when Russia bombs it and perhaps even deterring some attacks.
Along with that offensive capability, Ukraine needs to increase its resilience. In addition to heavy weaponry, you need help with maintenance to sustain a multi-year fight: routine repairs, reliable artillery supplies, and training. Above all, a long war requires better air defense. Ukraine cannot prosper if Russia bombs infrastructure and civilians with impunity, as it has done over the past 18 months. Kyiv is surprisingly vital because it has effective defenses against non-stop air attacks. The same configuration is needed in the other cities; For this reason, F-16 squadrons and more anti-missile defense systems are essential.
An economic adjustment is also necessary. That means fewer pretentious plans for postwar reconstruction and more attention now to boosting production and capital spending. The economy has shrunk by a third and almost half of the Ukrainian budget is paid for with Western money. The currency, the hryvnia, has strengthened despite the decline in private investment. With nearly a million people in the military and several million who have fled the country, workers are in short supply.
The economy has to go from depending on aid to attracting investment, even though the conflict continues to wreak havoc. From increasing weapons manufacturing to increasing processing of what it grows on farms, Ukraine’s potential is considerable. The challenge is to get local and foreign companies to invest more and attract a greater number of Ukrainians to the quieter areas of the country, the western ones.
Improving security can help. The stronger Ukraine’s air defenses, the lower the risk of a new factory being blown up. The further the Russian navy is pushed back, the safer exports through Ukrainian Black Sea ports will be. Although economic reforms also matter. More must be done to curb the country’s traditional corruption and prioritize the cleanliness and impartiality of the judiciary. And more measures are needed to make doing business easier, from recognizing the qualifications gained by refugees abroad to offering war insurance companies.
All of this requires political will on the part of Ukraine, but also on the part of its friends in the West. In the long term, the best guarantee for the country’s security is its membership in NATO. In the absence of that, the partners have promised a network of bilateral security guarantees. Equally important is what the European Union can offer: not just cash, but the prospect of accession. It is not easy to feed a flourishing economy while bombarding it with explosives; Not even Israel ever had to face such a powerful aggressor. Now, Ukraine, unlike Israel, could one day join the richest economic bloc in the world. A roadmap with clear milestones for EU membership within a decade, for example, would offer hope to Ukrainians and accelerate economic reforms, just as that same promise galvanized much of Eastern Europe into 1990s.
For that to happen, Europe needs a change of mentality. It has committed as much weapons as the United States and much more economic aid. However, you have to go one step further. If he wins the US elections in 2024, Trump could cut US military aid. Still, even if he loses, Europe will ultimately have to shoulder a greater burden. That means bolstering its defense industry and reforming the European Union’s decision-making process so that it is able to work with more members.
The stakes cannot be higher. Defeat means a failed state on the flank of the European Union and Putin’s killing machine closer to its borders. Success means a new member of the European Union with 30 million well-educated people, the largest army in Europe and a large agricultural and industrial base. Too many conversations about Ukraine are based on the “end of the war.” That has to change. Let us pray for a quick victory, but let us plan for a long fight, and for a Ukraine that can survive and prosper despite everything.
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Translation: Juan Gabriel López Guix
